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Abstract / 11 
ABSTRACT 
A problem that all computer-based natural language understanding 
(NLU) systems encounter is that of linguistic reference, and in 
particular anaphora (abbreviated reference). For example, in a 
text as simple as: 
Nadia showed sue her new car. 
orange. 
The seats were Day-Glo 
knowing that "her" probably means Nadia and not Sue and that 
"the seats" means the seats of Nadia's new car is not a simple 
task. 
This thesis is an extensive review of the reference and 
anaphor problem, and the approaches to it that NLU systems have 
taken, from early systems such as STUDENT through to current 
discourse-oriented ones such as PAL. 
The problem is first examined in detail, and examples are 
given of many different types of anaphor, some of which have 
been ignored by previous authors. The approaches taken in 
traditional systems are then described and abstracted and it is 
shown why they were inadequate, and why discourse theme and 
anaphor ic focus need to be taken into account. The strengths 
and weaknesses of current anaphora theories and approaches are 
evaluated . The thesis closes with a list of some remaining 
research problems. 
Abstract / iii 
The thesis has been written so as to be as comprehensible 
as possible to both AI workers who know no linguistics, and 
linguists who have not studied artificial intelligence. 
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Preface / viii 
eiI was a victim of a series of 
accidents.,, 
Kurt Vonnegut Jrl 
PREFACE 
This thesis was started in the boreal summer of 1976, making its 
first appearance as Hirst (1976b), and was completed almost 
three years later, after a number of lapses and relapses. Like 
a chinchilla one is trying to photograph, the field I was trying 
to describe would not sit still. Therefore, while I have tried 
to incorporate all the changes that occurred in those years, 
there may be some blurring at the edges. 
I have tried to make this thesis comprehensible both to the 
computer scientist who has no grounding in linguistics, and to 
the linguist who knows nothing of computers. However, it has 
been necessary to presume some information, since digressions to 
explain transformational grammar or Fillmore's case theory, for 
example, were clearly impractical. (Readers not familiar with 
these may wish to read an introductory text on transformational 
grammars such as Jacobsen (1977), Akmajian and Heny (1975) or 
Grinder and Elgin (1973), and Fillmore's (1968) introduction to 
cases. The reader not familiar with artificial intelligence 
--~~-~-~-------------------~-~-
1 From: The sirens Qf Titan. London: Coronet, 1967, page 161. 
will find Winston 
introductions.) 
Preface / ix 
(1977), Boden (1977) or Bundy (1979) useful 
jjit is to be noted, that when any part 
of this paper appears dull, there is a 
design in it.,~-
- Richard Stee1e2 
This is a long thesis, but few people will need to read it all. 
The chapter outlines below will help you find the sections of 
greatest interest to you. 
Chapter 1 introduces and motivates work on natural language 
understanding and in particular anaphora. If you are already 
motivated, skip to chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 defines anaphora formally, and motivates the idea 
of "consciousness" as a repository for antecedents. Section 2.3 
is an exposition of the various types of anaphora. I suggest 
that readers familiar with anaphora nevertheless at least skim 
-~-----------~-~---------------
2 In: The tatl~r, number 38, Thursday 7 July 1709. Reprinted 
in: The tatl~~, with not~ ~~d illustratiol!.§. Edinburgh: Robert 
Martin, 1845, volume 1, page 236. 
Preface / x 
this section, as I have included a number of unusual examples 
and counterexamples which are often ignored but which should be 
considered by anyone claiming to have a complete 
anaphor-handling system or theory . 
Chapter 3 reviews traditional approaches to anaphora 
resolution , and shows why they are inadequate. Section 3.1 
discusses the work of Bobrow , Winograd, Woods and his 
associates , Schank and his students, Taylor, Hobbs and Wilks. 
Then in section 3 . 2 I abstract and evaluate the approaches these 
people took . 
In chapter 4, I show the importance of discourse theme and 
anaphoric focus in reference resolution . 
In chapter 5 I review five current discourse-oriented 
approaches to anaphora those of Kantor, Grosz, Sidner, 
Webber , and the discourse cohesion approach of Lockman and 
others. Approaches to non-NP anaphora are -also outlined here. 
Chapter 6 describes 
information in resolution, and 
the role 
integrates 
valence into a more general framework. 
of anaphor-specific 
theories of causal 
Chapter 7 discusses some issues raised in earlier chapters, 
such as psycholinguistic testing, and also the problems of 
anaphora in language generation. 
review of outstanding problems . 
Preface / xi 
The thesis concludes with a 
copious bibliographic references will keep you busy in the 
library for hours , and an index of names will help you find out 
where in this thesis your favorite work is discussed. A subject 
index is also provided . 
Notation 
In the sample texts in this thesis, I use underlining to 
indicate the anaphor(s) of interest, upper case to indicate 
words that are stressed when the sentence is spoken , and the 
symbol "~" to explicitly mark the place where an ellipsis 
occurred . Superscript numbers in parentheses are sometimes used 
to explicitly label different occurrences of the same word in a 
text . Variant readings of a text are enclosed in braces, with 
the variations separated by a vertical bar. A sentence which is 
grammatical but unacceptable in the given context is denoted by 
"#" . As usual, "*" and 11 ? 11 denote text which is ill-formed and 
of questionable well-formedness, respectively. "NP" and "VP" 
stand for "noun phrase" and "verb phrase". 
By "I" , I mean myself , Graeme Hirst, the writer of this 
document , and by "we", I mean you, the reader, and me together. 
Preface / xii 
so, for example, when I say "I think ••• ", I am expressing a 
personal opinion; whereas when I say 11 we see ••• ", I am pointing 
out something about which the reader and I undoubtedly agree --
and if not, the fault is probably in the reader. 
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1. Introduction ________ .,..._ 
1. 1 / 1 
This thesis addresses a problem central to the understanding of 
natural language by computer.2 There are two main groups of 
reasons for wanting a computer to understand natural language: 
practical and theoretical. 
In the set of practical reasons is useful human-machine 
communication . At present, computer programs, database queries 
and the like must be expressed in some artificial computer 
language , human use of which requires training and practice. If 
people were able to specify their instructions to computers in 
their own natural language, then they would be able to avail 
themselves of computer services without the need to learn 
special languages. 
~------~----------~-------~~---
. 
1 From: Alic~~s Agy~~tur~s in Wonderland. chapter 12. 
2 
"Natural language understanding" may be abbreviated "NLU". 
1.1 / 2 
Presently, there are some prototypical systems which answer 
questions or write programs in response to commands expressed in 
a subset of English. Of these, few other than LSNLIS (Woods, 
Kaplan and Nash-Webber 1972) and ROBOT (Harris 1977, 1978) have 
been tested in the real world of potential users. Each system 
uses a slightly different subset of English, providing varying 
coverage and habitability;3 however, none is without important 
gaps . For more discussion of this point, and a survey of some 
systems , see Petrick (1976). 
Also of practical use would be a machine translation system 
which could translate documents from one natural language to 
another . Some such systems are already in everyday use 
(Hutchins 1978), but their performance still leaves much to be 
desired . 
The theoretical reasons for studying NLU are to create, 
test and study models of language. Presently, major models of 
language such as transformational grammars (Chomsky 1957, 196 5) 
nd generative semantics (Lakoff 1968, 1971; Mccawley 1968; 
reviewed by Gelbart 1976) have in practice been synthetic rather 
than analytic; that is, they account for sentence structure by 
generating the sentence from a deeE reQ£esentation.~ However, 
-------~--------------------~-~ 
3 The habita~ility (Watt 1968) of a subset of English is the 
ease with which a user can conform to its restrictions. 
tfootnotes continue] 
1.1 / 3 
this is only one half of the communication process; the other is 
perceiving and understanding the sentence. So far there has 
been no equally significant model for this, the analytic 
component of language. Research into computer programs which 
understand can help fill this gap. Not only does such research 
lead in the direction of a model, but implementation as a 
computer program provides a means for testing and evaluating 
analytic theories and models; in a sense, the implementation is 
the model (cf Winston 1977:258; Weizenbaum 1976:140-153).5 
In this thesis, we shall be interested in the second reason 
as much as the first. Therefore, we will, as much as possible, 
be investigating the whole of a natural language, specifically 
English, rather than restricting ourselves to a habitable subset 
for man-machine communication. Further, we shall be considering 
_.., ... .._ _________ _________ .., _______ _ 
• Theoretically, this statement is not correct. Chomsky 
(1957:48) emphasizes the neutrality in principle of 
transformational grammars with respect to synthesis or analysis 
of sentences. In practice, however, transformational grammars 
have not proved useful in automatic NLU; see section 3.2.5 and 
Woods (1970:596-597). 
5 I am aware that whether an implementation can constitute a 
theory is a controversial point, and I do not wish to pursue it 
here, as it has been discussed at much length in the oral 
presentations at (but, regrettably, not in the written 
proceedings of) the second conference on Theoretical Issues in 
Natural Language Processing, at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, July 1978. (For a summary of the views 
expressed at the conference on this matter, see Hirst (1978a).) 
It is necessary here only to assert the weaker view that an 
implementation, if not itself a theory, can aid understanding of 
a theory . Friedman, Moran and warren's (1978) computer programs 
for Montague grammars exemplify this. 
1. 2 / 4 
connected discourse rather than isolated sentences. The 
motivation for this is that many of the interesting problems of 
language, such as cohesion and reference, do not occur in their 
full glorious complexity in a single sentence. (This is not to 
imply, however, that there are not still problems aplenty in 
single sentences.) 
66The term ~na.E!!.Qr~ does not appear in 
many texts and monographs on 
linguistics, or it appears only in 
passing -- an omission not at all 
surprising, given the fact that the 
concept of anaphora is of central 
importance to discourse structure.~, 
William o Hendricks (1976:65) 
The particular problem we shall be considering is that of 
anaphora and reference. Reference is a central concept in 
language, and is one that philosophers have studied and pondered 
for many years (for example, Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), 
Linsky ( 1963) and Donnellan (1966)). In recent years, 
linguists , psychologists and artificial intelligence ( AI) 
workers have seen its relevance to their fields, and have 
researched many aspects of it. 
1.2 / 5 
The problem essentially is that of how words are able to 
denote concepts, and in particular how a certain sequence of 
words can denote a unique concept. For example, if I meet you 
and say, apropos of nothing: 
(1-1) The chinchilla ate my portrait of Richard Nixon last 
night. It devoured it so fast, I didn't even have a 
chance to save the frame. 
you are somehow able to determine that by "Richard Nixon" I mean 
Richard Milhous Nixon, ex-President of the United States of 
America, and not Richard Chomsky Nixon, sanitation engineer of 
Momence, Illinois. You further understand which chinchilla, of 
all in the world, I mean by "the chinchilla",6 that "it devoured 
it" refers to the aforementioned chinchilla's aforementioned act 
of eating the aforementioned portrait, and that "the frame" 
the frame of the aforementioned portrait. 
. 
1S 
Any language comprehender needs to make decisions all the 
time similar to those you made in reading the last paragraph. 
It needs to identify concepts when they are initially referenced 
and to identify subsequent references to them. Loosely speaking 
-- we shall have a more formal definition in the next chapter --
~PaE~~ is the phenomenon of subsequent reference.7 
-------------------------~-----
6 Note that it is not enough that "the chinchilla" identify the 
particular chinchilla uniquely to each of us. We must also both 
know that it identifies the same chinchilla to both of us. It 
is sometimes necessary that such mutual knowledge regress to 
infinity to ensure the felicity of such definite references; see 
Clark and Marshall (1978) for a demonstration of this, and a 
solution to the problems it raises. 
tfootnotes continue] 
1.2 I 6 
Because no coherent discourse is without both initial and 
subsequent reference, it is essential that any (computer) NLU 
system not limited to single sentence input be able to handle 
reference. (It is also advisable even in systems so limited, 
since intrasentential reference is very common.) 
motivation for this thesis. 
-------~----~------------------
That is the 
7 Do not confound this sense of the word "anaphora" with its 
use in rhetoric to mean the deliberate repetition of a word or 
phrase at the start of several successive verses or paragraphs, 
nor with its liturgiological meanings. 
iiI shall not attempt to give a serious 
definition of sMJ2hOJ;!£ ~lg.ment, a task 
which presupposes an understanding of 
this aspect of language which is, in my 
opinion, not now available.,! 
Paul M Postal (1969: 205) 
eiThe term "anaphora", used several 
times above, will not be determined with 
any greater precision in this paper than 
is usual; and far from reducing the 
number of open questions about anaphora, 
I will actually add to that number.,! 
William C Watt (1973) 
2. 1 / 7 
Aga.E112£~1 is the device of making in discoursez an abbreviated 
--~ ...... --....-
reference to some entity (or entities) in the expectation that 
the perceiver of the discourse will be able to disabbreviate the 
--~----------~--------~--------
1 The terminology and many of the basic concepts described in 
this section are derived from Halliday and Hasan (1976). 
2 By a discourse we mean a section of text, either written or 
spoken , which is coherent in the sense that it forms a unified 
whole (Halliday and Hasan 1976). We do not restrict its length, 
nor do we limit the number of speakers in the conversation in 
the case of spoken discourse. For convenience, we will 
sometimes refer to the speaker and listener of a discourse, 
using these terms to subsume respectively the writer and reader 
of written text. 
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reference and thereny determine the identity of the entity. The 
reference is called an ~EbQr,3 and the entity to which it 
refers is its referent or antg£edgnt.• A reference and its 
The process of 
determining the referent of an anaphor is called rg§Ql~tioll. By 
abbrevi~t~d, I mean containing fewer bits of disambiguating 
information (in Shannon's sense (Shannon and Weaver 1949}) 
rather than lexically or phonetically shorter (Hirst 1977a) • s 
Note that one possible realization of an anaphor is as a 
complete void -- an ellipsis; see section 2.3.13. 
Two simple examples of anaphors are shown in (2-1) and 
(2- 2) ; 
(2-1) Daryel carried a pewter centipede and a box to put it 
in. 
(2-2) Because Nadia was passing the sex shop, sh~ was asked 
to buy half a kilo of pornography. 
Here, "it" and "s.he" are anaphors with referents "a pewter 
centipede" and "Nadia", respectively. In these particular 
cases, the referents occurred explicitly in the text and did so 
~-------------------------~----
3 This term is due to Edes (1968). 
• Webbec ( 1978a) distinguishes between a referent and an 
antecedent, calling "antecedent" the invoking description of 
which the referent is an instance -- see section 5.4 . We will 
not need to make this distinction, and will follow general 
usage, using the two terms interchangeably. 
5 Although most anaphors are lexically shorter than their 
antecedents, we shall later see some that are not. 
before the anaphor. Neither need be the case. 
example, (2-2) is recast with the anaphor first: 6 
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In the next 
(2-3) Because she was passing the sex shop, Nadia was asked 
to buy half a kilo of pornography. 
That the referent need not be explicit is shown in these 
texts (the first based on an example of Grimes 
second, Webber (1978a)): 
(1975:46), the 
(2~4) When Ross visited his Aunt Cicely, thgy<1> spent the 
afternoon talking. Then, as arranged, Nadia arrived . 
Ross kissed his aunt goodbye, and set off with Nadia 
to the discotheque, where they<z> danced the night 
away. 
(2-5) Ross gave each girl a crayon. Thgy used th~m to draw 
pictures of Daryel in the bath. 
In (2-4), "they< 1 >11 refers to the set {Ross, Aunt CicelyJ, and 
"they<z >11 to {Ross, Nadia].. Neither of these sets is mentioned 
explicitly, and the listener has to piece them together from the 
explicitly given elements. In particular, the m~Bi~g of the 
text must be used to obtain the referent of "they<2> 11 • In 
(2-5), "they" and "them" are the sets of girls and crayons, 
respectively, whose existence is inferred from the 
sentence. 
---~-~---~-------------~-------
first 
6 Strictly speaking, a reference which textually precedes its 
referent is called a cataphor. Cataphors and anaphors are 
together called gggophors (see Halliday and Hasan 1976:14-18, 
31-37). Again, we will usually be sloppy, and use the term 
"anaphor" to refer to both forms of endophor, except where 
repugnant to the context. Sometimes we will also include 
exophors (see below in this section). 
iiThere are no discounts on 
person-to-person calls. Check your 
phone book or the inside covers of this 
directory to see how and when these 
discounts apply in your area.7 ,, 
2. 1 / 10 
Conversely, an explicitly mentioned entity need not be 
referable -- if negatively quantified, for example: 
(2-6) Ross doesn't have a car. #It is a battered old Skoda. 
(2-7) 
(2-8) 
Ross doesn't have a car any more. It was completely 
destroyed in an accident last week. 
Ross doesn't have a car, and if he did, it probably 
wouldn't run. 
It is unacceptable to predicate anything of the non-existent car 
in (2-6), but acceptable in (2-7) because the car's previous 
existence is implied. In (2-8), "it" refers not to the car Ross 
doesn't have, but to the one in the expansion of "did" as "did 
have a car" that he might have. 
Often, an anaphor with a non-explicit antecedent refers to 
something more complex than a set of explicitly mentioned items. 
Consider these texts: 
(2~9) The boy stood on the burning deck 
Picking his nose like mad. 
He rolled ite into little balls 
And threw it at his dad.9 
---~------------~~-------------
7 From an advertisement for the TransCanada Telephone System, 
1978. 
8 This usage has been called the dg§,Qicabl~ ~it" (Corum 1973). 
(footnotes continue] 
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( 2-10) Ro ss sat in the corner, knitting madly. Suddenly he 
threw it down, and stormed out of the room. 
What was thrown in each case is the £rQg~ct of the previously 
described actions and components, namely the results of the 
nose-picking and Ross•s knitting, respectively. 
sometimes the antecedent is nothing more than something 
brought to mind by part of the text. Here are some examples: 
(2-11) Ross wanted to NAIL the boards together, but sue made 
him do it with TAPE. 
(2-12) Nadia dreams a lot, but seldom remembers them. 
( 2-13) When I first saw your gallery, I liked 
ladies.to 
the ones of 
---~ 
(2-14) Idi Amin is a bad joke, unless you are unfortunate 
enough to live there.11 
(2-15) Early one morning at the end of August, a truck came 
up to the house. We loaded the paintings of the 
summer into the back, and closed and locked the doors. 
We stood on the porch and watched the truck drive off. 
"He is a careful driver, 11 Jacob Kahn said. "I 
have used him be£ ore." 12 
-..-~~----.---------~-------~-----
9 From: Turner, Ian Alexander Hamilton. 
y~la: Aystralian children's E!qYrhY]!gs. 
Educational, 1969, page 104, rhyme 26116. 
Cind~rgll~ drg§~gd i~ 
Melbourne: Heinemann 
1° From: Mitchell, Joni. The Gallery. On: Mitchell, Joni. 
Clouds. LP recording, Reprise RS6341. The quoted text is the 
opening lines of this song; not all informants found it 
completely acceptable. 
11 Not all 
acceptable. 
informants found this sentence 
1 2 From: Potok, Chaim. l1Y ~~e is}§~ 1gy. 
1973, page 231. {2) Heinemann, 1972. 
completely 
{1} Penguin, 
2. 1 / 12 
(2-16) Nadia wants to climb Mt Everest , and Ross wants to 
tour Africa, but neither of them will i because they 
are both too poor. 
(2-17) Ross and Nadia wanted to dance together, but Nadia's 
mother said she couldn't~-
In (2-11) (due to Watt 1973:466) the referent of "do it" is 
clearly "fasten the boards together", though this is only 
implied by the verb "nail11 .13 In (2-12) (which is due to Corum 
(1973)), 11them" refers to Nadia's dreams. In (2-13), "ones" 
refers to the pictures brought to mind by the mention of the 
gallery. In {2-14) the referent "Uganda" for "there" is 
suggested by mention of Amin. Similarly, in (2-15), the arrival 
of the truck suggests the presence of the driver, and this . l.S 
enough for him/her14 to be referenced anaphorically. In (2-16) 
(from Webber 1978a), the elided verb phrase "do what she/he 
wants to do" is a single VP combining and abstracting its two 
antecedents "climb Mt Everest" and "tour Africa", and in ( 2-17) 
(also from Webber 1978a), the ellipsis stands for "dance with 
Ross". 
Ex_QEhors1s refer deictically (Fillmore 1972) (that is, in a 
------~------------------------
13 Watt (1973) has called this phenomenon -- verbs like "nail" 
which can have related concepts extracted from them as 
antecedents -- Eenetrable rg_gfs (cf Corum 1973). 
14 Most people sexistly assume the truck driver to be male, and 
hence find (i) jarring in the same context: 
(i) "Sh~ is a careful driver, 11 Jacob Kahn said. 
15 The term "pragmatic anaphora" has been used for exophora by 
[footnotes continue] 
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pointing manner) to items in the external world rather than in 
the text. For example, in (2-18): 
(2-18) Pick that up and put it over there. 
"that" and "there" are exophors whose referent in the real world 
is something that the situation, perhaps including physical 
pointing, makes clear to the perceiver of the text. 
In summary, an anaphor is a reference whose antecedent is a 
concept or entity e!gked implicitly or explicitly by the 
preceding text or situation. 
In the previous section I described an anaphor as a reference 
that "the perceiver of the discourse will be able to 
disabbreviate". I now wish to elaborate on this, and to qualify 
't 16 1 • 
The qualification is to the words "will be able", which 
might better be "is expected by the speaker to be able". For 
---~----------~--------~-------
Hankamer and Sag (1976), and picked up by several other authors. 
The term is misleading, and will not be used here, as almost all 
anaphora is, in a sense, pragmatic (cf Morgan 1978; Partee 
197 8) • 
16 The influence of Chafe (1972, 1974) and Nash-Webber and 
Reiter (1977) is evident in this section. 
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when a speaker uses an anaphor, there is no iron-clad guarantee 
that the listener will in fact have the ability to resolve it. 
For example, the listener may have been busy thinking about 
something else and didn't even hear the referent of the anaphor; 
or, more frequently, the referent was mentioned so far back . in 
the discourse that the listener has completely forgotten it, as 
(2-19) demonstrates: 
(2-19) Just as Carrie, played by Sissy Spacek, can be seen as 
another of De Palma•s ambiguous women, as in 
Obs~iQ~, other parallels in the construction of the 
two films spring rapidly to mind. One can compare, 
for example, the extraordinary power of the final 
moments of the present film, in which the gentle, 
sunlit, Vaseline-lensed scene is shattered by a sudden 
horror that makes many people literally jump out of 
their seats, with that of Obs~§Si.Q1!, wherein the 
unexpected again happens, though this time in the 
negative sense that the expected does not happen. 
However, despite De Palma•s skill, it is he~ 
acting that ultimately makes the film. 
Here, few people, especially those not familiar with the films 
being discussed, would be able to resolve "her" as Sissy Spacek 
without consciously looking back through the text to find the 
referent. Anyone who didn't know that De Palma is male might 
have erroneously chosen him as the antecedent. 
What is illustrated here is this: for an anaphor to be 
resolvable, its antecedent must be in what we shall for the time 
being call the listener's "£2nscio_gs!!es2 11 .17 When a speaker 
----------~------~-------------
17 For readability, I will not in 
round "consciousness". However , 
intended whenever I use the word. 
better terminology. 
future put the quote marks 
they should be understood as 
In section 3.2.1 I introduce 
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uses an anaphor, they assume (usually correctly) that its 
antecedent is in the listener's consciousness and is therefore 
resolvable; if they are wrong, the discourse becomes ill-formed 
from the listener's point of view. Chafe (1970) has likened 
consciousness to a stage. Mentioning a concept, even 
implicitly, puts it on stage, from where it slowly retreats into 
the wings unless mentioned again. Concepts can be referenced 
anaphorically when and only when they are on stage (subject 
always to the constraints of syntax). 
The speaker's assumption is apparently based on a model of 
the listener's consciousness which the speaker maintains (cf 
Winograd 1976). There have been no investigations into the 
nature of this model (but see Norman, Rumelhart and the LNR 
Research Group (1975:68ff) and Grosz (1977a, 1977b)), nor even 
has its psychological reality ever been shown. It is, however, 
probably part of a larger model of the listener that the speaker 
constructs, the necessity of which has been shown by Cohen and 
Perrault (1976), Perrault and Cohen (1977), and Cohen (1978), to 
mention but a few (cf also Webber (1978a)). 
How does an antecedent enter the listener's consciousness 
in the first place? There are four basic ways. The first, 
illustrated by examples (2-1) and (2-2), is that the antecedent 
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be explicitly mentioned in the text, and further, as we have 
just seen, this mention must be 11 recent 11 .1s 
The second is similar, except that the mentioning is 
implicit. We saw this in example (2-4), where things like set 
elements were given, causing the listener to be "conscious" of 
the set itself. Again "recency" is relevant. 
The third and fourth ways antecedents may enter 
consciousness result in exophors when the entity is referenced. 
We saw the third illustrated by (2-18), a sentence which would 
be accompanied by pointing (or a similar gesture) to draw the 
listener's attention to what "that" is and where "there" is. 
The fourth method is qualitatively different from the other 
three, in that the speaker does not deliberately cause the 
antecedent to enter the listener's consciousness. Instead, the 
speaker makes a calculated guess that other means have 
previously placed it there. Here is an example: The scene is a 
party at a wealthy person's home, and one of the guests is 
admiring a painting on the wall. The host comes up and says: 
(2- 20) Do you like it? It's an original Chagall. 
~ 
The host can use "it" to refer to the painting because it is 
--·----------------------------
18 Much of this thesis will be concerned with determining 
exactly what is meant here by "recent". 
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clearly the upper-most thing on the guest's mind at that moment 
or at least so the host assumes. If in fact the guest was 
merely staring blankly into space in front of the painting, the 
guest would probably not realize at first what the host was 
talking about. 
It follows from the anove that if a computer is to take the 
part of a listener in discourse, it too must have a 
consciousness, or a model thereof, to understand anaphora. 
Further, if it is to generate discourse, it must make judgements 
about its listener's consciousness to use anaphora correctly; 
that is, it will need to model its hearer's consciousness. In 
this thesis we will be primarily concerned with the former case, 
namely modelling a listener's consciousness on a computer for 
anaphora resolution. 
66Anaone, 
Anatwo, 
Ana three, 
Anaphor!f-'-
Mark Scott Johnsont9 
---------------------~--------~ 
19 Personal communication. 
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2.3 Varieties Qf an~Ehor~ 
Before an anaphor can be resolved, you have to know that it's an 
anaphor. This section, therefore, will be devoted to 
identifying the common or garden varieties of anaphora, and also 
a few more exotic species.20 
2.3. 1 Pronomigal referggcg. The word "pronoun" has two 
meanings. Firstly, it can refer to a part of speech such as 
"he", "she", "it", "they" or "that". Secondly, it can refe~ to 
an anaphor whose antecedent is a noun phrase, that is one which 
"stands in place of a noun". In classical grammar, these 
meanings were generally taken to be equivalent. However, we 
shall see that they are not, and there are many cases in which 
pronouns in the first sense are not pronouns in the second 
sense, and vice versa. In this thesis, we shall generally use 
the word "pronoun" with its first meaning. To avoid confusion, 
we shall say that pronouns in the second sense of the word are 
Most pronouns are pronominally referent. For example: 
--------..-----------------------
2 0 This section is an expansion of a similar section in Hirst 
(1976b). An alternative taxonomy appears in Nash-Webber (1977) 
and Webber (1978a). 
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(2-21) Ross bought {a radiometer I three kilograms of 
after-dinner mints} and gave {it I them} to Nadia for 
her birthday. 
(2- 22) Nadia wanted a gold ring, but Ross bought h~r a 
plastic on.g. 
(2-23) Ross told Nadia about the coming of the Antichrist. 
It is due very soon, and he has bought exclusive film 
rights to it from the Vatican. 
Pronouns are usually marked for gender and/or number, which 
is often useful in resolution. However, there are awkward 
exceptions. In this text, "she" refers to a person, film 
director Robert Bresson, who is probably marked as male in the 
listener's world knowledge: 
( 2- 24) Who is this Bresson? Is sh~ a woman?Zt 
character named "The Countess" is introduced on page 63. It is 
not until page 66 that we find out that the countess is male, 
and we are told this only implicitly by the author's referring 
to him by the pronoun "he" when there is no other possible 
referent. A human reader is momentarily fazed by this, but 
finds recovery easy. 
A similar problem, which is becoming increasingly common, 
-----------------------~--~-~--
21 From: Robinson, David. Festival report: Berlin. 
Film, III(1), October 1977, 68-70, page 68. 
22 Robbins, Tom. 
Bantam, 1977. 
American 
----~--
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is the use of a genderless plural third-person pronoun to refer 
to a singular third-person of unknown, or deliberately unmarked, 
gender . For example:23 
( 2- 25) 
( 2- 26) 
( 2- 27} 
( 2- 28) 
%The author thanks the reader 
indulgence. 
for 
%The most important qualification 
programmer I want to hire is that thgy 
Cobol. 
kind 
for the new 
be fluent in 
"Would it not be possible for someone to come out by 
way of the drawing-room window and in this one while 
Mr Fitzroy was out of the room, and return the same 
way?" tasked Poirot. J 
% " But we • d h c-. v e 
Admira1 . 2• 
seen them" 
.. - , objected the 
%Neither Ross nor sue sank th~ir teeth into my apple. 
((2-28) is based on an example from Whitley (1978:19).) In many 
idiolects, these uses of "their", "they" and "them" are 
acceptable substitutes for ".his/her", "he/she" (sometimes 
rendered as "s/he") and 11 him/her". Other idiolects fiercely 
reject such laxness in selectional restrictions, and such 
idiolects may be an unstated reason why some people virulently 
oppose current moves to 11 desex" language. A computer NLU system 
should be willing to give people the benefit of the doubt in 
this respect, and thus be able to understand text like the above 
examples, even though an occasional ambiguity may be thereby 
-------~--~-~------------~-----
23 The symnol "%" indicates a sentence whose acceptability 
varies widely over different idiolects. 
24 From: Christie, Agatha. The submarine plans. in: Poirot~s 
early ca~2 , Fontana/Collins, 1974, page 130. tThis text was 
originally published some time between 1923 and 1936.J 
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engendered.ZS For more discussion on the use of the singular 
epicene "they", see Whitley (1978). 
The horrible bureaucratese expression "same" acts like a 
pronoun with the special restriction that it can only refer to 
very recent noun phrases, usually the one immediately preceding 
it: 
( 2- 29) Persons using this coffee urn must clean ~me after 
use. 
(2-30) Complete the enclosed form and post sa~e to the above 
address. 
Interposing another noun phrase, "he/sh.e" and "black ink" in the 
following examples, makes the sentence very marginal, at least 
in my idiolect: 
( 2- 31) 
( 2-32) 
?When the user has finished with this coffee urn, 
he/she must clean§~~-
?Complete the enclosed form in black ink and post sa~e 
to the above address. 
Intersentential 
acceptability: 
reference with "same" also reduces 
(2-33) ?Complete the enclosed form. 
address. 
Post same to the above 
---
Certain noun phrases also act as pronominal anaphors. These 
-------------------------------
2 s The astute reader will have already noticed that this thesis 
is written in the lax idiolect. 
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include "the former" and "the latter". We shall call these 
(2-34) Sue stared at the pumpkin and the turnip, and declared 
that she preferred the fgrmer. 
(2-35) One union, Prince Rupert Co-op Fisherman's Guild, owns 
a fish processing plant there. The other, the 
Amalgamated Shoreworkers and Clerks Union, represents 
workers in the plant. Thg fO£file~ locked out 1h~ 
latter on June 23 when they couldn't agree on a 
contract for the workers.2° 
The former example suggests that ordinal numbers can also be 
construed as anaphors, as in (2-36): 
(2-36) Nadia removed from her bag a tissue, a dime and a 
crumpled dollar note, and absentmindedly handed the 
cashier the fir§1 instead of thg third. 
Although not great literary usage, it is syntactically correct 
and we understand its meaning. (See also Postal (1976).) 
surface count anaphors require not only that the antecedent 
De in consciousness, but also that the surface structure of the 
sentence 
retained. 
(or at least the order of possible referents) be 
This leads to the problem of what a possible referent 
for such an anaphor is. For example, (2-36) contains six noun 
phrases before "the first"; you probably didn't notice that 
there were so many, let alone count them. They are: "Nadia", 
"her bag"~ "a dirty tissue", "a dime", 11 a crumpled dollar note" 
and "the cashier" .. (There 1.s also an elided seventh, "Nadia", 
----~------------------~-------
26 From: Evans-Atkinson, 
causes waste of good fish. 
page B6. 
Evan . From your side: Labor dispute 
Th~ Van£guver sun, 11 July 1978, 
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before "absent mind e d 1 y" • ) If "the first II and " the third" s imp 1 y 
counted NPs in the sentence, their referents would be, 
respectively, "Nadia" and "a dirty tissue", though we understand 
them unambiguously to be "a dirty tissue" and 11 a crumpled dollar 
note". Clearly, to resolve such anaphors computationally, we 
need some way of knowing where to start counting.27 
If there are too many items to be counted in a text with a 
surface count anaphor, the result is unacceptable, as not all 
possible referents can be retained in consciousness at once: 
(2-37) On the twelfth day of Christmas my true love gave me 
eight ladies dancing, six drummers drumming, eleven 
songbirds singing, nine pipers piping, fifty lords 
a-leaping, seven federal agents, a swarm of swans 
a-swimming, five pogo sticks, four cauliflowers, three 
french fries, two cans of yeast and a parsnip in a 
pear tree. #I returned all but the g!~ye~th to the 
store the following morning. 
---~-----..-----------... ---~----- .. 
2 7 One often sees sentences like (i) or, even worse, (ii) and 
(iii) in sloppy writing: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
?Ross was carrying a large box. The latt~ was brown. 
??Ross entered the room with a box under his arm, and 
put thg latter on the mantelpiece. 
??We know well that potent insect Xylocopilpil, which 
is to the Xylocopid as the auk to the hummingbird. 
The latter £~~atg£e is but an inch overall. lFrom: 
Hepworth, John. Outsight: Shock! Horror! Giant bee 
stuffs Boeing 747. N~ti.Q!! r~ig~, 8(32), 25-31 May 
1978, page 20. J 
The intention in (iii) is clearly that "the latter creature" is 
to refer to "the Xylocopid", not "the hummingbird". These texts 
are not acceptable in my dialect, though some people do not seem 
to mind (i) at least. For more of this, and its implications 
for transformational grammar, see Postal (1976). 
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Epithets can 
also be used pronominally, as in these texts: 
(2-38) Ross used his Bankcard so much, the EQQ~ ~JU had to 
declare bankruptcy. 
(2~39) When John found out about Mary's marital infidelity, 
the bast~rd punched her.2a 
Lakoff (1976) has shown that epithets cannot have pronouns as 
their antecedents.29 
2.3.4 Prosent~ntial r~{~renc~. Pronouns and words such as 
"such" and "so" may be .E~O§g_]!tenti,all~ referent. For example, 
consider (2-40) (due to Klappholz and Lockman 1975): 
(2-40) The president was shot while riding in a motorcade 
down a major Dallas boulevard today; it caused a panic 
on Wall Street.30 
Here, "it" does not refer to any of the preceding noun phrases, 
but to the whole situation of the president being shot while 
riding in a motorcade down a major Dallas boulevard today. In 
28 John and Mary are those playful characters well-loved by all 
readers of Schank (1975 and others). 
2 9 Apparent counterexamples to this can be explained as 
cataphora. For example, (i) parallels the structure of (ii) 
rather than (iii) : 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
When he entered the store, thg .EQOr basta£Q was 
robbed. 
When he entered the store, Daryel was robbed. 
When Daryel entered the store, he was robbed. 
30 Some instances of this type of sentence are idiolectically 
unacceptable to some people. 
this example (from Anderson 1976) 
embedded sentence: 
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"so" refers to a complete 
(2-41) Your wife was under the impression that you would be 
away tonight, and as you can see, I thought ~o too. 
More than just a single sentence may be so referenced. 
For example, the first sentence of chapter 11 of Tuchman•s A 
distant mirro~ is (2-42): 
(2-42) Su£h was the France to which Couey returned in 1367.31 
"Such" refers to the essence of all of chapter 10. 
2.3.5 Strained ana£l!Q£~· Lakoff and Ross (1972) point out 
the frequent idiolectic acceptability of sentences like (2-43): 
(2-43) John became a guitarist because he thought that i! was 
a beautiful instrument. 
The anaphor refers to the guitar, although this is only brought 
into consciousness by the noun phrase "guitarist". Watt (1975) 
has called this phenomenon str~ingd gnaBhQr~. Lakoff and Ross 
develop syntactic rules which explain why (2-43) is acceptable, 
but (2-44) and (2-4 5) are not: 
(2-44) *The guitarist bought a new one. 
(2-45) *John was a guitarist until he lost it on the subway. 
In general, the antecedents of strained anaphors must be 
-----------------------~-------
31 Tuchman , Barbara Wertheim . A distant mirror: The calamitous 
- ------- --~- -- -----,,.-14th century. New York: Knopf, 21 September 1978, page 232. 
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lexically similar to the actual words used in the text, such as 
"guitar" being similar to "guitarist". Th us informants 
generally find (2-46) less acceptable than (2-43): 
( 2- 46) ?John became a flautist because he thought that i~ was 
a beautiful instrument. 
Sentence ( 2-4 7) (due to Watt (1975:11 1)) is an apparent 
counterexample, in which the anaphor is not morphologically 
similar to its antecedent at all: 
(2-47) The government's decision to annex Baja California as 
the fifty-fourth state was the second blow to freedom 
in a§ ~a~y weeks. 
However, the lexical relationship seems to be enough for the 
anaphor to work like that of (2-43) (see also Watt 1973, 1975). 
All this does not mean that such anaphors refer to the 
surface structure (or something just under the skin), and ignore 
semantics; for if this were the case, we could use the fact that 
"a ruler" can mean both a sovereign and a measuring stick to 
rewrite (2-48) as (2-49) (due to Carlson and Martin 1975): 32 
-----------------------..... -------
32 There are punning exceptions to this -- a 
non-elliptic syllepsis -- varying in acceptability. 
Martin ( 197 5) offer (i) and ( ii) ; the fir st is 
accepted, the second not: 
(i) Henry Block even looks like Qne.33 
(ii) *Frank Church has never been in one. 
sort of 
Carlson and 
generally 
My explanation for the difference in acceptability is that the 
name must be sufficiently unusual for the hearer to notice its 
double meaning even before the punning anaphor is encountered in 
the text. Hence, we have: 
(iii) *Norman Smith is descended from one. tFrom which: a 
tfootnotes continue] 
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(2-48) The king picked up a measuring instrument and measured 
the lamp. 
(2-49) *The ruler picked on~ up and measured the lamp. 
Exactly what role semantics plays in this phenomenon is not 
clear. As Watt (1973) points out, the mere fact that "father" 
means "one who has sired a child" does not permit (2""'51) (after 
Watt 1973:461) to be derived from (2-50): 
---~-------------------~-------
(iv) 
(v) 
{vi) 
Norman or a smith?J 
*Kim Spencer wears one. 
Nadia Talent is full~£ it. 
Tom Collins drinks lots of them. 
--
such puns really do turn up in real world text, as {vii) [from: 
Tim~, 109(22), 30 May 1977] shows: 
{vii) Not all the aliens are bad however. One who is not is 
Chewbacca (he dQ~§n't), the 8-ft.-tall wookie. 
True ( e 11 i pt i c) s y 11 e psis , as for exam p 1 e in (viii) ( after 
Webber (~978a:105), who labels it zeugma) ,3• involves a similar 
kind of resolution: 
(viii) Ross takes sugar in his coffee, 2 pride in his 
appearance, and~ offence at the slightest innuendo. 
Non-elliptic zeugma (that is, metaphor combined with syllepsis) 
probably don't exist in coherent English; elliptic zeugma is bad 
enough. 
33 It is also possible to interpret this text as meaning "Henry 
Block even looks like a Henry Block", where a name like Henry 
Block is supposed to have associated with it a stereotyped image 
that a person with that name allegedly resembles: 
(i) I just met someone named Archie Bunker, and, by jove, 
he even looks like one. 
---
3
• Authorities disagree on where syllepsis and zeugma differ 
from one another. I follow here the terminology of Fowler's 
"Mo der11 E ng~h U.§~g~" ( 196 8) • 
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(2-50) Ross has sired a child, but none of his friends have 
seen it. 
(2-51) *Ross is a father, but none of his friends have seen 
it. 
That is, "father" is an g_ga£hQ£.1£ i~land (Postal 1969) in 
(2-50). Yet in the same paper, Watt offers this alarming 
example (1973:486): 
(2-52) Ross is already a father THREE TIMES OVER, but Clive 
hasn't even had ONE~ yet. 
(2-53) Ross is already a father THREE TIMES OVER, but sue 
hasn't even had ONE~ yet. 
That is, adding contrastive stress can turn an anaphoric island 
into a penetrable reef. 
explanation for this). 
(See section 7.1 for a possible 
2.3.6 Difficult indefinite uses of 11 one 11 • 
--------- --------- ---- --
A phenomenon 
which at first seems to be related to strained anaphora is the 
indefinite "one", as in this text: 
(2-54) Smoking gives .Qng cancer. 
This could be rephrased thus: 
(2-55) Smoking gives {a I theJ {smoker t person who smokes) 
cancer. 
This seems to parallel the case of (2~43) above. However, 
things are not so simple. Consider: 
(2-56) My boss makes~ work hard. 
(2-57) Malcolm Fraser makes one sick. 
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( 2-58) Plutonium in the atmosphere makes Q!!~ sick. 
These mean, respectively: 
( 2-59) My boss makes all those people he supervises work 
hard. 
( 2-60) Malcolm Fraser makes everyone who is aware of him 
sick. 
(2-61) Plutonium in the atmosphere makes everyone sick. 
In each case, "one" means "all those whom <the subject of the 
sentence> affects" again, an item implicitly placed in 
consciousness. This also holds for (2-54). Thus, we see that 
indefinite "one" is not a particular case of strained anaphora. 
iiHave you seen my wife, Mr Jones? 
Do you know what it's like on the 
outside?,~ 
Bobin and Barry Gibb35 
2.3.7 Nog-referential Ef:OUQgns. Some instances of the 
pronoun "it" don't refer to anything, and hence are not 
anaphors, and some have referents defined by convention which 
need not be · present in consciousness. It is necessary to 
recognize all these when they are found, lest precious hours be 
lost in bootless searches for textual referents. 
----------~--------------------
35 From : New York mining disaster, 1941. On: Bee Gees. 
of Bee Gg~. LP recording, Polydor 5837063. 
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Consider (2-62): 
(2-62) It is fortunate that Nadia will never read this 
thesis. 
This is a simple case of a dummy subject in a cleft sentence, 
derived from (2-63), and the 11 it 11 is essentially meaningless: 36 
(2-63) That Nadia will never read this thesis is fortunate. 
Note that syntax alone is not enough to identify the dummy "it". 
In (2-64) "it" is a dummy subject, but in (2-65) it could refer 
to 11the cat". 
( 2- 64) This thesis contains many facts that 
Nadia if she knew they were being 
therefore fortunate that Nadia will 
thesis. 
would embarrass 
published. It is 
never read this 
(2-65) If Nadia wer.e to read this thesis, she would probably 
get so mad that she would kick the cat. I~ is 
therefore fortunate that Nadia will never read this 
thesis. 
However, cleft interpretation seems to be the default in (2-65). 
Some pronouns have conventional unspecified referents, as 
1.n this: 
(2-66) It is half past two. 
This could be restated thus: 
(2- 67) The time is half past two. 
But the same process cannot, of course, be applied to (2-6 8) to 
-~---~----~---~-------------~--
36 One could say, for convenience, that it does have a 
referent, namely "that Nadia will never read this t hesis", b ut 
this is merely playing with the definition of "referent". There 
is notwithstanding a clear qualitiative difference between this 
and other uses of the word "it". 
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give (2-6 9) : 
(2-68) It is half a lamington. 
(2-69) *The time is half a lamington. 37 
In general, we have to be on the lookout for cases where "it" 
means by convention "the time". Care is required, as we see 
here: 
(2-70) How late is it? It's ten to one. 
(2-71) What's the starting price of Pervert•s Delight? 
It's ten to one. 
There are other awkward cases, too.38 
-------------------------~-~-~-
37 This sentence is unacceptable for 
reasons, while it is syntax that 
optionally rendered as (ii): 
(i) What time is it? 
(ii) *What time is the time? 
selectional or 
prevents (i) 
semantic 
from being 
3e The question of these uses of "it" is complex and the only 
important point here is that they must be recognized by an 
anaphor resolver to avoid wasting time on fruitless searches for 
their referents. 
Some of the problems in this area can be seen by 
considering (i): 
(i) It is raining. 
Unlike the case of "the time", we cannot simply eliminate this 
sentence• s "it" by rephrasing: 
(ii) * {The sky j The weather} is raining. 
But note also that (iii) is an acceptable sentence, although 
(iv) is strange to most people: 
{iii) 
(iv) 
It was half past two and raining when Sue finally 
arrived. 
?It was raining and half past two when Sue finally 
arrived. 
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2.3.8 Pro-verbs. The only English pro-verbs are forms of 
"to do", as in (2-72) and (2-7 3): 
( 2-7 2) 
(2-7 3) 
Daryel thinks like I dQ. 
When Ross orders sweet and sour fried short soup, 
Nadia does too. 
The antecedents are, respectively, the VPs39 "thinks" and 
-------------------------... -~---
sentence (iii) suggests that "it" can mean both the time and the 
weather taken together -- perhaps the general state of affairs. 
The strangeness of (iv) then needs to be explained. I leave 
this as an exercise for the reader. 
The question of how and why "it" 
sentences is a matter of much debate 
like (v) (due to Morgan 1968) are 
rephrase without it: 
actually appears in these 
in linguistics. Sentences 
even harder than ( i) to 
(v) It is dark outside. 
However, such sentences may have non-dummy subjects in other 
languages, indicating the presence of a subject in a deep, 
language-independent representation of the sentence. For 
example, in German, the dummy-subject sentence (vi) translates 
into English as (vii) with a substantial subject: 
(vi) 
(vii) 
Es klingelt. (Literally, "It rings". J 
Someone is ringing. 
See Morgan (1968) for a slightly different approach to this 
question. 
3 9 Halliday and Hasan (1976:114-115) give examples in which 
"do" replaces only part of a verb phrase: 
(i) Does Granny look after you every day? -- She can't gg 
at weekends, as she has to go to her own house. 
{ii) Mrs Birling: I don't understand you, Inspector. 
Inspector: You mean you don't choose to dQ, Mrs 
Birling . (From: Priestly, J B. An in§E§~tQr c~ll§. 
in~ The £!ays of J B P£i~atly, Heinemann, volume 3. J 
(iii) What are you doing here? -- We're mycologists, and 
we•re looking for edible mushrooms. -~ Yes, we are 
doillSl too. 
However , this usage is acceptable only in a British dialect of 
[footnotes continue] 
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"orders sweet and sour fried short soup". 
Under certain conditions the antecedent can be two or more 
VPs. Nash-Webber and Sag (1978) cite this example: 
( 2- 74) She walks and she chews gum. Jerry dQg§ too, but not 
at the same time. 
Of course, not all occurrences of "to do" are anaphoric: 
it can also mean "to perform <some task>", and it can be a 
meaningless auxiliary: 
( 2- 75) 
( 2- 76) 
Nadia did her exercises. 
Ross doe§ not like lychees with ice cream. 
2. 3. 9 ProactioQs. When used in conjunction with "so", 
11 it 11 or demonstratives, "do" can reference action§ in a manner 
which is almost prosentential. Consider: 
( 2- 77) Daryel frequently goes to 
secretly pours himself a 
drinks it in one gulp. sue 
discreetly. 
the cupboard, where he 
glass of Cointreau. He 
dQ§§ it too, but less 
(2-78) Ross makes his dinner on weekdays, but when she stays 
the weekend sued~§ it for him. 
(2-79) Nadia removed a herring from her pocket and began to 
fillet it. Ross g!d §O too. 
----------------------~-----~~-
English; informants who were speakers of Canadian, American or 
Australian English immediately marked such sentences as British, 
and said that their dialect would not generate them. These 
dialects would use an ellipsis instead of "do". 
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In each of these texts, the ~roactional anaphor refers not to 
the previous events but to the action therein: to the act of 
taking a herring from a pocket and beginning to fillet it, 
rather than Nadia ' s specific performance of that act. Note in 
particular that (2-79) does not mean that Ross removed the 
herring from Nadia's pocket, but rather from his own, and in 
(2-77) , sue pours herself, not Daryel , a glass of Cointreau. 
However in (2- 78) Sue cooks Ross•s dinner, not her own. 
There is no firm dividing line between proactions and 
pro-verbs: (2-73) could have "does it" or "does so" in place of 
"does" without changing its meaning . 
2.3. 10 Pr~qdj~tives. Postal (1969:205) points out that 
words like "such" are anaphoric in texts like these: 
(2-80) I was looking for a parple wombat, but I couldn't find 
§J!.£h a wombat . 
(2-81) I was looking for a wombat which spoke English, but I 
couldn't find §ych a wombat. 
Such references are E£Qsdjectiy~l, or, in Postal•s term, 
£ro_£ela ti ve , referring here to "purple t womba tJ" and "l wombat] 
which spoke English" . Often the antecedent is only implicit, as 
in (2 - 82) : 
(2-82) Ross came rocketing out the door and tripped over 
Nadia ' s narbalek, which bounced off and cowered under 
the garage. Su£!! situations have been a common 
occurrence since the vacation started. 
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Here, the antecedent for "such [situations]" is not 
• h • h k t • II b t th "l situations] in w ic Ross comes roe e ing... , u ra er 
something like "chaotic t situations]". See also Halliday and 
Has an ( 1 9 7 6 : 7 6- 8 7) • • o 
2. 3. 11 Tgm12or~l rg_ferfil!.f_~. The word "then" can be used 
as an anaphoric reference to a time or an event, as can "at that 
time": 
(2-83) In the mid-sixties, free love was rampant across 
campus. It was then that sue turned to Scientology. 
(2-84) In the mid-sixties, free love was rampant across 
campus. At !hat time, however, bisexuality had not 
come into vogue. 
Many temporal relations such as "afterwards" are anaphoric, 
in the sense that the time they are relating to is also a 
referent determined like that of an anaphor. In (2-85), "many 
4 0 In bureaucratese and legalese, "said" can be used as a 
proadjective for very explicit discourse cohesion: 
(i) I bequeath absolutely my bandicoot Herbert to Ross 
Frederick Andrews of 79 Lowanna Street Braddon in the 
Australian Capital Territory provided that the said 
Ross Frederick Andrews shall keep feed and generally 
maintain the said bandicoot in good health order and 
condition. 
"The said Ross Frederick Andrews" means "Ross Frederick Andrews 
of 79 Lowanna Street Braddon in the Australian Capital 
Territory" . The "said"s serve to explicitly prevent the 
condition being satisfied by a different Ross Frederick Andrews, 
or by the maintenance of a different bandicoot. 
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years later" implies a reference to "the mid-sixties", in a very 
similar manner (though of course with different meaning) to the 
"then II of ( 2-83) : 
(2-85) In the mid-sixties, free love was rampant across 
campus. Many yea~§ !atgr sue turned to Scientology. 
2. 3. 12 Loca tiy_g referencg§. The word "there" is often an 
anaphoric reference to a place: 
(2-86) The Church of Scientology met in a secret room behind 
the local Colonel Sanders• chicken stand. Sue had her 
first dianetic experience th§Ig. 
Locative relations, like temporal relations, may reference 
anaphorically: 
(2-87) The Church of Scientology met in a secret room behind 
the local Colonel Sanders• chicken stand. Across the 
------ -.... -
strg_gt was a McDonald's where the Bokononists and The 
Church Of God The Utterly Indifferent had their 
meetings. 
Some anaphors are 
completely null. In (2-88): 
(2-88) Ross took Nadia and sue i Daryel. 
the word "took" has been elided. A whole VP may be elided: 
( 2-89) Nadia brought the food for the picnic, and Daryel i 
the wine. 
Here the elided VP is "brought to the picnic". VP ellipsis 
cannot in general be exophoric (see Hankamer 1978; cf Schachter 
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1977 and Hankamer and Sag 1976). 
The above examples illustrated VP ellipsis. However almost 
any part of a sentence can be elided: 
(2-90) Ross carefully folded his trousers and~ climbed into 
bed. 
( 2- 91) Who put this 
biscuit barrel? 
bewildered baby bandicoot in Barbara's 
-- Ross~-
In (2-90), the subject NP "Ross" is elided, and in (2- 90) only 
the subject NP remains after the removal of "put that bewildered 
baby bandicoot in Barbara's biscuit barrel". This latter kind 
of ellipsis is very common in answers to questions, so it is 
important that it be understood by any system which accepts 
natural language answers to queries.•t 
•1 It should be noted that not all "syntactic gaps" are 
anaphoric. Thomas ( 1979) distinguishes elisio!l and 
!!.Qn-realizati6B, which are non-anaphoric, from true ellipsis, 
which requires context for its resolution. Elision is the 
removal of certain words, usually in informal speech, that may 
be recovered by applying certain conventional rules of 
conversation which Thomas details. An example: 
(i) ~ Got the tickets? 
Non-realization is the syntactic removal, at a level below the 
surface , of elements that do not require recovery at all. An 
example of this is the non-appearance of "[by] someone" when 
(ii) is passivized to become (iii): 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Someone murdered Jones. 
Jones was murdered. 
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2.3.14 An awkward mi~llau. The following examples are 
awkward exceptions to normal pronominalization: 
(2-92) Andy sends the j978 World BQQk Scieg£g Y~a£ Annu~l to 
Lorri Dunn, 12, of Visalia, Calif., for her question: 
Why is it called a gunny sack?•2 
( 2- 93) Nadia: Is it pronounced "tom-AY-to" or "tom-AH-to"? 
Ross: Is WHAT pronounced "tom-AY-to" or "tom-AH-to 11 ?•3 
one could dismiss (2-92) as an illiteracy -- it is unacceptable 
in my idiolect -- but (2-93) is quite acceptable.•• 
version of (2-92) is also mysterious: 
( 2- 94) 
Another 
Here "so.-called" is an adjective which refers to a noun phrase 
-- a most unusual state of affairs. It may be objected that the 
referent here is the adjective "gunny", not the NP "gunny sack". 
But consider: 
(2-96) Why is rappelling so=£alled? 
Here the referents are unquestionably NPs. Note that in (2-96) 
the NP is a gerund; this seems to be the only way to ask such a 
question about a verb. 
---------------------------~---~ 
• 2 From: Andy. Ask Andy. The erovin£e, 11 July 1978, page 14. 
•
3 Old joke, recently resurrected on the television series Th~ 
IDUQEet shQW. 
•• That Nadia's question in (2-93) is well-formed is 
Ross•s reply being humorous. The humour relies 
question being quite acceptable, although based on a 
that normally wouldn • t be. See Hirst (1979) 
discussion. 
shown by 
on Nadia's 
prototype 
for more 
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TYPE OF ANAPHOR LEXICAL REALIZATION 
Pronominal 
• pronouns "he", "she", "it", "they", "one",••• 
• epithets "the idiot", "that stinking lump of camel 
excrement",··· 
• surface count 
Prosentential 
Pro-verbial 
Pro action al 
11 the former", "the latter", 11 same", 1 ow 
ordinals, ••• 
"it", "so" , ... 
"do" 
"do so", "do it" 
Proadjectival/prorelative 
"such", "so" , ... 
Temporal "then", temporal relations 
Locative "there", locative relations 
Ellipsis ~ 
The previous section dealt with various anaphoric proforms. The 
spirit of anaphora is not limited to proforms, however. This 
section examines some other linguistic constructions that can be 
used in an anaphor-like manner. 
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2.4.1 Paraphr~se. Paraphrase is a restatement of a part 
of a text in different words to clarify the intended meaning or 
for stylistic reasons. When a noun phrase is subsequently 
paraphrased in a text, the result is often anaphor-like. 
Indeed, it is not clear where anaphora ends and paraphrase 
begins. Consider these examples: 
(2-97) The man carrying the aeolian harp stumbled and for a 
moment Sue thought the man would fall. 
(2-98) sue watched the man from her hiding place. ];he ~an 
had an aeolian harp, which he was holding above his 
head in an attempt to make it play. 
(2-99) At first Ross couldn't locate the Pope. Then he 
looked up, and saw the b~loved BOn!iff floating gently 
to earth. 
In (2-97) , "the man" (second occurrence) refers to the man 
carrying the aeolian harp. such iQ£.Q!!Blgt~ rg~g~iii2ns clearly 
fit our definition of an anaphor, although people may not always 
classify them as such. The problem of understanding them 
differs from the case where a preform is used only in the 
quantity of information given in the reference. Programs such 
as Bobrow's (1964) STUDENT (see section 3.1.1) have dealt with 
such incompletes, using heuristics to equate them with their 
referent. Further, as in (2-98), a single complete repetition 
is again anaphor-like in the way it performs a subsequent 
reference to the man with the aeolian harp. 
In (2-99), "the beloved. pontiff" refers to the Pope. 
Although this is not an abbreviation,•s but rather a 
tfootnotes continue] 
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disabbreviation, it again shares the spirit of anaphora, and 
again the problem of understanding and making the connection is 
similar. 4 6 
The style of writing in which the paraphrases are not just 
lexically longer but are used to give more information than the 
original noun phrase occurs frequently in North 
newspaper reports; (2-100) demonstrates this style: 
(2-100) BIG BEN FATIGUED 
American 
LONDON - With a rattle and a bang, London's famous 
landmark, the Big Ben clock, ground to a halt today at 
4:46 a.,m. 
Th~ 117-year-old tifilg£iece apparently was the 
victim of metal fatigue.~, 
Here the paraphrase (underlined) gives us new information, in 
this case about the age of the clock. We can make the 
connection easily since "the ••• timepiece" clearly points back to 
"the ••• clock 11 • (If the noun phrase had been 11 a ••• timepiece 11 , 
then the indefinite article would mean that a different clock 
was being talked about.) 
--~-------------------~--------
45 It is not an epithet either, as it can be stressed if 
spoken. 
4 6 Could we take this analysis backwards, and construe "the 
Pope" as a cataphor of "the beloved pontiff" as we did in 
footn ote 29? we probably cannot since, without more context, we 
could replace the latter but not the former with the anaphor 
"him". In other words, in the absence of a compelling reason to 
do so we are loathe to allow the possibility of a cataphoric 
noun phrase existing where a cataphoric pronoun could not. 
4 7 Associated Press, 5 August 1976. 
2.4.1 / 42 
In the next example, there is no definite article or other 
pointer to help resolve the coreference: 
(2-101) CHOWCHILLA, Calif. - Two men charged with the 
abduction of 26 school children appeared in a packed 
courtroom today amid tight security and pleaded not 
guilty to 43 charges of kidnap and robbery. 
J~filgs Schoentgld and Fr~derick Woods, both 24, 
appeared in jus1i~g £ourt with Schoenfeld's brother, 
Richard, 22, who entered a plea of not guilty to the 
same charges a week ago.48 
The two paragraphs of (2-101) could he two separate court report 
summaries; only our knowledge of the style (and perhaps previous 
knowledge of the Chowchilla kidnapping case) allows us to detect 
that "James Schoenfeld and Frederick Woods" are the "two men" of 
the previous paragraph, and "justice court" is "a packed 
courtroom"· 
It is necessary, however, that the identity of the 
paraphrase and its referent be reasonably easy to infer. 
Informants frequently failed to recognize the paraphrase in this 
text: 
(2-102) Most of the city's federal buildings were dark, but 
chandeliers shone brightly from the National Portrait 
Gallery. Inside th~ bgilding in ~hi£h Walt Whitfilan 
QQ£g read hi§ EQet~y ~o wou~d~d UniQ~ trgQ.Es ~~d Abg 
Lincoln held his s~cQgd Inaugural B~ll, a black-tie 
assemblage of guests stood chatting.•9 
In fact, "the building in which Walt Whitman once read his 
--~~----------~----------------
Associated Press, 4 August 1976. 
4 9 From: Davidson, Ralph P. 
Time , 111 (20), 15 May 1978. 
A letter from the publisher. 
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poetry to wounded Union troops and Ane Lincoln held his second 
Inaugural Ball" is the previously-mentioned National Portrait 
Gallery, but many readers assume two separate buildings are 
being spoken of, apparently due to the difficulty of detecting 
the paraphrase in such convoluted prose. 
Not only NPs but also sentences and situations may be 
paraphrased. In this example (after Phillips 1975) "the 
mistake" refers prosententially to the whole preceding sentence: 
(2~103) Ross put his car into reverse instead of drive and hit 
a wall. The mistake cost him two hundred dollars. 
2.4.2 Defi~it~ referenc~. The anaphora and paraphrase 
problems are actually special cases of the definite reference 
problem. This is illustrated in the next two examples: 
(2-104) Nadia bought a DECsystem-10. 
KL 10 B. 
The scene for the second example is similar to that for (2-20), 
except that this time the guest is admiring the host's new car. 
The host comes up and remarks: 
(2-105) Because I'm a nostalgic horse racing fan, I've had the 
speedometgf marked in furlongs per hour. 
In these examples, the NPs "the processor" and "the speedometer" 
mean those of the DECsystem-10 and the car,so respectively, and 
------------~---------~--------
so We regard "the speedometer" as a reference to "the car" with 
the latter as antecedent, rather than a direct reference to "the 
Lfootnotes continue] 
semantically stand in the relation P!RT OF to those antecedents. 
Other possible relations include SUBSET OF 
Lockman 1975), and ASPECT or ATTRIBUTE OF.s1 
(Klappholz and 
We see that 
anaphora and paraphrase are merely cases of coreferentiality 
where the relation is IS IDENTICAL TO. 
Sometimes a coreference relationship is not one of those 
just mentioned, but rather is one determined by inference (Clark 
1975). Consider this example: 
(2-106) "It's nice having dinner with candles, but there's 
something funny about the two we•ve got tonight", 
Carol said. "They were the same length when you first 
lit them. Look at them now." 
John chuckled. "The _girl did say one would burn 
for four hours and the other for five", he replied. 
"Now one is twice as long as the other." 
-------~---- ... ---~---------~-----
speedometer" as 
assumption that 
consciousness. 
part of the 
that makes the 
unlikely that 
consciousness. 
an item in consciousness, on the reasonable 
the speedometer itself was not in the listener's 
Clearly, the speaker could have referenced any 
car from the engine through to the little switch 
light come on when you open the door but it is 
the listener would have had all these parts in 
s1 Examples of these relations: 
SUBS ET OF: 
(i) The Department has graduated five students this 
year. The PhDs were all in AI. 
ASPECT 
(ii) 
or ATTRIBUTE OF: 
For Christmas that year, Julian gave Sissy a 
miniature Tyrolean village. Th~ £raftsmgQ§hiE was 
remarkable. [From: Robbins, Tom. ].yg~ £QW9!£ls g~1 
the blues. New York: Bantam, 1977, page 191.J 
Klappholz and Lockman 
possible relation, but 
practice from PART OF. 
(1975) suggest MEMBER OF as another 
I am not convinced that it differs in 
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They had been burning for the same time, of 
course. How long was that?S2 
The relationship between "the candle" and "the girl" is that the 
latter presumably is the salesperson who sold John the former. 
To determine this requires a high level of inference, such as 
that performed in the MARGIE system (Schank, Goldman, Rieger and 
Riesbeck 1975; Rieger 1975), and we would not want to say that 
there is an intrinsic semantic relation between girls and 
candles. A simplistic resolution algorithm would probably have 
decided that "the gir 1 11 in this example was "Carol"· 
Between the extremes of a fixed relation like ASPECT OF and 
inferred relation like that in (2-106) 
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH: 
is the vague relation 
(2-107) The manager ushered sue and Nadia into his Qff!cg with 
obvious embarrassment. 
The concept of "office" is closely associated with the concept 
of "manager", through some fairly direct piece of world 
knowledge like (WORKS-IN MANAGER OFFICE). In section 5.2.2 we 
will see how this sort of relation might be handled. 
~------------------~~---------~ 
52 From: Hunter, J AH. Figure it out. The Canbe£!:£ timgs, 26 
October 1977, page 25. 
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2.5 1,yQg§ of ~ference 
Having reviewed the different sorts of anaphora in English, we 
are now in a position to make another elaboration of our 
definition of anaphora. We will distinguish between iientity Q! 
(ISA) 
(IRA) .s• 
An IRA is an anaphor which denotes the same entity as its 
antecedent. For example, in (2-108): 
(2-108) Ross made a gherkin sandwich and ate it. 
"it" refers to the very same gherkin sandwich that Ross made. 
An ISA denotes not the same entity as its antecedent, but one of 
a similar description. Wasow (1975) offers this example: 
(2-109) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser 
than the man who gave it to his mistress. 
Clearly, "it" means the second man's paycheck, not the first 
man's. 
Since the meaning of a text may depend on whether an 
anaphor is an ISA or an IRA, it is necessary for the complete 
computer NLU system to be able to tell them apart. This 
---------~--------------------~ 
53 The term is due to Grinder and Postal (1971), who abbreviate 
it "I - S = A" l sic]. 
5
" An alternative terminology (Nash-Webber 197 6) : ISA are like 
dgscriEtional anaphora, and IRA like d~nota!ion~l anaphora. 
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requires the use of semantics and world knowledge. In (2-109), 
we know "it" is an ISA because, we assume, each man has a 
paycheck, and an item cannot be given independently to two 
people at once. 
Occasionally below, we will follow Partee (1978) in 
distinguishing between anaphors which function as bound 
variables and other anaphors. For example, in (2-110): 
(2-110) No child will admit that he is sleepy. 
"he" is a bound variable anaphor which functions as a 
place-holder for "child", much as the bound variable x does in 
the logical form (2-111): 
( 2-111) -, (Ex: child) • will-admit-sleepiness x 
Many anaphors, like that of (2-112): 
(2-112) Ross told Daryel he had passed the exam. 
are ambiguous -- "he" could be either Ross or Daryel. However, 
some which are theoretically ambiguous are in practice not: 
(2-113) Daryel told Ross he<t> was the ugliest person he<2> 
knew of. 
In this example, each occurrence of "he" could mean either 
Daryel oc Ross, giving a total of four readings for the 
sentence . Yet most people immediately assume that "he<1> 11 is 
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Ross and "he<2> 11 is Daryel without even noticing some or all of 
the other readings. 
This indicates that in many cases of ambiguous anaphors 
there is a _E£eferred or default gnt~g1g~t, which is taken as 
the correct one in the absence of contraindicating context or 
knowledge. The qualification is necessary, as a sentence like 
(2-113) can be disambiguated by context: 
(2-114) Daryel examined his face disapprovingly in the mirror. 
When Ross asked him what conclusions he came to, 
Daryel told Ross he vas the ugliest person hg knew of. 
Both "he"s refer to Daryel here. 
More examples to convince the doubtful: 
(2-115) BRISBANE -- A terrific right rip from Hector Thompson 
dropped Ross Eadie at Sandgate on Friday night and won 
him the Australian welterweight boxing title.ss 
No informant to whom I showed this saw any ambiguity. They were 
clearly using their knowledge of boxing to infer, without 
realising it, that it was Thompson (and not Eadie) who won the 
boxing title. To see that world knowledge is the key factor 
here , we need only consider this report on the sport of 
dropping, the object of which is to be the first one dropped: 
(2-116) BRISBANE -- A terrific right rip from Hector Thompson 
dropped Ross Eadie at Sandgate on Friday night and won 
him the Australian welterweight dropping title. 
-------------------------~-----
55 From: The Canberra times, 25 May 1977. 
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Not all ambiguous anaphors have a default; this one 
probably doesn't: 
(2-117) SALEM, ore. - Police Chief Paul Arritola of nearby 
Jordan Valley runs what could be the most profitable 
radar speed trap on the continent. 
Documents filed here in connection with suit 
against him show that he collected $102,117 in traffic 
fines last year. Under his contract with this 
community of 210 people, he gets all the revenue, less 
the state's share and the cost of running his two-man 
department. In 1978, that worked out to $70,000. 
Said Jordan Valley Mayor Ed Krupp: "I'd rather 
have no comment.nsc, 
There was no consensus among informants as to whether the police 
chief ended up with $70,000 or $32,000 because of the ambiguity 
of "that". The former case was however slightly preferred (and 
was probably intended by the writer), since the overall theme of 
the text is the amount of money that the police chief collected. 
That there can, however, be a default referent which is 
neither the subject nor the theme (see also section 4.1) is 
shown by this example: 
(2-118) The FBI's role is to ensure our country's freedom and 
be ever watchful of those who threaten it.s7 
Most informants took "it" to be "our country's freedom" or "our 
country" (these referents having more or less the same meaning 
1.n this context, I assume), rather than "the FBI" or "the FBI's 
role", which are also semantically plausible referents, and 
-------------------------------
56 From: The Vancouv~ e~~res§, 9 March 1979, page AS. 
s7 Slightly modified from: 
111 (20), 15 May 1978. 
Sherman, Craig. tLetter]. Time, 
---
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which are, respectively, the theme and the subject. (Of course, 
there are those who say that all four candidates have more or 
less the same meaning in this context.) 
Defaults will be discussed further in section 6.5. 
An anaphor which can be read as both an IRA and an ISA can 
make a text ambiguous: 
(2~119) Ross likes his hair short, but Daryel likes it long. 
"It" can be Ross•s hair, if an IRA, or Daryel's, if an ISA. 
Ambiguity may arise only after another anaphor is resolved. 
The text (2-120) (after Grinder and Postal 1971): 
(2-120) Ross loves his wife and Daryel does too. 
is ambiguous as to whose wife Daryel loves -- his own or Ross•s; 
that is, when "does" is macro-expanded (Hirst 1976b) as "loves 
his wife", the "his" is ambiguous. sa This phenomenon is called 
---------~---------~-----~-----
5 8 The sentence is unambiguous if we happen to know that Daryel 
is not married. 
59 Related to the sloppy identity problem is the problem of 
m~i.!ill antecedent§, described by Grinder and Postal (1971) who 
provide this example: 
(i) My uncle doesn't have a spouse, but your aunt does and 
he is lying on the floor. 
The referent of "he" .1.s clearly "your aunt's spouse". 
only be resolved after the ISA pro-verb "does" is 
interpreted or macro-expanded as "has a spouse". 
This can 
properly 
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Sometimes, ambiguities can be resolved by simple lexical 
information. For example, (2-121) is not ambiguous in the same 
way that (2-120) is, simply because it is inherent in nose 
twitching that one can only do it to one's own nose: 
( 2-121) 
similarly, 
Nadia was able to twitch her nose and Ross was l 
too.60 
(2-122) is only two ways ambiguous and not four ways 
as is (2-112), since both anaphors must be coreferential: 
(2-122) Ross told Daryel hg was able to twitch his nose. 
Verb symmetry and reflexivity can also inhibit ambiguity. 
For example, for all entities A and B "A looks like B" implies 
"B looks like A", and "A looks like A" is identically true for 
all A. Hence (2-123), superficially four ways ambiguous, can 
only have one meaning, since the two readings with the anaphors 
coreferential can be dismissed as tautologies (which violate 
conversational postulates (Gordon and Lakoff 1971; Grice 1975)) 
and the other two readings are semantically identical: 
( 2-123) People like dogs because they look like them. 
We would not want an NLU system to waste time (or infinitely 
loop) trying to decide if "people look like dogs" is better than 
"dogs look like people". 
---------~---------------------
6 0 Even if Ross had the power to make Nadia's nose twitch, by 
Pavlovian conditioning for example, we could not express this 
fact with (2-121), instead having to say something like: 
(i) Nadia was able to make her nose twitch and Ross was q 
too. 
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What does all this portend for a computer NLU system? 
Clearly, it sets certain minimum requirements. 
need: 
1 knowledge about words and their uses; 
2 world knowledge; 
A system will 
3 a method of determining default antecedents; and 
4 inference mechanisms to apply to 1-3 above and to the 
meaning of the discourse itself. 
2.7 summary an~ discussion 
In this chapter, I have tried to do these things: 
1 define with reasonable precision what anaphora and 
reference are; 
2 give examples of various types of anaphora; 
3 demonstrate that a referent can be almost anything in 
the listener's consciousness, be it explicit or implicit 
in the discourse, or not in the discourse at all; and 
4 show how and why anaphora and reference can be a problem 
for NLU by computer, and how they are interrelated with 
other problems in NLU; 
5 show that anaphor resolution requires world knowledge, 
word meaning, inference and default referents. 
This chapter, then, has been essentially the statement of 
a problem. The rest of this thesis looks at solutions to the 
problem. Because of the fuzziness of the boundary between 
anaphora and paraphrase and other forms of reference, the 
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problem has, unfortunately, a very fuzzy boundary. It follows 
by definition that any general resolver of definite reference 
(clearly a desirable AI goal) will contain an anaphor resolver 
as a subset. It does not follow, however, that any anaphor 
resolver can be expanded into a definite reference resolver. 
Perhaps what is needed is not a happily independent anaphor 
resolver, but a more general solution to the problem of 
reference. However, such a solution may not exist, and even if 
it does, it may not be accessible to us in the near future . 
Therefore, an independent anaphor resolver is a good step to 
take next. In subsequent chapters, we shall sometimes, where it 
is fairly easy to do so, be general and address the problem of 
reference. At other times, we shall concentrate more 
particularly on anaphora. 
vacillation paradigm. 
This is what AI workers call the 
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eeThey went about and sang of Rama Is 
deeds; and Rama heard of it, and he 
called an assembly of the Brahmans and 
all kinds of grammarians ••• and the 
hermit children sang before them all. 9~ 
The Ramayanat 
In this chapter and chapter 5 I describe and evaluate some of 
the approaches that have been taken to anaphora, with respect to 
NLU systems, over the past years. I have divided them very 
roughly into two classes: traditional and modern. The 
traditional systems tend not to recognize as a separate problem 
the question of what is or isn't in consciousness. Rather, they 
assume that, other things being equal, the set of possible 
referents is exactly the set of NPs (or whatever), from the 
whole of the preceding text, in strict order of recency. Their 
resolution methods tend to work at the sentence level, and may 
bring to 
knowledge. 
handled. 
bear world knowledge and low-level linguistic 
Antecedents not explicit in the text are not 
This characterization is of course a generalization; 
not all approaches classified as tradi tiona 1 fit this 
description in every detail. on the other hand, modern methods 
-------~-----------------------
1 From the translation in: Coomaraswamy, Ananda K and The 
Sister Nivedita of Ramakrishna-Vivekananda (Margaret E Noble). 
My~ of the Hindus & fu!ddhists. {1) Harrap, 1913. {2) New 
York: Dover, 1967. page 110. 
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recognize the importance of focus and discourse-level knowledge 
for resolution. Implicit antecedents may also be handled. 
In this chapter, I review the traditional methods; in 
chapter 5, the modern methods are presented. 
3.1 Some traditional SY§tems 
First we will look at some of the systems that employed 
traditional anaphor resolution methods. 
:fiar lisp' d in Numbers.,, 
Alexander Pope2 
3. 1. 1 STUDENT. The high~school algebra problem answering 
system STUDENT (Bobrow 1964), an early system with natural 
language input, has only a few limited heuristics for resolving 
anaphors and, more particularly, anaphor-like paraphrases and 
incomplete repetitions. For example, in a question such as 
(3- 1) : 
------------------~----~--~----
2 From: An epistle to Dr Arbuthnot. 2 January 1735, line 128. 
in, inter alia: Pope, Alexander. Imitations of Horace liith ag 
eE1stl~ to Dr Arbuth~Q! and the E£ilogue to the Satires. (= The 
Twickenham edition of the poems of Alexander Pope 4). London: 
-r Methuen, 1939. 
(3-1) 
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The number of soldiers the Russians have is half the 
number of guns they have . The number of guns is 7000. 
What is the number of soldiers they have? 
the system will first try to solve the problem treating "the 
numner of soldiers the Russians have" and "the number of 
soldiers they have" as two separate and distinct variables. 
Upon failure, it will eventually identify the two phrases by 
noting that they are identical up to the pronoun in the second. 
Similarly, it will identify "the number of guns" with "the 
number of guns they have" by the fact that the former is 
contained in and occurs after the latter. STUDENT does not 
actually resolve the pronouns at all. Phrases containing "this" 
are usually taken to refer to the consequence of the immediately 
preceding item without looking at the rest of the phrase. Thus, 
in (3-2): 
(3-2) A number is multiplied by 6. 
increased by 44. 
This product is 
the word "product" could be changed to "result" or "sasguatch" 
without changing the assumed referent of "this". Cases like 
(3-3) : 
(3-3) The price of a radio is 69 .70 dollars. This £rice is 
15% less than the marked price. 
are apparently resolved through the two occurrences of the word 
"pr ice" .. 
Clearly, these simple heuristics are easily fooled since 
the sentence is not even parsed in any real sense. For example, 
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in (3-4) the two references to sailors would not be matched up, 
although modifications to the heuristics may change this: 
(3-4) The number of soldiers the Russians have is twice the 
number of sailors they have. The number of soldiers 
is 7000. How many sailors do the Russians have? 
However a sophisticated paraphrase of 
chance: 
(3-4) would stand no 
(3-5) If the Russians have twice as many soldiers as 
sailors, and they have 7000 soldiers, how many sailors 
are there? 
••"No, no", said Anne. "That won't do. 
You must do something more than that." 
"But what? All the good jobs are 
taken, and all I can do is lisp in 
numbers." 
"Well, then, you must lisp", 
concluded Anne.!~ 
Aldous Leonard Huxley3 
3.1.2 SHRDLU. Winograd's (1971, 1972) celebrated SHRDLU 
system employs heuristics much more complex than those of 
STUDENT , providing impressive and, for the most part, 
sophisticated handling of anaphors, including references to 
earlier parts of the conversation between the program and its 
user. The most important aspect of SHRDLU's handling of 
----------~--------~--------~--
3 From: CrQJBe yellow. New York: Harper, 1922. 
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anaphors is that in checking previous noun groups as possible 
referents, it does not seize the first likely candidate for use, 
but rather checks all possibilities in the preceding text and 
assigns each a rating whereby the most plausible answer is 
selected. If none clearly stands out as a winner, the user is 
asked for help in choosing between the serious contenders. 
Gross heuristics cover some simpler cases. If "it" or 
"they" occurs twice in the same sentence, or in two adjacent 
sentences, the occurrences are assumed to be coreferential. 
This usually works, but there are, as always, easy 
counterexamples, such as (3-6) (from Minsky 1968): 
(3-6) He put the box on tbe table. Because it wasn't level, 
it slid off. 
--
An anaphor which is part of its own referent, as (3-7): 
(3~7) a block which is bigger than anything which supports 
it 
can be detected and interpreted correctly by SHRDLU without 
infinite regression. Reference to events, as in (3-8): 
(3-8) Why did you do it? 
is resolved through always remembering the last event referred 
to. 
Some contrastive uses of "one" can be handled, as in (3-9): 
(3-9) a big green pyramid and a little one 
A list of pairs of words like "big" and "little" that are often 
used contrastively is employed to work out that "little one" 
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here means "little green pyramid" and not "little pyramid" or 
"little big green pyramid". This method assumes no redundant 
information is given. suppose your universe had three pyramids: 
a big blue one, a big green one and a little blue one. Then the 
above interpretation of (3-9) would have you looking for a 
little green pyramid which you don't have, when the speaker 
obviously meant the little blue one. Although the "big" in 
resulted in an erroneous (3-9) is redundant and has 
interpretation, it is a perfectly acceptable phrase which 
reflects the way people often talk. 
The methods used for "one" are also used for incompletes 
which are cardinal numbers, such as in (3-10): 
(3-10) Find the red blocks and stack up thr~~-
3. 1. 3 LSNLIS. The Lunar Sciences Natural Language 
Information System (LSNLIS also known as LUNAR) (Woods, 
Kaplan and Nash-Webber 1972; Woods 1977) uses an ATN parser 
(Woods 1970) and a semantic interpreter based on the principles 
of procedural semantics (Woods 1968).• It . 1S in this latter 
component that the system resolves anaphoric references, giving 
full meaning to pronouns found in the parse tree. 
-~---------------------------~-
• A useful overview of the whole LSNLIS system, together with a 
detailed critique of its anaphor handling capabilities, may be 
found in Nash~Webber (1976). 
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The system distinguishes two classes of anaphors: £~rti~l 
and £9.!!plete. A complete anaphor (of which there are three 
types) is a pronoun which refers to a complete antecedent noun 
phrase, while a partial one refers to only part of a preceding 
NP; that is, the first is an IRA and the second an ISA. (3-11) 
shows a complete anaphoric reference and (3-12) a partial one: 
(3-11) Which coarse-grained rocks have been analyzed for 
cobalt? Which QQes have been analyzed for strontium? 
( 3- 12) Give me all analyses of sample 10046 for hydrogen. 
Give me them for oxygen. 
Note that in (3-12), "them" refers to "all analyses of sample 
10046 11 , whereas the NP . in the antecedent sentence was "all 
analyses of sample 10046 for hydrogen". such partial anaphors 
are signalled by the presence of a relative clause or 
prepositional phrase modifying the pronoun; here it is "for 
oxygen". 
Partial anaphors are resolved by searching through 
antecedent noun phrases for one with a parallel syntactic and 
semantic structure. In (3-12), for example, the antecedent NP 
is found, and "for oxygen" substituted for "for hydrogen". This 
method is not unlike Bobrow's in STUDENT (see section 3.1.1), 
nut it works on the syntactic and semantic level rather than at 
the more superficial level of lexical matching with a little 
added syntax. It suffers however from the same basic 
limitation, namely that it can only resolve anaphors where the 
antecedent is of a similar structure. Neither (3-13) nor 
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(3-14), for example, could have been used as the second sentence 
of (3-12): 
Give me the oxygen 2ngs. (3-13) 
( 3- 14) Give me tho~g that have been done for oxygen. 
Three different methods are used for complete anaphoric 
references, the one chosen depending on the exact form of the 
anaphor. The first form includes a noun and uses the anaphor as 
a determiner: 
(3-15) Do any breccias contain aluminium? 
breccias? 
What are _tho 2g 
The strategy used here is to search for a noun phrase whose head 
noun is "breccias". Note that if the second sentence contained 
instead a paraphrase, such as "those samples", this method would 
either find the wrong antecedent, or none at all, as there is no 
mechanism for recognizing the paraphrase. 
The second form is a single pronoun: 
(3- 16) How much titanium 
silicon is in them? 
1S 
. in type B rocks? How much 
In this case, more semantic information needs to be used. The 
semantic template which matches "ELEMENT BE IN" requires that 
the object of the verb be a SAMPLE, and this fact is used in 
searching for a suitable antecedent in this example. This is 
isomorphic to a weak use of a case-based approach (see sections 
3.1.5 and 3.2.4). 
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The third type of complete anaphor is "one" and "ones", as 
in (3-11). These are resolved either with or without modifiers 
like "too" and 11 also 11 • (Notice that if either of these 
modifiers were appended to (3-11) , the meaning would be 
completely changed, the anaphor referring not to the first 
question but rather to its answer.) Resolution is by a method 
similar to that used for single pronouns. 
The primary limitation of LSNLIS is that intrasentential 
anaphors cannot be resolved, because a noun phrase is not 
available as an antecedent until processing of the sentence 
containing it is complete. 
So far, the natural language 
systems based on conceptual dependency theory (Schank 1973) , 
MARGIE (Schank, Goldman, Rieger and Riesbeck 1975; Schank 1975) 
and SAM (Schank and the Yale AI Project 1975; Schank and Abelson 
1977; Nelson 1978), have apparently not been able to handle any 
form of anaphor much beyond knowing that "he" always refers to 
John (a pathetic victim of social brutalization) and "she" to 
Mary (a pathetic victim of John, 
murders her). 
who frequently beats and 
Howe ver, the Conceptual Memory section of MARGIE (Rieger 
1975) is able to resolve some limited forms of definite 
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reference by inference. Conceptual Memory operates upon 
nonlinguistic representations of concepts based on Schank's 
conceptual dependency theory, and can perform sixteen types of 
inference, including motivational, normative, causative and 
resultative. For example, if the system knows of two people 
named Andy, one an adult and one an infant, it can work out 
which is the subject of (3-17): 
(3-17) Andy's diaper is wet. 
That conceptual dependency-based systems should be so 
limited with respect to reference is disappointing, as 
conceptual dependency may prove to be an excellent framework for 
inference on anaphors (see section 3.2.6) . 
3.1.5 A £a§e=driven £~§~- In his case-driven parser, 
Taylor (1975; Taylor and Rosenberg 1975) uses case analysis 
(Fillmore 1968, 1977) to resolve anaphors. 
Pronouns are only encountered by the parser when a 
particular verb case is being sought, thereby giving much 
information about its referent. Previous sentences and 
nonsubordinate clausess are searched for a referent that fits 
--~--~-~------------~---~------
5 Subordinate clauses in English can contain anaphors, but 
Taylor 's system will not find them. 
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the case and which passes other tests, usually SHOULD-BE and 
MUST-BE predicates, to ensure that it fits semantically. As the 
search becomes more desperate, the SHOULD-BE tests are relaxed. 
Locative and dummy-subject anaphors can also be resolved. 
The parser will always take the first candidate that passes 
all the tests as the referent. This occasionally leads to 
problems, where there are two or more acceptable candidates, but 
the first one found is not the correct one. 
iiHow is this done? By fucking around 
with syntax.~! 
Tom Robbins6 
3.1.6 Parse t£eg 2 e~r£hillg. An algorithm for searching a 
parse tree of a sentence to find the referent for a pronoun has 
been given by Jerry Hobbs (1976, 1977). The algorithm takes 
into consideration various syntactic constraints on 
pronominalization (see section 3.2.2) to search the tree in an 
optimal order such that the NP upon which it terminates is 
probably the antecedent of the pronoun at which the algorithm 
started . (For details of the algorithm, which is too long to 
----~-----------~--------------
6 From: Ey~ £Q~gi£ls get the blues. New York: Bantam, 
page 379. 
1977, 
3.1.6 / 65 
give here, and an example of its use, see Hobbs (1976:8-13) or 
Hobbs (1977:2-7).) 
Because the algorithm operates purely on the parse, it does 
not take into account the meaning of the text, nor can it find 
non-explicit antecedents. Nonetheless, Hobbs found that it 
gives the right answer a large proportion of the time. 
To test the algorithm, Hobbs took text from an archaeology 
book, an Arthur Hailey novel and a copy of Ne~sweek. From each 
of these as much contiguous text as was necessary to obtain one 
hundred occurrences of pronouns was taken. He then applied the 
algorithm to each pronoun and counted the number of times it 
worked. 7 He reports (1976:25) that the algorithm worked 88 
percent of the time, and 92 percent when augmented with simple 
selectional constraints. In many cases, the algorithm worked 
because there was only one available antecedent anyway; in the 
cases where there was more than one, the algorithm combined with 
selectional restrictions was correct for 82 percent of the time. 
Clearly, the algorithm by itself is inadequate. However 
Hobbs suggests that it may still be useful, as it is 
-~-----------------~-----------
7 To the best of my knowledge, Hobbs is the only worker in NLU 
to have ever quantitatively evaluated the efficacy of a language 
understanding mechanism on unrestricted real-world text in this 
manner. Clearly, such evaluation is frequently desirable. 
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computationally cheap compared to any semantic method of pronoun 
resolution. Because it is frequently necessary for semantic 
resolution methods to search for inference chains from reference 
to referent, time may frequently be saved, suggests Hobbs 
(1976:38), by using a bidirectional search starting at both the 
reference and the antecedent proposed by the algorithm, seeing 
if the two paths meet in the middle. 
3. 1. 7 Preference semantics. 
-----..-
Wilks (1973b, 1975a, 1975b) 
describes an English to French translation systems which uses 
four levels of pronominal anaphor resolution depending on the 
type of anaphor and the mechanism needed to resolve it. The 
lowest level, type "A", uses only knowledge of individual lexeme 
meanings. For example, in (3-18): 
(3-18) Give the bananas to the monkeys although !h~I are not 
ripe, because they are very hungry. 
each "they" is interpreted correctly using the knowledge that 
monkeys, being animate, are likely to be hungry, and bananas, 
being a fruit, are likely to be (not) ripe. The system uses 
"fuzzy matching" to make such judgements; while it chooses the 
most likely match, future context or information may cause the 
decision to be reversed. The key to Wilks•s system is very 
general rules which specify £referred choices but don't require 
------~------------------------
8 For an unbiased description of Wilks' system, see Browse 
(1976). 
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an irreversible commitment in case the present situation should 
turn out to be an exception to the rule. 
If word meaning fails to find a unique referent for the 
pronoun, inference methods for type "B" anaphors -- those that 
need analytic inference -- or type "C" anaphors -- those that 
require inference using real-world knowledge beyond simple word 
meanings are brought in. These methods extract all case 
relationships from a template representation of the text and 
attempt to construct the shortest possible inference chain, not 
using real-world knowledge unless necessary. 
If the anaphor is still unresolved after all this, "focus 
of attention" rules attempt to find the topic of the sentence to 
use as the referent. 
Wilks•s system of rules exhibiting undogmatic preferences, 
as well as his stratification of resolution requirements, is 
intuitively appealling, and appears the most promising of the 
approaches we have looked at; it could well be applied to forms 
of anaphora other than pronouns. My major disagreement is with 
Wilks•s relegation of (rudimentary) discourse considerations to 
use only in last desperate attempts. I will show in the next 
chapter that they need to play a more important role. 
3. 1. 8 Sum]!!ary. We have seen six 
approaches to anaphora and coreferentiality: 
1 a few token heuristics; 
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basic traditional 
2 more sophisticated heuristics with a semantic base; 
3 a case-based grammar to give the heuristics extra power, 
using word meanings as well; 
4 lots and lots of undirected inference; 
5 dumb parse-tree searching, with semantic operations to 
keep out of trouble; 
6 a scheme of flexible preference semantics with word 
meanings and inference. 
In the next section, we will evaluate in greater detail these 
and other approaches. 
eeThe Hodja was walking home when a man 
came up behind him and gave him a thump 
on the head. When the Hodja turned 
round, the man began to apologize, 
saying that he had taken him for a 
friend of his. The Hodja, however, was 
very angry at this assault upon his 
dignity, and dragged the man off to the 
court. It happened, however, that his 
assailant was a close friend of the £adi 
tmagistrateJ, and after listening to the 
two parties in the dispute, the cadi 
said to his friend: 
"You are in the wrong. You shall 
pay the Hodja a farthing damages." 
His friend said that he had not 
that amount of money on nim, and went 
off, saying he would get it. 
Hodja waited and waited, and still 
the man did not return. When an hour 
had passed, the Hodja got up and gave 
the cadi a mighty thump on the back of 
his head. 
"I can wait 
"When he comes, 
yours. 11 9 9! 
no longer", he said. 
the farthing is 
[footnotes continue] 
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Before continuing on to the discourse-oriented approaches to 
anaphora in the next two chapters, I would like to stand back 
and review the position so far. 
It is a characteristic of research in NLU that, as in many 
new and smallish f ields, the best way to describe an approach is 
to give the name of the person with whom it is generally 
associated. This is reflected in the organization of both 
section 3.1 and chapter 5. However , in this section I would 
like to categorize approaches, divorcing them from people's 
names, and to formalize what we have seen so far. 
3.2.1 A formalization of the Eroblem. David Klappholz and 
_, - ---- -- -- -----
Abe Lockman (1975) (hereafter K&L), who were perhaps the first 
in NLU to even consider the problem of reference as a whole, 
sketch out the basics of a reference resolver. They see it as 
-------~---------------~-------
9 From: Charles Downing 
Oxford University Press, 
recommended for anaphor 
lesson, but also as a good 
(reteller). Talg§ Qf thg HQdj~. 
1964, page 10. This excerpt is 
resolvers not only as a useful moral 
test of skill and ruggedness. 
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necessarily based upon and operating upon representations of 
meaning, a set of world knowledge and a memory of the focus 
derived from each past sentence, including noun phrases, verb 
phrases, and events.10 One then matches up anaphors with 
previous noun phrases and other constituents, and uses semantics 
to see what is a reasonable match and what isn't, hoping to 
avoid a combinatorial explosion with the aid of the world 
knowledge. 
Specifically, K&L envisaged three focus sets for 
noun-objects, events and time.11 As each sentence comes . in, a 
meaning representation is formed for it; then the focus sets are 
updated by adding entities from the new sentence, and discarding 
those from the nth previous sentence, which are now deemed too 
far back to De referred to. (K&L do not hazard any guess at 
what a good value for n is.) A hypothesis set of all triples 
(N1, N2, r) is generated, where N1 is a reference needing 
resolution, N2 is an entity in focus and r is a possible 
reference relation (see section 2.4.2). A judgement mechanism 
then tries to winnow the hypotheses with inference, semantics 
-------------------------------
10 In general, we will mean by the fQCY§ of a point in text all 
concepts and entities from the preceding text that are referable 
at that point. As should soon be clear, focus is just what we 
have been calling "consciousness". 
11 In Hirst (1976b), I proposed that their model really 
requires three other focus sets -- locative, verbal and actional 
-- for the resolution of locative, pro-verbial and proactional 
anaphors, respectively. 
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and knowledge, until a consistent set is left. 
This method is, of course, what Winograd and Woods (see 
sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) were trying to approximate. However, 
in their formalization of the problem K&L are aiming for higher 
things, namely a solution for the general problem of definite 
reference, from which an anaphor resolver will fall out as an 
immediate corollary. I believe their model however still 
represents less than the minimum equipment for a successful 
solution to the problem. For example (as K&L themselves point 
out} their model cannot handle examples like (2-106) 12 where 
deter mining the reference relationship requires inference. 
Further, as we shall soon see, the model of focus as a simple 
shift register is overly simplistic.13 
3.2.2 Syntax ~ethods. Linguists have found many syntactic 
constraints on pronominalization in sentence generation. These 
---- ..... ~--------------------------
12 (2-106) "It's nice having dinner with candles, but there's 
something funny about the two we've got tonight", Carol said. 
"They were the same length when you first lit them. Look at 
them now." 
John chuckled. "The girl did say one would burn for four 
hours and the other for five", he replied ••• 
1 3 K&L have since developed their model to eliminate some of 
these problems, and we will see their later work in section 5.4. 
My reason for presenting their earlier work here is that it 
serves as a useful conceptual scaffold from which to build both 
our review of traditional anaphora resolution methods and our 
exposition of modern methods. 
3.2.2 I 72 
can be used to eliminate otherwise acceptable antecedents in 
resolution 
examples:t• 
fairly easily. We will look at a couple of 
The most obvious constraint is reflexivization. Consider: 
----~----
( 3-19) Nadia says that sue is knitting a sweater for h~r. 
"Her" is Nadia or, in the right context, so-me other female, but 
cannot be sue, as English syntax requires the reflexive 
"herself" to be used if sue is the intended referent. In 
general an anaphoric NP is coreferential with the subject NP of 
the same simple sentence if and only if the anaphor is 
reflexive . 
Another constraint prohibits a pronoun in a main clause 
referring to an NP in a subsequent subordinate clause: 
( 3- 20) Because Ross slept in, hg was late for work. 
(3- 21) Because hg slept in, Ross was late for work. 
( 3- 22) Ross was late £or work because he slept in. 
(3-23) He was late for work because Ross slept in. 
In the first three sentences, "he" and "Ross" can .be 
coreferential. In (3-23), however, "he" cannot be Ross because 
of the above constraint, and either "he" is someone in the wider 
context of the sentence or the text is ill-formed. 
-------------------------------
1 
• See Langacker ( 1969) and Ross 
restrictions on pronominalization. 
(1969) for more syntactic 
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We have already seen that syntax-based methods by 
themselves are not enough. However, syntax-oriented methods may 
still play a role in anaphora resolution, as we saw in section 
3.1.6. 
iiThe fool hath said in his heart, 
There is no God.99 
King Davidts 
This is where prejudices 
start showing. Many AI workers, myself included, adhere to the 
maxim "One good theory is worth a thousand heuristics". People 
like Yorick Wilks (~971, 1973a, 1973b, 1975c) would disagree, 
arguing that language by its very nature -- its lack of a sharp 
boundary -- does not always allow (or perhaps nevg~ allows) the 
formation of 11 100%-correct" theories; language understanding 
cannot be an exact science, and therefore heuristics will always 
be needed to plug the gaps. If the heuristic approach has 
failed so far, so this viewpoint says, then we just haven't 
found the right heuristics.16 
-------------------------------
16 For a discussion of Wilks• arguments in detail, see Hirst 
(1976a). 
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While not totally rejecting Wilks•s arguments,t 7 I believe 
that the search for a good theory on anaphora resolution should 
not yet be terminated and labelled a failure. Gathering 
heuristics may suffice for the construction of a particular 
practical system, such as LSNLIS, but the aim of present work is 
to find more general principles. (Chapter 5 describes several 
theoretical approaches to the problem.) 
This does not mean that we have no time for heuristics. 
The essence of our quest is £O~~letengs§. Thus, a taxonomy of 
anaphors or coreferences, together with an algorithm which will 
recognize each and apply a heuristic to resolve it, would be 
acceptable if it could be shown to handle every case the English 
language has to offer. And indeed, if we were to develop the 
heuristic approach, this would be our goa1.1a 
However, our prospects for reaching this goal appear 
dismal. Consider first the problem of a taxonomy of anaphors, 
coreferences and definite references. Halliday and Hasan 
(1976), in attempting to classify different usages in their 
--------------~----------------
1 7 I confess that when in a slough of despond I sometimes fear 
he may be right. 
1s One attempt at the heuristic approach was made by Baranofsky 
(1970), who described such a taxonomy with appropriate 
algorithms. However , her heuristics made no attempt to be 
complete, but rather to cover a wide range with as few cases as 
possible. I have been unable to determine whether the 
heuristics were ever implemented in a computer program. 
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study of cohesion in English, identify 26 distinct types which 
can function in 29 distinct ways. (Compare my loose and 
informal classification in section 2.3 . 15.) While it is 
possible that some of their categories can be combined in a 
taxonomy useful for computational understanding of text, it is 
equally likely that as many, if not more, of their categories 
will need further subdivision . There is, moreover, no way yet 
of ensuring completeness in such a taxonomy, nor of ensuring 
that a heuristic will work properly on all applicable cases. 
Also, there is the problem of semantics again . Rules which 
will allow the resolution of anaphors like those of the 
following examples will require either a further fragmentation 
of the taxonomy, or a fragmentation within the heuristic for 
each category: 
( 3- 24) 
(3- 25) 
When sue went to Nadia's home for dinner,§~ served 
sukiyaki au gratin. 
When Sue went to Nadia's home for rlinner, §hi ate 
sukiyaki au gratin. 
(These examples will be referred to collectively below as the 
•sukiyaki' examples.) Here "she", superficially ambiguous, 
means Nadia in (3-2 4) and sue in (3-25). 
Thus, a heuristic approach will essentially degenerate into 
a demon-like system (Charniak 1972), in which each heuristic is 
just a demon watching out for its own special case. Although 
this is theoretically fine, the shortcomings of such systems are 
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well known (Charniak 1976). 
All this is not to do away with heuristics entirely. As 
Wilks points out, we may be forced to use them to plug up holes 
in any theory, and, moreover, any theory may contain one or more 
layers of heuristics.19 
3.2.4 Th~ Case "grammars" case 
----
(Fillmore 1968, 1977), with their wide theoretical base, are 
able to resolve many anaphors in a way that is perhaps more 
simple and elegant than heuristics. The extra information 
provided by cases is often sufficent to easily pair reference 
with referent, given the meaning of the words involved. 
For example, this approach is able to handle differences in 
the meaning of a word or anaphor in context. Compare (3-26) and 
(3-27): 
(3- 26) 
(3-27) 
Ross asked Daryel to hold hi§ books for a minute. 
Ross asked Daryel to hold his breath for a minute. 
~----------~------------~-----~ 
19 You may have noticed that most of my arguments in this 
section depend on precisely what I mean by a "heuristic", and 
that I have placed it somewhere on a continuum between "theory" 
and "demon". While this is not . the place to discuss this matter 
in detail, I am using the word to mean one of a set of 
essentially uncoordinated rules of thumb which together suffice 
to provide a method of achieving an end under a variety of 
conditions. 
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In the first sentence, "his" refers to Ross, the default 
focus,20 and in the second, it refers to Daryel. Further, in 
each sentence, "hold" has a different meaning -- "support" and 
"retain" respective1y21 -- and handling the difference would be 
difficult for many systems. A case-driven parser, such as 
Taylor's (1975) (see section 3. 1.4), would have a dictionary 
entry for each meaning of "hold". In this example, 11 breath 11 
could only pass the tests associated with the case-frame for one 
meaning, while "books" could only pass the tests for the other. 
Hence the correct meaning would be chosen. It is then possible 
to resolve the anaphors. In (3-26), there is nothing to 
contraindicate the assignment of the default focus. In (3-27), 
the system could determine that since the "retain" sense of 
"hold" was chosen, 11 his" must refer to Daryel. Taylor• s parser 
does not have this resolution capability, but to program it 
would be fairly straightforward, if a default finder could be 
given. 
Case-based systems also have an advantage in the resolution 
of situational anaphors. Compare (2-40)22 with (3-28): 
----------~------------------~-
zo Some idiolects appear not to accept this default, and see 
the anaphor as ambiguous. 
21 That these two uses of "hold" are not the same is 
demonstrated ny the following examples: 
(i) Daryel held his books and his briefcase. 
(ii) ?Daryel held his hooks and his breath. 
[footnotes continue] 
( 3- 28) 
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The president was shot while riding in a motorcade 
down a major Dallas boulevard today; it was crowded 
with spectators at the time. 
A general heuristic system would have trouble detecting the 
difference between the "it" in each case. A case grammar 
approach can use the properties of the verb forms "to be 
crowded" and "to cause" to recognize that in (2-40) the referent 
may be situational. To determine exactly what situation is 
being referred to, though, some ugd~rstagdillil of sentences will 
be needed. This problem doesn't arise in this particular 
example, since there is only one previous situation that can be 
referenced prosententially. But as we have seen, whole 
paragraphs and chapters can be prosententially referenced, and 
deciding which previous sentence or group of sentences is 
intended is a task which requires use of meaning. 
The case approach would not be sufficient to resolve our 
•sukiyaki' examples. Recall (3-24) .23 The parser would look 
for a referent for "she" witb. such conditions as MUST.,..BE HUMAN, 
MUST-BE FEMALE and SHOULD-BE HOST. But how is it to know that 
Nadia, and not sue, is t~e item to be preferred as a HOST? 
Humans know this from the location of the event taking place. 
----------------------~--------~~ 
22 (2-40) The president was shot while riding in a motorcade 
down a major Dallas boulevard today; it caused a panic on Wall 
Street. 
23 (3-24) When sue went to Nadia's home for dinner, §he served 
sukiyaki au gratin. 
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However, a case-driven parser does not have this knowledge, 
expressed in the subordinate clause at the start of the 
sentence, available to it. To get this information, an 
inferencing mechanism is needed to determine from the verb 
"went" that the serving took place at, or on the way to,2 4 
Nadia's home, and to infer that therefore Nadia is probably the 
host. such an inferencer will also need to use a database of 
information from previous sentences, as not all the knowledge 
necessary for resolution need be given in the one sentence at 
hand (For example, in this case the sentence may be broken into 
two simple sentences.) This database must contain semantic 
information -- meanings of, and inferences from, past sentences; 
that is, sentences must be, in some sense, understood.ZS Thus 
we see once more that parsing with anaphor resolution cannot 
take place without understanding. 
Now consider (3-25).26 Here, a case approach has even less 
information -- only MUST-BE ANIMATE and MUST-BE FEMALE -- and no 
---~-----~-~~-----------~------
z• Sentence (i) shows that we cannot conclude from the 
subordinate clause that the location of the action expressed in 
subsequent verbs necessarily takes place at Nadia's home: 
(i) When Sue went to Nadia's home for dinner, she 
caught the wrong bus and arrived an hour late. 
2s The database 
knowledge. 
will also need common-sense real-world 
26 (3-25) When sue went to Nadia's home for dinner, §h~ ate 
sukiyaki au gratin. 
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basis for choosing between sue and Nadia as the subject of the 
main clause. The way we know that it is sue is that she is the 
topic of the preceding subordinate clause and, in the absence of 
any indication to the contrary, the topic remains unchanged. 
Notice that this rule is neither syntactic nor semantic but 
pragmatic -- a convention of conversation and writing. Apart 
from this, there is no other way of determining that Sue, and 
not Nadia, is the sukiyaki consumer in question. 
Another use of cases is in meta~hQr resolution for anaphor 
resolution. A system which uses a network of cases in 
conjunction with a network of concept associations to resolve 
metaphoric uses of words has been constructed by Roger Browse 
(1977, 1978). For example, it can understand that in: 
(3- 29) Ross drank the bottle. 
what was drunk was actually the contents of the bottle. This is 
determined from the knowledge that bottles contain fluid, and 
"drink" requires a fluid object. such metaphor resolution can 
be necessary in anaphor resolution, especially where the anaphor 
is metaphoric but its antecedent isn't, or vice versa. For 
example: 
(3-30) 
(3-31) 
Ross picked up the bottle and drank i!. 
Ross drank the bottle and threw it away. 
We can conclude from this discussion that a case-base is 
not enough, but a maintenance of focus (possibly by means of 
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heuristics) and an understanding of what is being parsed are 
essential. we have also seen that cases can aid resolution of 
metaphoric anaphors and anaphoric metaphors. 
How could such a case system resolve paraphrase 
coreferences and definite reference? Clearly, case information 
alone is inadequate, and will need assistance from some other 
method. Nevertheless, we see that a case "grammar" may well 
serve as a firm base for anaphora resolution. 
3.2.5 Aga!ysis QI S.Y!!thg§is. Transformational grammarians 
have spent considerable time pondering the problem of where 
pronouns and other surface proforms come from, and have produced 
a number of theories which I will not attempt to discuss here. 
This leads to the possibility of anaphora resolution through 
analysis by .synthesis, where we start out with an hypothesized 
deep structure which is generated by intelligent (heuristic?) 
guesswork, and apply transformational rules to it until we 
either get the required surface or fail. 
What this involves is a parser, such as the ATN parser of 
Woods (1970), to provide a deep structure with anaphors intact. 
Then each anaphor is replaced by a hypothesis as to its 
referent, and transformations are applied to see if the same 
surface is generated. If so, the hypotheses are accepted; 
otherwise new ones are tried. 
selected by a heuristic search. 
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The hypotheses are presumably 
There are many problems with this method. First, the 
generation of a surface sentence is a nondeterministic process 
which may take a long time, especially if exhaustive proof of 
failure is needed; a large number of combinations of hypotheses 
may compound this further. Second, this approach does not take 
into account meanings of sentences, let alone the context of 
whole paragraphs or world knowledge. For example, in (3-32): 
(3-32) sue visited Nadia for dinner because §!!e invited h.§£. 
both the hypotheses "• she' = Sue, • her• = Nadia" and 
"'she'= Nadia, 'her• = sue" could be validated by this method 
and without recourse to world knowledge there is no way of 
deciding which is correct. Third, the method cannot handle 
intersentential anaphora. 
synthesis is not promising. 
We must conclude that analysis by 
3.2.6 Resolvi!!SL ~aEh.2.£§ by inf~§~£e. If we are to bring 
both world knowledge and word meaning to bear in anaphora 
resolution, then some inferencing mechanism which operates in 
this domain is needed. Possible paradigms for this include 
Rieger• s Conceptual Memory (1975) (see 3. 1. 4) and Wilks• s 
preference semantics (1973b, 1975a, 1975b) (see section 3.1. 7). 
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Although conceptual dependency, which Conceptual Memory 
uses, is not without its problems (Davidson 1976), it may be 
possible to extend it for use in anaphor resolution. This would 
require giving it a linguistic interface such that reasoning 
which involves world knowledge, sentence semantics and the 
surface structure can be performed together -- clearly pure 
inference, as in Conceptual Memory, is not enough. An effective 
method for representing and deploying world knowledge will also 
be needed. A system using frames (Minsky 1975), or scripts 
(Schank and Abelson 1975, 1977) (which are essentially a subset 
of frames), appears promising. Frames allow the use of world 
knowledge to develop exgect~tiogs about an input, and to 
interpret it in light of these. For instance, in the •sukiyaki' 
examples, the mention of sue visiting Nadia's home should invoke 
a VISITING frame, in which the expectation that Nadia might 
serve sue food would be generated, after which the resolution of 
the anaphor is a matter of easy inference. 
In Wilks's system inference is more controlled than in 
Conceptual Memory; whereas the latter searches for as many 
inferences to make as it can without regard to their possible 
use,27 the former tries to find the shortest possible inference 
chain to achieve its goal. Although Wilks•s system does not use 
_____________________ .,.. ________ ,.. 
27 Rieger has since developed a more controlled approach to 
inference generation (Rieger 1978). 
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the concept of expectations, its use of preferred situations can 
achieve much the same ends. In the •sukiyaki' examples, the 
host would be the preferred server. 
3.2.7 Summar~ ~nd dis£!!§SiQ1!. I have discussed in this 
section five different approaches to anaphor resolution. They 
are: 
1 syntactic methods -- which are clearly insufficient; 
2 heuristics -- which we decided may be necessary, though 
we would like to minimize their inelegant presence, 
preferring as much theory as possible; 
3 case grammars which we saw to be elegant and 
powerful, but not powerful enough by themselves to do 
all we would like done; 
4 analysis by synthesis -- which looks like a dead loss; 
and 
5 inference -- which seems to be an absolute necessity to 
use world knowledge, but which must be heavily 
controlled to prevent unnecessary explosion. 
From this it seems that an anaphor resolver will need just about 
everything it can lay its hands on case knowledge, inference, 
world knowledge, and word meaning to begin with, not to mention 
the mechanisms for focus determination, discourse analysis, etc 
that I will discuss in subsequent chapters, and perhaps some of 
the finer points of surface syntax too.zs 
---~-------------------~-------
2a That a boots-and-all approach is necessary should perhaps 
have been clear from the earliest attempts in this area because 
of the very nature of language. For natural language was 
designed (if I may be so bold as to suggest a high order of 
tfootnotes continue] 
3.2.7 I 85 
------..-------------------...--~~--
teleology in its evolution) for communication between human 
beings, and it follows that no part of language. is beyond the 
limits of competence of the normal human mind. And it is not 
unreasonable to expect, a fortio~i, that no part is far behind 
the limits of competence either, for if it were, either it could 
not meet the need for a high degree of complexity in our 
communication, or else language use would be a tediously 
simplistic task reguiring long texts to communicate short facts. 
Consider our own problem, anaphora. Imagine what language 
would be like if we did not have this device to shorten repeated 
references to the same thing, and to aid perception of discourse 
cohesion. Clearly, anaphora is a highly desirable component of 
language. It is hardly surprising then that language should 
take advantage of all our intellectual abilities to anaphorize 
whenever it is intellectually possible for a listener to resolve 
it. Hence, any complete NLU system will need just about the 
full set of human intellectual abilities to succeed. (See also 
Rieger (1975:268).) 
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In this chapter, we bring two more factors, which are 
interrelated, into play: 
1 focus, and 
2 discourse theme and discourse pragmatics. 
In section 3.2.1 we introduced formally the concept of a focus 
set to model consciousness as a repository for antecedents, and 
we noted that the approaches described in section 3.1 do not 
explicitly use focus, but instead rely on a simple kind of 
history list to retain possible referents. In this and the 
following chapters we will consider in detail the problems 
entailed in focus: 
1 Is an explicit focus really necessary? 
2 What does focus look like? Is it just a set, or has it 
more structure than that? 
3 How is focus maintained? What makes entities enter and 
1 eave focus? 
We will also introduce the notion of discourse theme and ask 
ourselves: 
1 Does an anaphor resolver need to use discourse theme? 
2 How is theme related to focus? 
3 How is theme determined? 
iiThe procedure is actually quite 
simple. First you arrange things into 
different groups depending on their 
makeup. Of course, one pile may be 
sufficient, depending on how much there 
is to do. If you have to go somewhere 
else due to lack of facilities that is 
the next step, otherwise you are pretty 
well set. It is important not to overdo 
any particular endeavour. That is, it 
is better to do too few things at once 
than too many.~9 
John D Bransford and Marcia K 
Johnson (1973) 1 
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To define the theme of a discourse, we appeal to the intuition 
as follows: The the.mg or toeic of a discourse is the main entity 
or concept that the discourse is abQYt -- the subject central to 
the ideas expressed in the text, "the idea(s) at the forefront 
of the speaker's mind" (Allerton 1978:134). We use this 
intuitive definition because no more rigorously formal one is 
yet agreed on upon in linguistics. 
A simple example: Is (4-1): 
(4-1) The boy is riding the horse. 
-----------~------------~~---~-
1 A paragraph said to have no theme, used in their experiments. 
Subjects found it very hard to comprehend or recall until it was 
given a theme by adding the heading "Washing Clothes". 
a 
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a statement about the hoy or the horse? In this case, the 
answer seems to be clearly the former; "the boy" is the topic 
and "is riding the horse" is a comment about the topic.2 As we 
shall see, however, the choice is not always as clear-cut as 
this. Much work has been done in attempting to capture 
precisely the concept of theme, and attempting to determine 
rules for deciding what the theme of a given text is. 
example the papers in Li (1975) .) 
(See for 
Let us begin by sorting out our terminology. To the 
confusion of all, different workers have used different 
nomenclatures, often describing the same concept with different 
words, or different concepts with the same words. I suspect 
that the failure of some people working in the field to realize 
that they and their colleagues were not talking the same 
language has hindered progress in this area. 
table summarizes terminology used:3 
--~~---------------------------
The following 
2 This is not the case in all contexts. 
answer to (i) : 
If ( 4-1) were the 
(i) Who is riding the horse? 
then "the boy" would be the comment and "riding the horse" the 
topic. 
3 While the words in each 
concepts, it should not 
synonymous. In particular, 
draw a distinction between 
new (see section 4.1.1). 
column describe closely related 
be inferred that they are precisely 
Halliday ( 19 6 7) and Allerton ( 197 8) 
theme and old, and between rheme and 
a 
"The bov 11 
--- -~-
topic 
theme 
old 
given 
given 
given 
logical subject 
focus 
psychological 
subject 
comment 
rheme 
new 
new 
new 
new 
logical object~ 
psychological 
predicate 
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Sgall et al (1973) 
Halliday (1967) 
Chafe ( 197 0) 
Haviland and Clark (1974) 
Clark and Haviland (1977) 
Allerton ( 1978) 
Chomsky (1965) 
Sidner (1978a, 1978b) 
Hornby ( 1972) 
(See Allerton (1978) for a more detailed discussion of 
terminological confusion.) 
In this thesis I will follow Allerton (1978) and use the 
words "theme" and "topic" interchangeably. I will also need to 
make a distinction not yet commonly recognized explicitly in the 
nomenclature jungle: I will use "J:Qcal theme" or "local toE,ic" 
to refer to what a sentencg is about, and "global themg" or 
"gl.Qbal to.Ei£" to refer to what a disCQJ!rse is about at a given 
point. These two concepts often coincide, but frequently don't. 
For example, in (4-2): 
(4-2) Nadia's chinchilla is shaped like a pear with a brush 
for a tail. Its teeth are long, but not very sharp. 
the local and global topics of the first sentence are both 
"Nadia's chinchilla". In the second sentence the global theme 
is unchanged from the first sentence, while the local theme is 
-~-----------------------------
• "The horse" rather than "is riding the horse" is the logical 
object in Chomsky's nomenclature. 
a 
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now "Nadia's chinchilla• s teeth". 
TheLe are currently two major paradigms in investigating 
problems of discourse theme. The the ore tic al approach, 
initially centred in Europe, uses introspective linguistic 
analysis, and is typified by the work of Firbas (1964), Sgall, 
Haji~ov~ and Benesova (1973), Halliday (1967), Chafe (1970, 
1972, 1975) and many of the papers in Li ( 1975). The 
experimental approach uses the techniques of psycholinguistics, 
and . is typified by the work of Hornby (1971, 1972) and 
Johnson-Laird (1968a, 1968b). First we will look at each 
paradigm in turn, and then at their applications in 
computational analysis of language. 
4.1.1 The liggyisti£ s~Ero~ch. Chafe (1970:210-233, 1972) 
discusses the relationship between the topic of a sentence and 
the information in it which is not new. For example, in (4-1), 
it is assumed that the boy is already being talked about, and is 
therefore the topic, while the new information conveyed is what 
the boy is doing, riding the horse, and this is therefore the 
comment. Chafe describes given, or old, information as that 
already "in the air", used as a starting point for the addition 
of further information. Old information need not be explicitly 
spoken;s it may be something assumed to be known to both speaker 
[footnotes continue] 
a 
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and listener. For example, if I come up to you and say (4-3): 
(4-3) Hi! Did you hear that Ross was arrested on a morals 
charge? 
it is assumed that we both know who Ross is. If I added the 
word "again", it is also assumed we know about his previous 
arrest, and the new information that I am giving you is that it 
happened once more. 
Halliday (1967) and Allerton (1978) refine the concept 
thus: given is what was being spoken about before, while theme 
is what is being spoken about now, these not necessarily being 
the same thing. 
The concept of theme has been generalized somewhat by Chafe 
(1972) to that of foregroundiag; if the topic is what is "in the 
air", then foregrounded items are those "on stage"; they are 
those "assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness" (Cha f e 
1972:50, 197 4) • When a lexical item occurs £n a discourse, it 
automatically becomes foregrounded in future occurrences, says 
s A common literary device, for example, is to begin a novel 
with a sentence which presumes information, forcing the reader 
to immediately construct a mental frame containing this 
information, and thereby plunging them straight into the story. 
A similar phenomenon occurs when sentences are presented in 
a contextual vacuum, as are most of the example texts in this 
thesis. A series of experiments by Haviland and Clark (1974) 
showed that people take longer to comprehend sentences which 
presume ungiven information, implying that time is taken to 
create or invoke the mental frame required to understand the 
sentence. 
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Chafe, until it retreats to the wings through lack of further 
mention. How long this retreat takes is unclear, and probably 
varies depending on other items taking the places, or "slots", 
of previous ones. Clearly, foregrounding is very similar to 
what we have been calling focusing. 
In verbal discourse, a lexical item is signalled as being 
the theme or as being in the foreground by vocal tone, stress 
and gesture, as well as by textual devices. We see in (4-4) and 
(4-5) that the comment is stressed and the theme is not: 
(4-4) 
(4-5) 
What is Nadia doing? 
Nadia is PRACTISING ACUPUNCTURE. 
*NADIA is practising acupuncture. 
Who is practising acupuncture? 
NADIA is practising acupuncture. 
*Nadia is PRACTISING ACUPUNCTURE. 
In written language the topic is usually indicated by syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic cues, though italics or upper case may be 
used to simulate vocal stress. 
We see, then, that the linguistic approach assumes that we 
have an intuitive idea of what topic is, and tries to formulate 
rules to formalize this idea. It has , however, yet to agree on 
any precise definition of theme, or produce any formal method 
for determining the theme of a sentence or discourse by 
computational analysis. 
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4.1.2 Th~ £s1cholingyi§ti£ ~EB£2~£h. To determine what 
subjects thoyght the theme of a sentence was, Hornby (1971, 
1972) used the following experimental procedure: A number of 
pairs of pictures were drawn with each picture having three 
components, two objects and an action. The action was the same 
in each pair. A typical pair showed (a) an Indian building a 
tepee and (b) an Eskimo building an igloo. For each pair, 
subjects were presented with sentences which described each 
picture with partial correctness. For the above pair, typical 
sentences were (4-6) and (4-7): 
(4-6) The Indian is building the igloo. 
(4-7) The one who is building the igloo is the Indian. 
Subjects were asked to pick which picture each stimulus sentence 
''is about, even though it is not exactly correct" (1972:637). 
In the above example, most felt that (4-6) was nearest to (a) 
and (4-7) to (b). The component that is the same in both 
picture and sentence (here, Indian and igloo respectively) is 
then assumed to be the psychological subject, or local theme. 
Hornby found that the theme of a sentence is not 
necessarily either the syntactic subject or the first item 
mentioned, a result contrary to suggestions that word order 
determines theme (Halliday 1967) or that case relationships play 
a role independent of surface syntax (Fillmore 1968). 
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4.1.3 Lacu~ae ~bounding. Although much work has been done 
in the area of theme, there is little of substance to use. The 
linguistic approach has served to intuitively define for us the 
concepts of theme and foreground, but has given us no way to 
find them in a text, even though, as we will see, finding them 
is a necessity in NLU. Similarly, the psycholinguistic approach 
has so far shown us where not to look for rules about theme, but 
has not helped us find them. 
I believe that Hornby's experiments point us in the right 
direction: the theme of a sentence is a function of, int~r alia, 
both its construction and the case relationships therein, and, 
if in a context, then of the topic of the previous sentence as 
well. Lt therefore remains to find this function. From this 
should follow rules for the foreground, which we can use in 
deciding when things no longer remain in focus. Despite the 
simplicity with which it can be stated, this goal is, of course, 
a major research problem. In the next chapter we will look at 
some recent approaches to it. 
resolution 
- --~ 
Is a recency list really inadequate as a focus for anaphor 
resolution? Does discourse theme really play a role? In this 
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section I will show that the answer to both these questions is 
"yes". 
Taking an opposing view, Yorick Wilks (1975b) rejects the 
use of theme, except as a last resort, on the basis of the 
following examples: 
(4-8) John left the window and drank the wine on the table. 
I,1 was good. 
(4-9) John left the window and drank the wine on the table. 
It was brown and round. 
(These examples, together with (4-10), will be referred to below 
as the 'table' examples •. ) In (4-8), "it" clearly refers to the 
wine . In (4-9), things are not so clear; Wilks says that "it" 
must mean the table, and, uncoincidentally, the anaphor 
resolution component of his natural language system comes to the 
same conclusion, using the method of "preference semantics" (see 
section 3.1.7), whereby the table is chosen as the referent on 
the grounds that it is much more likely to be brown and round 
than the window or the wine. Since the wine (but not the table) 
is the theme here, Wilks concludes that we can therefore "reject 
all simple solutions based on l theme]"6 (1975b: 68). 
The problem is that Wilks's interpretation of the sentence 
-----~----~------------------~~ 
6 The word in brackets was originally "focus"; where Wilks uses 
this term, he apparently means "discourse theme", "topic", or 
"focus of attention". To avoid confusion with our sense of the 
word "focus", I have amended this g:uotation. 
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is wrong, or at best idiolectic. In my idiolect, (4-9) could 
only be describing the wine as brown and round (adjectives which 
make as much sense as many of the other terms often applied to 
wine).7 Informants, speakers of American and Australian 
English, agreed. One described (4-9) as an absurdity, and when 
told that "it" meant the table replied that that possibility had 
not even occurred to them. When I included (4-9) in a 
conference presentation (Hirst 1977a), the audience broke up in 
laughter at it. Clearly, (4-9) is ill-formed.a 
-----~----------------~--~--~--
7 Compare Lehrer (1975), who showed that many oenological terms 
contain zero bits of information. 
8 This points out the danger, well known in linguistics but 
perhaps not in artificial intelligence, of losing one's 
intuition for even one•s native language. (Spencer (1973) has 
shown that linguists have quite different intuitions regarding 
grammaticality and acceptability from non-linguists.) When 
generating sample sentences to demonstrate a point about the 
nature of language, it is surprisingly easy to come up with 
ill-formed or marginal sentences without being aware of the 
fact. (See also Carroll and Bever (1978), whose experiments 
suggest that linguistic intuition varies with context and mental 
state, including degree of self-awareness.). It is therefore 
advisable to at least test examples on informants (namely, 
long-suffering non-linguist friends) before using them. I have 
done this with important and/or contentious examples in this 
thesis, but nevertheless do not believe that I am necessarily 
innocent of generating ill-formed sentences myself. This is why 
I have, throughout this thesis, where possible, taken my 
examples from "real-world text", and given a complete citation 
of the source. Nevertheless, real-world text is sometimes 
suspect -- people inadvertently write sentences they themselves 
would not accept, and some people are just plain illiterate --
and in some instances I have marked real-world text used in this 
thesis as ill-formed, so much did it grate my idiolect. (In 
section 7.3, I address the question of better alternatives for 
obtaining or testing linguistic data.) 
A related problem is that of idiolects. Some examples in 
this thesis were acceptable to some but not all informants (all 
tfootnotes continue] 
4.2 / 97 
Example (4- 9) is ill-formed because when "it" 1S 
encountered in the text, "the table" is no longer in focus; that 
is, it cannot be referred to anaphorically, notwithstanding only 
a period separates it from the "it". (We will see in section 
5.1.2 an explanation of why this happens.) Clearly, an anaphor 
resolver with nothing more than a history list ordered by 
recency would fail to find (4-9) ill-formed;9 a similar language 
could erroneously it. Moreover, the generator 
recency-list approach would 
produce 
spuriously consider (4-10) 
ambiguous, though it isn't: 
( 4-10) John picked up the toy on the table. 
wood. 
It was made of 
--
and then choose the wrong "possibility", namely the table being 
wooden, on grounds of greater recency and equal reasonableness. 
--,-~----~---------------------
such examples are so noted). 
with Wilks may be merely 
appears to be in a small 
anything). 
I concede that my difference here 
idiolectic; howe~er, his idiolect 
minority (not that that proves 
9 An important point relevant here is the comprehension of 
ill-formed sentences: humans can do it in many cases, and it is 
desirable for computer natural language understanders to do so 
too. Baranof sky (19 70) , for example, gave heuristics for 
resolving the relative pronoun in sentences such as (i): 
(i) *A man went to the fair who lost his mind. 
Wilks might therefore defend his system as one which has the 
bonus advantage of understanding ill-formed sentences. But then 
he could not reject theme-based resolution on the basis of 
(4-9). In addition, we surely want such a system to try all 
possible well-formed interpretations first, and flag a sentence 
for which it is forced to make an assumption of ill-formedness. 
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To show that the argument above does not rest solely on the 
idiolectic acceptability or not of 
example: 
(4~9), here is another 
(4-11) If an incendiary bomb drops near you, don't lose your 
head. Put it in a bucket and cover it with sand.to 
There are only two candidates for the first "it" here: "an 
incendiary bomb" and "your head". Semantics and world knowledge 
indicate the former, as its speaker presumably intended, yet the 
latter unambiguously "sounds like" the correct referent despite 
the nonsense resulting; and therein lies the jest. That "your 
head" is the referent despite the presence of a better choice 
means that the better choice violated other constraints which 
prevented it even being considered as a candidate in the 
resolution. These constraints are those of focus: "an 
incendiary bomb" was not properly in focus at the time of the 
first "it" and therefore was not available. However, "your 
head" appears to be the topic of the sentence despite the need 
to fracture the idiomatic expression, and is _ ipso facto the 
"dominant" item in focus.11 When presented with (4-11), Wilks's 
preference semantics program would not, I think, see the humour, 
and would wrongly choose the bomb as the referent of "it". 
-~---.,---------------------------
10 This text is of obscure origin, but is usually alleged to 
have come from a British air raid precautions leaflet during 
World War II. 
11 see section 5.1 for support for this assertion. 
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The above discussion demonstrates that focus is an integral 
part of language (or at least of English). Any anaphora 
resolution system should therefore take it into account; failure 
to do so will result in the wrong answers. 
A second reason for maintaining a focus is that without it 
the number of possible referents grows with the length of the 
text . Clearly an NLU system attempting to read a scientific 
paper, for example, should not, on the fourth page, look back 
over all entities evoked by the entire preceding text for the 
most reasonable antecedent for an anaphor. But, as should be 
clear by now, a simple shift register, saving the last n 
possible antecedents or those from the last n sentences, is not 
enough. 
We now agree that focus is necessary. The following 
examples demonstrate that discourse th~~ plays a role in focus: 
( 4-12) Nadia hastily swallowed the licorice, and followed 
Ross to the bathroom. She stared in disbelief at the 
water coming out of the tap; it was black. 
Wilks•s preference semantics system will (as far as I can 
determine from his 1975b paper) choose "licorice" over "water" 
as the referent of "it", because licorice is more likely than 
water to be black. The licorice should have been discarded from 
focus by the end of the first sentence of (4-12). It is out of 
focus because it is unrelated to the discourse topic or theme, 
the strange events in the bathroom, at the point the anaphor 
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occurs. 
Now consider this text, from Whe~,,2 in which the 
president of General Motors discusses with his wife charges 
brought against the motor industry by Vale, a Ralph Nader~like 
character: 
( 4-13) She continued, unperturbed, 
about air pollution. 11 
"For Christ's sake! 
anything about that?" 
"Not Christ's sake, 
Testament." 
"Mr Vale quotes the Bible 
Where does the Bible say 
dear. It's in the Old 
His curiosity aroused, he growled. "Go ahead, 
read it. You intended to, anyway." 
"From Jeremiah," Coralie said. '" And I brought 
you into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit thereof 
and the goodness thereof; but when ye entered ye 
defiled my land, and made mine heritage an 
abomination.'" She poured more coffee for them both. 
"I do think that's rather clever of him." 
Vale is still available to Coralie in her conversation as an 
antecedent for "him" after eight intervening sentences of the 
conversation, and her anaphor is quite comprehensible to us in 
the written report of the conversation, despite ten intervening 
sentences which contain two other possible referents the 
president of General Motors and Jeremiah. This is possible 
because Mr Vale and his quotation is the topic of the whole 
conversation. It may be objected that there is no possible 
confusion -- Vale is the only referent for "him" that makes 
sense; in particular, Coralie would not refer to her husband in 
----------------------~---------
12 Hailey, Arthur. Wheels. New York, 1971, page 2. Quoted by 
Hobbs (1977). 
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the third person when addressing him. But as we saw with (4-9) 
and (4-11), "making sense" is not enough. In any case, it is 
non-trivial to exclude the interpretation in which "him" means 
Jeremiah, and Coralie is commenting on something like the clever 
use of language in the quotation. It is also apparent that the 
reference is to Mr Vale as a concept in consciousness rather 
than the words 11 Mr Vale", which are almost certainly forgotten 
by the reader by the time the reference occurs. 
Here is another example of reference to discourse topic: 
(4-14) D~r Ann: No lectures on morality, please, I'm not 
asking you whether or not I should continue to sleep 
with this man. I have already decided that he is 
better than nothing. Now to the problem: 
The guy's toenails are like razor blades. I get 
up some mornings and feel like I've been stabbed. I 
have mentioned this to him a few times, but he does 
nothing about it. I need help. -- CLAWED-A-PLENTY 
Ans!er: Buy King Kong a pair of toenail scissors. 
Be extra generous and offer to trim them for him. If 
he refuses, insist that he sleep with his socks on --
or move to another bed.13 
"Them" is the toenails in question, the topic o.f the second and 
third paragraphs, but not the actual text "the guy's toenails", 
which is too far back to be recalled word for word. Nor is 
"them" a strained anaphor into "toenail scissors", as the 
reference is ill-formed if the first two sentences of the answer 
are taken out of context. (In passing, we also notice in (4-14) 
the epithet "King Kong", which requires a large amount of world 
-----------------------------~-
13 From: Landers, Ann. [Advice column]. The Vancouve£ sun, 11 
August 1978, page BS. 
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knowledge and inference to recognize and comprehend.) 
Lastly, consider this text: 
( 4-15) The winning species would have a greater amount of 
competitive ability than the loser as far as that 
resource axis of then-dimensional niche is concerned 
(e.g. it would be more adapted to using that resource 
in that particular habitat).1• 
Not only is "the winning species" the local theme and the 
antecedent of "it", but it is the only item in focus. None of 
the more recent NPs -- "a greater amount", "a greater amount of 
competitive ability", "competitive ability", "the loser", "that 
resource axis", "the n-di mensional niche", "tha t resource axis 
of the n-dimensional niche" -- can be referred to by th.is "it" 
regardless of the text that follows it. That is, there is ~2 
text which could replace the text after "it" in (4-15) and make 
a well-formed sentence in which "it" refers to one of the more 
recent NP s. 1 s 
Implicit in the preceding discussion is the assumption that 
-------~--------------~-~~-----
t• From: Mares, M A. Observation of Argentine desert 
ecology , with emphasis on water relations of eligmo~nti~ 
in: I Prakash and P K Ghosh (editors). Rod~t§ ig 
ggyironments (= Monographiae biologicae 28). The Hague: 
Junk b v Publishers, 1975. 
rodent 
llEUS. 
desert 
---~-Dr W 
1s For support for this type of assertion, see section 5.6. 
a 
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given any point in a text there 1S a set of focus sets 
associated with that point. It should be clear from our 
exposition so far that this is indeed the case. What is not so 
clear 1S how we can know the contents of these focus sets. For 
example, if the point 1S a pronoun, P, we are interested in 
knowing the contents of the nominal focus set Fn, which consists 
of all those concepts that P could refer to for some following 
text. More formally, Fn is a function of P and the preceding 
text t defined by: 
Fn(t,P) - {n I n is a noun phrase contained int or a 
concept evoked by t, and there exists t• 
such that tPt' is well-formed English text 
in which Prefers to nJ 
At any given time, the nominal focus set Fn contains zero or 
more entities foregrounded items -- which are possible 
referents for anaphors. When a pronominally referent anaphor 
needs resolving, one of several cases can occur: 
1 There is exactly one noun phrase in Fn which fits the 
basic syntactic and selectional constraints (see chapter 
6); it is chosen as the referent. 
2 There are no suitable members of Fn; then either the 
alleged anaphor is really a cataphor or exophor, or the 
sentence is ill-formed. 
3 There is more than one suitable member of Fn; then 
either (a) we need to choose one of these possibilities, 
or (b) the sentence is ambiguous. 
Case 3(a) is the one of most interest here. Many apparent 
ambiguities can be resolved by knowing what the topic is. We 
have already seen one example of this: 
I 
st 
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( 4-16) Ross asked Daryel to hold his books for a minute. 
This is unambiguous in most idiolects because the topic 
indicates that "his" means II Ross• s "· In gen er al, the present 
topic is the default referent, and this is why we would like to 
be able to determine the topic of a sentence. 
The definition of Fn above is clearly not of much use 
computationally, as it begs the question: it assumes the anaphor 
resolution capability of which it is itself a part. Therefore, 
if we intend to make use of focusing, we will need other, easier 
rules to determine the contents of the focus sets. It is likely 
that such rules exist -- humans, after all, have no problems 
but finding them may be difficult. However, we have no choice 
but to search. 
To summarize: In this chapter, I have tried to show that 
focus and theme are necessary in anaphora resolution, and that 
they are closely related. In the next chapter, we will look at 
the nature of this relationship and at some attempts to discover 
rules for focus. 
I 
d 
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••It is indeed harmful to come under the 
sway of utterly new and strange 
doctrines.!§ 
Confucius1 
The relationship between theme on the one hand and 
pronominalization, anaphora and reference in general on the 
other has often been noted -- for example by Kuno (1975), Giv6n 
(1975), Hirst (1976b) and Hinds (1977). In this section we will 
look at some work which attempts to explicate and/or exploit 
this relationship in resolving anaphora. 
Robert Kantor (1977) has investigated the problem of why some 
pronouns in discourse are more comprehensible than others, even 
when there is no ambiguity or anomaly. In Kantor•s terms, a 
hard-to-understand pronoun is an example of 
discourse, and speakers (or, more usually, writers) who produce 
In our 
terms, an inconsiderate pronoun is one that is not properly in 
1 From: Ware, James R (translator). 
New York: Mentor, 1955. 
Confucius. 
----~--
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focus. 
I will first summarize Kantor•s work, and then discuss what 
we can learn about focus from it. 
Kantor•s main exhibit is the 
following text: 
(5-1) A good share of the amazing revival of commerce must 
be credited to the ease and security of communications 
within the empire. The Imperial fleet kept the 
Mediterranean Sea cleared of pirates. In each 
province, the Roman emperor repaired or constructed a 
number of skillfully designed roads. Thgy were built 
for the army but served the merchant class as well. 
Over them, messengers of the Imperial service, 
equipped with relays of horses, could average fifty 
miles a day. 
He claims that the "they" 1.n the penultimate sentence is hard to 
comprehend, and that most informants need to reread the previous 
text to find . 1S neither its Yet the referent. sentence 
semantically anomalous nor ambiguous "the r_oads" is the only 
plural NP available as a referent, and it occurs immediately 
before the pronoun with only a full-stop intervening (cf (4-9)). 
To explain this paradox is the task Kantor set himself. 
Kantor•s explanation is based on discourse topic and the 
listener's expectations. In (5-1), the discourse topic of the 
first three sentences is "easing and securing communication". 
In the fourth sentence, there is an improper shift to the roads 
F 
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as the topic: improper, because it is unexpected, and there is 
no discourse cue to signal it. Had the demonstrative "these 
roads" been used, the shift would have been okay. (Note that a 
definite such as "the roads" is not enough.) Alternatively, the 
writer could have clarified the text by combining last three 
sentences with semicolons, indicating that the last two main 
clauses were to be construed as relating only to the preceding 
one rather than to the discourse as a whole. 
Kantor identifies a continuum of factors affecting the 
comprehension of pronouns. At one end is 
says in effect is that a pronoun is easy to understand if 
expected, and difficult if unexpected. This is not as vacuous 
as it at first sounds; Kantor provides an analysis of some 
subtle factors which affect expectation. 
The most expected pronouns are those whose referent is the 
discourse topic, or sometbing associated with it (though note 
the qualifications to this below). Consider: 
(5~2) The final years of Henry's reign, as recorded by the 
admiring Hall, were given over to sport and gaiety, 
though there was little of the licentiousness that 
chacacterized the French court. The athletic contests 
were serious but very popular. Masques, jousts and 
spectacles followed one another in endless pageantry. 
He brought to Greenwich a tremendously vital court 
life, a central importance in the country's affairs, 
and above all, a great naval connection.2 
[footnotes continue] 
a 
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In the last sentence, "he" is quite comprehensible, despite the 
distance back to its referent, because the discourse topic in 
all the sentences 1.s "Henry• s reign". An example of the 
con verse an unexpected pronoun which is difficult despite 
recency -- can be . seen in (5-1) above. Between these two 
extremes are other cases involving references to aspects of the 
local topic, changes in topic, syntactic parallelism, and, in 
topicless instances, recency (though the effect of recency 
decays very fast). I will not describe these here; the 
interested reader is referred to section 2.6.5 of Kantor•s 
dissertation (1977). 
Kantor then defines the notion of the ~gtiyatedng§§ of a 
concept. This provides a continuum of concept givenness, which 
contrasts with the simple binary given-new distinction usually 
accepted in linguistics (for example Chafe (1970)). Kantor also 
distinguishes activatedness from the similar "communicative 
dynamism" of the Prague school (Firbas 1964). Activatedness is 
defined in terms of the comprehensibility phenomena described 
above: the more activated a concept is, the easier it is to 
understand an anaphoric reference to it. Thus activatedness 
depends upon discourse topic, context, and so forth. 
2 From: Hamilton, Olive and Hamilton, Nigel. Royal Gre~.i£h. 
Greenwich: The Greenwich Bookshop, 1969. Quoted by Halliday and 
Hasan (1976:14), quoted by Kantor (1977). 
a 
5. 1. 2 The work. 
---
~--
ramifications of Kantor•s thesis for focus? 
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What are the 
Clearly, the 
notions of activatedness and focus are very similar, though the 
latter has not previously been thought of as a continuum. It 
follows that the factors Kantor finds relevant for activatedness 
and comprehensibility of pronouns are also important for those 
of us who would maintain focus in computer-based NLU systems; we 
will have to discover discourse topic and topic shifts, generate 
pronominalization expectations, and so forth. 
In other words, if we could dynamically compute (and 
maintain) the activatedness of each concept floating around, we 
would have a measure for the ordering of the focus set by 
preferability as re£erent -- the referent for any given anaphor 
would be the most highly activated element which passes basic 
tests for number, gender and semantic reasonableness. And to 
find the activatedness of the concepts, we follow Kantor•s 
pointers (which he himself concedes are very tenuous and 
difficult) to extract and identify the relevant factors from the 
text . 
It may be objected that all we have done is produce a mere 
notational variant of the original problem. This is partly 
true . One should not gainsay the power of a good notation, 
however , and what we can buy here even with mere notational 
variance is the (perhaps limited, but non-zero) power of 
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Kantor•s investigations. And tnere is more to it than that. 
Previously, it has been thought that items either are in focus 
or they aren't, and that at each separate anaphor we need to 
compute a preference ranking of the focus elements for that 
anaphor. What Kantor tells us is that such a ranking exists 
independent of the actual use of anaphors in the text, and that 
we can find the ranking by looking at things like discourse 
topic. 
Some miscellaneous comments on Kantor•s work: 
1 It can be seen as a generalization albeit a weakening of 
Grosz's (1977a, 1977b, 1978) findings on focus in task-oriented 
dialogues (where each sub-task becomes the new discourse topic, 
opening up a new set of possible referents) which are discussed 
below in section 5.2. (Kantor and Grosz were apparently unaware 
of each other's work; neither cites the other.) 
2 It provides an explanation for focus problems that have 
previously baffled us. For example, in section 4.2 I 
contemplated the problem of the ill-formedness of this text: 
(5-3) *John left the window and drank the wine on the table. 
It was brown and round. 
I had previously (Hirst 1977a) thought this to be due to a 
syntactic factor -- that cross-sentence pronominal reference to 
an NP in a relative clause or adjectival phrase qualifying an NP 
a 
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was not possible. However, it can also be explained as a 
grossly inconsiderate pronoun which does not refer to the topic 
properly "the table" occurs only as a descriptor for the 
wine, and not as a concept in its own right. This would be a 
major restriction on possible reference to sub-aspects of 
topics.3 
3 Kantor makes many claims about comprehensibility and the 
degree of well-formedness of sentences which others (as he 
concedes) may not agree with. He uses only himself (and his 
friends, sometimes) as an informant, and then only at an 
intuitive level.• Claims as stong and subtle as Kantor•s cry 
out for empirical testing. Kieras (1978), to mention but one, 
has performed psycholinguistic 
comprehensibility of paragraphs. 
verification by similar experiments. 
am not in a position to do this.)S 
-~--------~------------~-------
experiments 
Kantor•s 
on 
claims 
the 
need 
(Unfortunately, I myself 
3 Note however that this restriction may apply to all relative 
clauses and adjectival phrases. Then the syntactic explanation 
would still be correct and would be descriptively simpler. 
• I do not deny that I am guilty too. But I at least try to do 
penance, in footnote 8 of chapter 4 and in section 7.3. I also 
suggest that Kantor is more culpable than I, because of the 
peculiar subtlety of the phenomena he studied and because his 
results rely so heavily on his claims of well- and 
ill-formedness. 
5 Kantor tells me that he hopes to test some of his assertions 
by observing the eye movements of readers of considerate and 
inconsiderate texts, to find out if inconsiderate texts actually 
make readers physically search back for a referent. 
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Barbara Grosz (1977a, 1977b, 1978) 
studied the maintenance of the focus of attention in 
task-oriented dialogues and its effect on the resolution of 
definite reference, as part of SRI's speech understanding system 
project (Walker 1976, 1978). a task-oriented 
-----~---
dialogue By l.S 
meant one which has some single major well-defined task as its 
goal. and studied dialogues . l.Il For example, Grosz collected 
which an expert guides an apprentice in the assembly of an air 
compressor. She found that the structure of such dialogues 
parallels the structure of the task. That is, just as the major 
task is divided into several well-defined sub-tasks, and these 
perhaps into sub-sub-tasks and so on, the dialogue is likewise 
divided into sub-dialogues, sub-sub-dialogues, etc, 6 each 
corresponding to a task component, much as a well-structured 
Algol program is composed of blocks within blocks within blocks. 
As the dialogue progresses, each sub-dialogue in turn 1.s 
performed in a strict depth-first order corresponding to the 
order of sub-task performance in the task goal (though note that 
some sub-tasks may not be ordered with respect to others). As 
we will see, this dialogue structure can be exploited in 
reference resolution. 
~--------~--~--------------------
6 Below I will use the prefix "sub-" generically to include 
"sub-sub-sub~ ••• " to an indefinite level. 
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Grosz's . aim was to find ways of determining and 
representing the fo£_!!~ of attentiQ~ of a discourse -- that is, 
roughly speaking, its global theme and the things associated 
therewith -- as a means for constraining the knowledge an NLU 
system needs to bring to bear in understanding discourse. In 
other words, the focus of attention is that knowledge which is 
relevant at a given point in a text for comprehension of the 
text . 7 Gro·sz claims that antecedents for definite reference can 
be found in the focus of attention. That is, the focus of 
attention is a superset of focus in our sense, the set of 
referable concepts (in this case definite reference, not just 
anaphoric reference). Moreover, no element in the focus of 
attention is excluded from being a candidate antecedent for a 
definite NP . Grosz thereby implies that all items in the focus 
of attention can be referred to, and that hence the two senses 
of the word "focus" are actually identical. 
focus. In Grosz's 
---
representation, which uses a partitioned semantic net formalism 
{Hendrix 1975a, 1975b, 1978), an exe~icit fo~§ corresponds to a 
sub-dialogue, and includes, for each concept in it, type 
information about that concept and any situation in which that 
7 In her later work (Grosz 1978), Grosz emphasizes focusing as 
an active process carried out by dialogue participants. 
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concept participates. For each item in the explicit focus, 
there is an associated impli£it focy2 , which includes subparts 
of objects in explicit focus, subevents of events in explicit 
focus, and participants in those subevents. The implicit focus 
attempts to account for reference to items that have a close 
semantic distance to items in focus (see sections 2.4.2 and 
6.7), or which have a close enough relationship to items in 
focus to be able to be referred to (see section 2.4.2). The 
implicit focus is also used in detecting focus shifts (see 
below). 
Then, at any given point in a text, antecedents of definite 
non-pronominal NPs can be found by searching through the 
explicit and implicit focus for a match for the reference. 
After checking the other non-pronominal NPs in the same sentence 
to see if the reference is intrasentential, the c~~rently g£ti~e 
explicit focus (the focus corresponding to the present 
sub-dialogue) is searched, and then if that search is not 
successful, the other currently open focus spaces (that is, 
those corresponding to sub-dialogues that the present 
sub-dialogue is contained in) are searched in order, back up to 
the top of the tree. As part of the search the implicit focus 
associated with each explicit focus is checked, as are subset 
relations, so that if a novel, say, is in focus, it could be 
referred to as "the book". If there is still no success after 
this, one then checks whether the NP refers to a single unique 
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concept (such as the sun), contains new information (such as 
"the red coat", when a coat is in focus, but not yet known to be 
red), or refers to an item in implicit focus. 
A similar search method could be used for pronouns. 
However, since pronouns carry much less information than other 
definite NPs, more inference is required by the reference 
matching process to disambiguate many syntactically ambiguous 
pronouns, and it would be necessary to search focus 
exhaustively, comparing reasonableness of candidate referents, 
rather than stopping at the first plausible one. In addition, 
other constraints on pronoun reference, such as local (rather 
than global) theme, and default referent, would also need to be 
taken into account; Grosz's mechanisms do not do this. However, 
Grosz does show how a partitioned network structure can be used 
to resolve certain types of ellipsis by means of syntactic and 
semantic pattern matching against the immediately preceding 
utterance, which may itself have been expanded from an 
elliptical expression. She leaves open for future research most 
of the problems in relating pronouns to focus. 
5.2.3 Maint£ini11.9 fO£.!!§.• Given this approach, one is then 
faced with the problem of deciding what the focus is at a given 
point in the discourse. For highly constrained task-oriented 
dialogues such as those Grosz considered, the question of an 
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initial focus does not arise; it is, by definition, the overall 
task in question. The other component of the problem, handling 
changes and shifts in the focus, is attacked by Grosz in a 
top-down manner using the task structure as a guide. 
A shift in focus can be indicated explicitly by an 
utterance, such as: 
(5-4) Well, the reciprocating afterburner nozzle speed 
control is assembled. Next, it must be fitted above 
the preburner swivel hose cover guard cooling fin 
mounting rack. 
In this case, the reciprocating afterburner nozzle speed control 
assembly sub-task and its corresponding sub-dialogue and focus 
are closed, and new ones are opened for the reciprocating 
afterburner nozzle speed control fitting, dominated by the same 
open sub-tasks/sub-dialogues/focuses in their respective trees 
that dominated the old ones. If however the new sub-task were a 
sub-task of the old one, then the old one would not be closed, 
but the new one added to the hierarchy below it as the new 
active focus space. The newly created focus space initially 
contains only those items referred to in the utterance, and 
those objects associated with the current sub-task. (Being anlg 
to bring in the associated objects at this time is, of course, 
the crucial point on which the whole system relies.) As 
subsequent non-shift-causing utterances come in, their new 
information is added to the active focus space. 
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Usually, of course, speakers are not as helpful as in 
(5~4) , and it is necessary to look for various clues to shifts 
in focus . For Grosz, the clues are definite NPs. If a definite 
NP from an utterance cannot be matched in focus, then this is a 
clue that the focus has shifted, and it is necessary to search 
for the new focus. If the antecedent of a definite NP is in the 
current implicit focus, this is a clue that a sub-task 
associated with this item is being opened. If the task 
structure is being followed , then the new focus vill reflect the 
opening or closing of a sub-task. 
Shifting cannot be done until a whole utterance . l.S 
considered, as clues may conflict, or the meaning of the 
utterance may contraindicate the posited shift. In particular, 
recall that the task structure is only a guide, and does not 
define the dialogue structure absolutely. For example, the 
focus may shift to a problem associated with the current 
sub- task with a question like this: 
(5-5) Should I use the box-end ratchet wrench to do that? 
This does not imply a shift to the next sub-task requiring a 
box-end ratchet wrench (assuming that the current task doesn't 
require one) (cf Grosz 1977b:105). 
We can see here that the problem of the circularity of 
language comprehension looms dangerously to determine the 
focus one must resolve the references, and to resolve the 
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references, one must know the focus. In Grosz's work, the 
strong constraints of the structure of task-oriented dialogues 
provide a toehold. Whether generalization to the case of 
discourse with other structures, or with no particular 
structure, is possible is unclear, as it may not be possible to 
determine so nicely what the knowledge associated with any new 
focus is. (See however my 
relationship between Grosz's 
remarks in section 5.1.2 on the 
work and that of Kantor, and 
section 5.5 on approaches which attempt to exploit local 
discourse structure.) 
In addition, Grosz's mechanisms are limited in their 
ability to resolve intersentential and/or inference-requiring 
anaphora. The assumption that global focus of attention equals 
all and only possible referents (except where the focus shifts), 
while perhaps not unreasonable in task-oriented domains, is 
probably untrue in general. For example, could such mechanisms 
handle the •table' examples of chapter 4, exctuding the table 
from focus when the second sentence of each of these texts is 
considered? Recall that local as well as global theme is 
involved (see section 5.1). Similarly, could the level of world 
knowledge and inference required by the •sukiyaki' examples of 
chapter J be integrated into the partitioned semantic net 
formalism? could entities evoked by, but not explicit in, a 
text of only moderate structure be identified and instantiated 
in focus? Grosz did not address these issues (nor did she need 
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to for her immediate goals), but they would need to be resolved 
in any attempt to generalize her approach. (Some other related 
problems, including those of focus shifting, are discussed in 
Grosz (1978) .) 
Grosz's contribution was to demonstrate the role of 
aiscourse structure in the identification of theme, relevant 
world knowledge and the resolution of reference; we now turn to 
another system which aspires to similar goals, hut in a more 
general context. 
The PAL personal assistant program (Bullwinkle 1977a) is a 
system designed to accept natural language requests for 
scheduling activities. 
1977b:44) is: 
A typical request (from Bullwinkle 
(5-6) ~ I want to schedule a meeting with Ira. It should be 
at 3 pm tomorrow. we can meet in Bruce's office. 
The section of PAL that deals with discourse pragmatics and 
reference was developed by Candace Sidner [Bullwinkle] 
(Bullwinkle 1977b; Sidner 1978a). Like Grosz's system (see 
section 5.2), PAL attempts to find a focus of attention in its 
knowledge structures to use as a focus for reference resolution. 
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Sidner sees the focus as equivalent to the discourse topic; in 
fact in Bullwinkle (1977b) the word "topic" is used instead of 
"focus". 
There are three major differences from Gcosz•s system: 
1 PAL does not rely heavily on discourse structures. 
2 Knowledge is represented in frames. 
3 Focus selection and shifting are handled at a more 
superficial level. 
I will discuss each difference in turn. 
5.3. l PAL's gE£rQach to dis£Qurs~. Because a request to 
PAL need not have the rigid structure of one of Grosz's 
task-oriented dialogues, PAL does not use discourse structure to 
the same extent, instead relying on more general local cues. 
However, as we shall see below, in focus selection and shifting, 
Sidner was forced to use ad hoc rules based on observations of 
the typical requests to PAL. 
5.3.2 The t£gme as fo£g§. The representation of knowledge 
in PAL is based on the fra~ concept first introduced by Minsky 
(1975),8 and its implementation uses the FRL frame 
-----------~-~-----------~-----
a I will have to assume the reader is familiar with the basic 
concept of frames. Readers who require further background 
should read the section of Charniak (1976) on frames and/or 
Minsky's original paper (1975). 
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representation language (actually a dialect of LISP) developed 
by Roberts and Goldstein (1977a, 1977b; Goldstein and Roberts 
19 7 7) • 
In PAL, the frame corresponds to Grosz's focus space. 
Following Rosenberg's (1976, 1977) work on discourse structure 
and frames , the antecedent for a definite NP is first assumed to 
be either the frame itself, or one of its slots.9 
example , in (5-7): 
So, for 
(5-7) I want to have a meeting with Ross<1>. It should be 
at three pm. The l2£ati.Ql! will be the department 
lounge. Please tell Ross<2> . 
"it" refers to the MEETING frame (.!!Qt to the text "a meeting") 
which provides the context for the whole discourse; "the 
location" refers to the LOCATION slot that the MEETING frame 
presumably has (thus the CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH relation (see 
section 2. 4. 2) .1.s easily handled), and "Ross< 2>" to the 
contentsto of the CO-MEETER slot, previously given as Ross. 
---------------------------~-~~ 
9 In Sidner (1978b:91) it is claimed that a definite NP cannot 
refer to the focus if it contains more information than the 
focus. This is often true, but (2-100) is a counterexample to 
the complete generality of her assertion. 
10 Sidner only speaks of 
without saying whether she 
contents; it seems reasonable 
that she actually means both. 
reference to slots (1978a:211), 
means the slot itself or its 
to assume, as I have done here, 
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If the antecedent cannot be found in the frame, it is 
assumed to be either outside the discourse or inferred. In 
(5-7), PAL would search its database to find referents for 
"Ross<1> 11 and "the department lounge". Personal names are 
resolved with a special module that knows about the semantics of 
names (Bullwinkle 1977b:48). PAL carries out database searches 
for references like "the department lounge" apparently by 
searching a hierarchy of frames, looking at the frames in the 
slots of the current focus, and then in the slots of these 
frames , and so on (Sidner 1978a:211) though it is not apparent 
why this should usefully constrain the search in the above 
example. 11 
5.3.3 Focus selecti.QB.. In PAL, the initial focus is the 
first NP following the VP of the first sentence of the discourse 
-- usually, the object of the sentence -- or, if there is no 
11 In fact there is no need in this particular example for a 
referent at all. The personal assistant need only treat "the 
department lounge" as a piece of text, presumably meaningful to 
both the speaker and Ross, denoting the meeting location. A 
human might do this when passing on a message they didn't 
understand: 
(i) Ross asked me to tell you to meet him in the 
arboretum, whatever the heck that is. 
On the other hand, an explicit antecedent would be needed if PAL 
had been asked, say, to deliver coffee to the meeting in the 
department lounge. Knowing when to be satisfied with ignorance 
is a difficult problem which Sidner does not consider, 
preferring the safe course of always requiring an antecedent. 
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such NP, then the subject of that sentence. This is a short-cut 
method, which seems to be sufficient for requests to PAL, but 
which Sidner readily admits is inadequate for the general case 
(Sidner 1978a:209). I will briefly review some of the problems. 
Charniak (1978) has shown that the frame-selection problem 
(which is here identical to the initial focus selection problem, 
since the focus is just the frame representing the theme of the 
discourse) is in fact extremely difficult, and is not in the 
most general case amenable to solution by either strictly 
top-down or bottom-up methods. Sidner•s assumption that the 
relevant frame is given by an explicitly mentioned NP is also a 
source of trouble, even in the examples she quotes, such as 
these two (Sidner 1978b:92): 
(5-8) I was driving along 1h~ ir~e~~y the other day. 
Suddenly the engine began to make a funny noise. 
(5-9) I went to a new restaurant with Sam. The waitress was 
---------~ nasty. The food was great. 
(Underlining indicates what Sidner claims 1S the focus.) In 
(5- 8) , Sidner posits a chain of inferences to get from "the 
engine" to the focus, the FREEWAY frame . This . more complex is 
than is necessary; if the frame/focus were DRIVING (with its 
LOCATION slot containing the FREEWAY frame), then the path from 
the frame to "the engine" is shorter and the whole arrangement 
seems more natural. Thus we see that focus need not be based on 
an NP at all. 
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In (5-9), our problem is what to do with Sam, who could be 
referenced in a subsequent sentence. It is necessary to 
integrate Sam into the RESTAURANT frame/focus, since clearly he 
should not be considered external to the discourse and sought in 
the database. While the RESTAURANT frame may indeed contain a 
COMPANION slot for Sam to sit in, it is clear that the first 
sentence could have been "I went <anywhere at all> with Sam", 
requiring that any frame referring to something occupying a 
location must have a COMPANION slot. This is clearly 
undesirable . . 1§ involved in (5-9) , But the RESTAURANT frame 
otherwise "the waitress" and "the food" would be external to the 
discourse. A natural solution is that the frame/focus of (5- 9) 
is actually the GOING-SOMEWHERE frame (with Sam in its COMPANION 
slot) , containing the RESTAURANT frame in its PLACE slot, with 
both frames together taken as the focus. 
consider mechanisms for a multi~frame focus. 
Sidner does not 
It is, of course, not always true that the frame/focus is 
explicit. Charniak (1978) points out that (5-10) is somehow 
sufficient to invoke the MAGICIAN frame: 
(5-10) The woman waved as the man on stage sawed her in half. 
(See also Hirst (1979) for more on frame invocation problems.) 
Focus shifting in PAL is restricted: the only shifts 
permitted are to and from sub-aspects of the present focus 
(Sidner 1978a:209). Old topics are stacked for possible later 
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return. This is very similar to Grosz's open-focus hierarchy. 
It is unclear whether there is a predictive aspect to PAL's 
focus-shift mechanism,12 but the basic idea seems to be that any 
new phrase in a sentence is picked as a potential new focus. If 
in a subsequent sentence an anaphoric reference . l.S a 
semantically acceptable coreferent for that potential focus, 
then a shift to that focus is ipso facto indicated (Sidner 
1978a:209). Presumably this check is done after a check of 
focus has failed, but before any database search. A potential 
focus has a limited life span, and is dropped if not shifted to 
by the end of the second sentence following the one in which it 
occurred. 
An example (Sidner 1978a:209): 
( 5- 11) I want to schedule a meeting with George, Jim, Steve 
and Mike. He can meet in my office. {It's kind of 
small, but the meeting won't last long anyway I It 
won't take more than 20 minutesJ. 
In the second sentence "my office" is identifi.ed as a potential 
focus, and "it", in the first reading of the third sentence, as 
an acceptable coreferent to "my office" confirms the shift. In 
---~-------..,.-----------~--..-----
12 On page 209 of Sidner (1978a) we are told: "Focus shifts 
cannot be predicted; they are detectable only after they occur". 
Yet on the following page, Sidner says: "Sentences appearing in 
mid-discourse are assumed to be about the focus until the 
coreference module predicts a focus shift ••• once an implicit 
focus relation is established, the module can go onto [sicJ 
predictions of focus shift". My interpretation of these remarks 
is that one cannot be certain that the next sentence will shift 
focus, but one Cfil! note when a shift might happen, requiring 
later checking to confirm or disconfirm the shift. 
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the second reading, "it" couldn't be "my office", so no shift 
occurs. The acceptability decision is based on selectional and 
case-like restrictions. 
While perhaps adeguate for PAL, this mechanism is, of 
course, not sufficient for the general case, where a true shift, 
as opposed to an expansion upon a previously mentioned point, 
may occur. This is exemplified by many of the shifts in Grosz's 
task-oriented dialogues. 
Another problem arising from this shift mechanism is that 
two different focus shifts may be indicated at the same time, 
but the mechanism has no way to choose between them. For 
example: 
(5-12) Schedule a meeting of thg ExEe£iJ!!ental Th~olo_gy 
Research Grou£, and tell Ross ABdrew2 about it too. 
I'd like him to hear about the deocommunication work 
that th~y•r~-doing ••• 
Each of the underlined NPs in the first sentenc~ would be picked 
as a potential focus. Since each is pronominally referenced in 
the second sentence, the mechanism would be confused as to where 
to shift the focus. 
correct choice here.) 
(Presumably "Ross Andrews" would be the 
5.3.4 / 127 
••I always get buggered by the bottom-up 
approach.9-9 
"Sydney J Hurtubise 11 13 
5.3.4 Sidner•s geµergl theQ£y. In another paper (Sidner 
1978b) Sidner describes a more general theory of focus whose 
relation to PAL is not explicitly stated. For example, for 
details of focus shifting one is simply referred to the section 
of Bullwinkle (1977b) on PAL's shift mechanism, which, as we 
saw, is inadequate for the general case. one can't tell if 
Sidner intends that PAL's mechanism be part of her general 
theory, or merely makes the reference as a stopgap. 
Her theory is based on Grosz's system, but does not rely on 
a rigid discourse structure, nor does it suggest a knowledge 
representation for focus. However , Sidner does suggest 
(1978b:92) that a semantic association network should be 
involved as well. This would be used in determining CLOSELY 
ASSOCIATED WITH relations (Sidner 1978b:92), though she doesn't 
say how an acceptable closeness would be determined in the net. 
The net would be used instead of, or together with, the database 
------~------------------------
13 While presenting a paper at the first national conference of 
the Canadian Society for Computational Studies of 
Intelligence/Societe canadienne pour etudes d'intelligence par 
ordinateur, on 26 August 1976. 
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search, the search starting from concepts closely related to the 
focus and working outwards. When a reference's relationship to 
the focus requires inference, this too would use the semantic 
net, though we are not told if this is attempted before, after, 
in parallel with or as part of the database search, nor exactly 
how it would be done. 
Sidner is also concerned, in her general theory, with 
deciding whether or not a definite NP is generic. (Grosz did 
not attempt this, assuming all references to be specific.) 1• 
Sidner gives 
g::..9:mbig,¥Q.!!.§ NP 
non-generic 
some heuristics for determining whether a 
one that could be either generic or 
has a preferred generic or non-generic reading. 
She then points out that those NPs whose head nouns match the 
focus usually have the same genericity as the focus, with which 
they are coreferential. She gives these examples (1978b:91): 
------------------------~--~-~--
1• A §£ecific NP refers to a certain entity, a g~Qe£ic NP to a 
class of entity, but via a single member of the class. For 
example, (i) shows specific NPs and (ii) a generic NP: 
(i) When RoEs returned to his £ar, t~ ~heel§ were gone. 
(ii) Today we will discuss rare marsupials. First let me 
tell you about the gar~glek. 
Note that the second sentence of (ii) has a generic · reading in 
this context, but can be specific in a different context: 
(iii) Ross gave Nadia a narbalek and a bandicoot. First let 
me tell you about t~e narbalek. 
An NP may be attrib~tive instead of either specific or generic 
this usage need not concern us here . 
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( 5-13) I'm going to tell you about the elephant<1>. 
ele£hfil!tC2> is the largest of the jungle mammals. 
weighs over 3000 pounds. 
(5-14) I sent George an elephantC3> last year for a birthday 
present. The ~l~Bha~t<•> likes potatoes for 
breakfast. 
The underlined NPs are u-ambiguous without context. But since 
the focus of (5-13), "the elephant<1> 11 , is generic, so are "the 
elephant< 2>" and "he"; the focus of (5-14), "an elephant< 3 > 11 , is 
specific, and therefore so is "the elephant<•> 11 • The focus can 
thus be used to u-disambiguate such NPs. Unfortunately there 
are counterexamples to this; Sidner•s is (5-15): 
(5-15) Mary got a ferret<1> for Christmas last year. The 
ferret<2> is a very rare animal. 
"The ferret< 2 >" is so strongly generic that the specific focus, 
Mary's ferret, cannot override it, and "the ferret<2> 11 therefore 
does not refer to the focus. Hence genericity must also be 
checked at the sentence level before testing NPs to see if they 
refer to the focus. In 
top-down/bottom-up conflict 
other 
here. 
words, 
Sidner's 
there 1S a 
solution is 
apparently to first check whether an NP is overwhelmingly 
generic at the sentence level; if not, only then is the 
genericity of the focus used. 
genericity is suggested. 
No threshold for overwhelming 
Sidner•s general theory has a more complex initial focus 
selection mechanism than PAL; she refers the reader to her 
forthcoming thesis for details. 
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5.3.5 Concl~§ions. The shortcomings of Sidner•s work are 
mainly attributable to two causes: her avoidance of relying on 
the highly constrained discourse structures that Grosz used, and 
the limited connectivity of frame systems, compared to Grosz's 
semantic nets. Recognizing the latter point, Sidner proposed 
the use of an association network . in her general theory 
(1978b:87), though she does not say whether this should supplant 
or supplement other knowledge structures like PAL's frames. 
(Perhaps a synthesis, such as a network whose nodes are frames 
(cf Mccalla 1977), is the answer.) With respect to the former 
point, perhaps Sidner•s main contribution has been to show the 
difficulties and pitfalls that lie in wait for anyone attempting 
to generalize Grosz's work, even to the extent that PAL does. 
5.4 Webber'§ formalis~ 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, we saw approaches to 
focus that were mainly top-down in that they relied on a notion 
of theme and/or focus of attention to guide the selection of 
focus (although theme determination may have been bottom-up). 
An alternative approach has been suggested by Bonnie 
tNash~JWebber (Nash-Webber and Reiter 1977; Webber 1978a, 
1978b), wherein a set of rules is applied to a logical-form 
representation of the text to derive the set of entities that 
that text makes available for subsequent reference. Webber's 
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formalism attacks problems caused by quantification, such as 
those we saw in (2-5)15 that have not otherwise been considered 
by workers in NLU. 
I can only give the flavour of Webber's formalism here, and 
I shall have to assume some familiarity with logical forms . 
Readers who want more details should see her thesis (1978a); 
readers who find my exposition mystifying should not worry 
unduly -- the fault is probably mine -- but turn to the thesis 
for illumination. 
In Wenber•s formalism, it is assumed that an input sentence 
is first converted to a parse tree, and then, by some semantic 
conversion that anaphor resolution takes place. When the final 
representation, which we shall simply call a lggicaJ fQr~, is 
complete, certain rules are applied to it to generate the set of 
referable entities and descriptions that the sentence evokes. 
Webber considers three types of antecedents those for 
definite pronouns (IRAs), those for 11 one 11 -anaphora, and those 
for verb phrase ellipsis. 
which we will briefly look. 
----------~----------------..-~--
Each has its own set of rules, at 
15 (2-5) Ross gave each girl a crayon. They used them to draw 
pictures of Daryel in the bath. 
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5.4.1 Definite J2£Q1!0Uns. The antecedents for definite 
--.:-- -
pronouns are invokilli1 descr!2~ion2 (IDs), which are derived from 
the logical form representation of a sentence by a set of rules 
that attempt to take into account factors, such as NP 
definiteness or references to sets, that affect what antecedents 
are evoked by a text. There are six of these ID-rules;t& which 
one applies depends on the structural description of the logical 
form. 
Here is one of Webber's examples (1978a:64): 
(5-16) Wendy bought a crayon. 
This has this representation: 
(5-17) ("'lx:Crayon) • Bought Wendy,x 
(":1" is read "there exists".) Now, one of the ID-rules says 
that any sentences whose representation is of this form: 
(5- 18) (jx: C) • Fx 
where c is an arbitrary predicate on individuals and Fx an 
arbitrary open sentence in which xis free, evokes an entity 
whose representation is of this form: 
( 5- 19) e j ix: C x & F x & evoke S, x 
where ej is an arbitrary label assigned to the entity and i is 
the definite operator. Hence, starting at the left of (5-17), 
---------------------------~---
16 Webber regards her rules only as a preliminary step towards 
a complete set which considers all relevant factors. She 
discusses some of the remaining problems, such as negation, in 
Webber (1978a:81-88). 
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we obtain this representation for the crayon of (5-16): 
(5-20) e1 ix: Crayon x & Bought Wendy,x & evoke (5-16) ,x 
which may be interpreted as "e1 is the crayon mentioned 1n 
sentence (5-16) that Wendy bought". Similarly we will obtain a 
representation of e2, Wendy, which is then substituted for 
"Wendy" in (5-20) after some matching process has determined 
their identity. 
In this next, more complex example, (Webber 1978a:73) we 
see how quantification is handled: 
( 5- 21) Each boy gave each girl a peach. 
(¥x:Boy) (¥y:Girl) (:1z:Peach) • Gave x,y,z 
("¥" is read "for all".) This matches the following structural 
description (where Qj stands for the quantifier (¥xj € ej) where 
ej is an earlier evoked discourse entity, and! is the left 
boundary of a clause): 
(5-22) ! Q1 ••• Qn (:)y :C) • Fy 
and hence evokes an ID 0£ this form: 
(5-23) ei iy: maxset(lambda (u:C)l (~x1 € e1) ••• (~xn e en) 
• Fu & evoke s,u]) y 
(For any predicate X, maxset(X) is a predicate true if and only 
if its argument is the maximal set of all items for which X is 
true. Lambda is the abstraction operator.) 
already given us: 
( 5-24) e1 ix: maxset(Boy) x 
"the set of all boys" 
e2 ix: maxset(Girl) x 
"the set of all girls" 
Another rule has 
5.4.1 / 134 
and so {5-23) is instantiated as: 
(5- 25) e 3 iz: max set (lambda (u: Peach) [ (:ix e e 1) (~y e e 2) 
• Gave x,y,u & evoke (5-21) ,yJ) z 
"the set of peaches, each one of which is linked 
to (5-21) by virtue of some member of e1 giving it 
to some member of e2" 
Although such rules could (in principle) be used to 
generate all IDs (focus elements) that a sentence evokes, Webber 
does not commit herself to such an approach, instead allowing 
for the possibility of generating IDs only when they are needed, 
subsequent information such as speaker's depending on 
perspective. She also suggests the possibility of "vague, 
temporary" IDs for interim use (1978a:67). 
There is a problem here with intrasentential anaphora, 
since it is assumed that a sentence's anaphors are resolved 
before ID rules are applied to find what may be the antecedents 
necessary for that resolution. Webber proposes that known 
syntactic and selectional contraints may help in this conflict, 
but this is not always sufficient. For example: 
(5-26) Mary bought each girl a cotton T-shirt, but none of 
them were the style de rigeur in high schools. 
The IDs for both the set of girls and the set of T-shirts are 
needed to resolve "them", but "them" needs to be resolved before 
the IDs are generated. In this particular example, the clear 
solution is to work a clause at a time rather than at a sentence 
level. However, this is not always an adequate solution, as 
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(5-27) shows: 
(5-27) The rebel students annoyed the teachers greatly, and 
by the end of the week none of the faculty were 
willing to go to th~ir classes. 
In this ambiguous sentence one possible antecedent for "their", 
"th.e faculty", occurs in the same clause as the anaphor. Thus 
neither strictly intraclausal nor strictly interclausal methods 
are appropriate. Webber is aware of this problem (1978a:48), 
and believes that it suffices that such information as is 
available be used to rule out impossible choices; the use of 
vague temporary IDs then allows the anaphor to be resolved. 
5.4.2 ~on~~=an~Ehors. The second type of anaphor Webber 
discusses is the ~one"-an~h.Qf.17 By this, she means an anaphor 
that refers to a description rather than a specific entity 
section 2.5). For example (Webber 1978a:97): 
(see 
(5-28) Wendy didn't give either boy a green tie-dyed T-shirt, 
but she gave sue a red oge. 
Here "one" is either "T-shirt" or "tie-dyed T-shirt", but not 
"green tie-dyed T-shirt". 
Webber believes that the logical-form representation, as 
-----------------------~--~----
t 7 I feel 1111 one 11 -anaphor" 1.s a misleading (as well as clumsy) 
term, since a "one"-anaphor can be instantiated by "that", 
"those", "it", or 11 ~ 11 as well as "one". Perhaps Webber• s 
earlier term 11 descriptional anaphor" (Nash-Webber 1976) would 
have been better. 
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used above for deriving IDs , is an adequate representation from 
which such descriptions may be derived when needed by an 
appropriate reasoning procedure. She argues that this 
representation fulfils four desiderata: 
1 It must retain the structure of noun phrases as a unit 
(so that, for example, in (5-28) "tie-dyed" remains 
connected to "T-shirt" to provide a single antecedent). 
2 Yet it must allow decomposition of the description (so 
that, for example, in (5-28) "green" can be broken off 
"green tie-dyed T-shirt" when found inappropriate). 
3 It should allow identification of word sense, to prevent 
inadvertent syllepsoid/zeugmoid interpretations (so 
that, for example, (5-29): 
(5-29) *The ruler L• i.e. head of state] picked one 
ti.e. a ruler, i.e. a measuring stick] up and 
measured the lamp. 
can be flagged as anomalous).1a 
4 It must retain definite pronouns in both their resolved 
and unresolved forms (so that, for example, in (5-30) 
(after Webber 1978a:106): 
(5-30) I compared Ross•s behaviourist analysis of his 
mother with Daryel's gestalt on~. 
"one" is resolved as Ross•s mother, not Daryel's, while 
in (5-31) (after Webber 1978a: 106): 
(5-31) sue will pay up to seventy dollars for a dress 
~~e can wear without alteration, but Nadia 
refuses to pay more than fifty for .Q!!g. 
"one" is a dress that Nadia, not Sue, can wear without 
alteration}. 
Given this approach, the problem remains of determining 
-----~------------------------~ 
1e See footnote 32 of chapter 2. 
5.4.2 / 137 
when an anaphor is a "one"-anaphor and when it is a definite 
anaphor, as some pronouns, such as "it", can be either. Webber 
offers so me ten ta ti ve suggestions: 
of 
~ "That" and "those" are 11 one 11 -anaphors if and only if 
they are followed by one or more NP postmodifiers (such 
as a prepositional phrase or relative clause). 
2 An ellipsis can be used as a "one"-anaphor when preceded 
by an adjective but not followed by a postmodifer, or 
when preceded by a possessive, ordinal, comparative or 
superlative (with optional postmodifier). However, the 
problem of detecting the ellipsis in the first place 
remains, as structural ambiguities can arise (Webber 
1978a:116). 
3 "It" is problematic, but it seems to be a "one"-anaphor 
whenever followed by a postmodifier, and it requires as 
an antecedent a description of a unique entity in the 
discourse. 
Webber asserts (1978a:111) that only recency, independent 
discourse structure, controls the availability of 
descriptions as antecedents. I'm not sure that this is entirely 
correct. For example: 
(5-32) ?Ross drank the wine on the table. Meanwhile Nadia 
and Sue played cards on another ong next door. 
(5-33) ?Ross moved the wine on the table to another Q!!_e. 
In each of these texts an attempt to reference a recent 
description with "one" is ill-formed, or at best marginal. That 
is, not all recent descriptions are in focus. Are, conversely, 
all referable descriptions textually recent? The answer is 
probably yes; I for one have not found any counterexamples. 
Only descriptions explicitly present in the text are 
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available as antecedents in the approach mentioned so far. What 
of implicit descriptions evoked by the text, which are also 
referable? Webber divides these into three categories, and 
gives suggestions on the handling of each (1978a:118-124): 
1 Strained anaphora (see section 2.3.5). Webber suggests 
strained anaphora can occur with only a certain few words, and 
therefore can be handled by noting all such cases in the 
lexicon. I find this intellectually unsatisfying -- I'm sure 
there is a general principle lurking about waiting to be 
discovered -- but I have no better suggestions to offer. 
2 References to IDs evoked by existential quantifiers. 
For example (after Webber 1978a:120): 
(5- 34) Nadia gave Ross some cotton T-shir ts . The most 
expensive~ was too large, but the other on~§ fitted • 
The referents . in (5-34) are not just "cotton T-shirt(s)" but 
"cotton T-shirt (s) that Nadia gave Ross" . Two. ways of deriving 
these are suggested: either (a) the 11 one 11 -anaphors could be 
treated as above, referring only to "cotton T-shirt(s)", and 
these references are in turn treated as again anaphoric (cf 
section 2.4.2) and resolved as definite references to the ID for 
the T-shirts that Nadia gave Ross; or (b) the 11 one 11 -anaphors may 
be viewed as direct references to the ID. The latter has 
problems with negationt9 and blurs the useful line between 
tfootnotes continue] 
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"one"- and definite anaphors; the former requires great care 
with determiners when checking whether a resolved 11 one 11 -anaphor 
has turned into a definite anaphor. 
3 Abstraction of list elements. For example (Webber 
1978a.: 122-123): 
(5-35) 
(5-36) 
I have in my cellar a 1 76 Beaujolais, a 1 71 Chateau 
Figeac, a 1 75 Durkheimer Feuerburg and a 1 75 Ockfener 
Bockstein. Shall we drink the German oy~§ now and the 
others later? 
I know about Advent, Bose, AR and KLH, but about 
Japanese 011§§ you'll have to ask Fred. 
According to Webber, "ones" is "wines" in (5-35) and something 
like "speakers" or "speaker manufacturers" in (5-36). This sort 
of sentence varies in acceptanility (I personally find (5-36) 
ill-formed) and Webber suggests that the poorer sentences are 
exactly those where the anaphor occurs in an indefinite NP, 
requiring an explicit abstraction on the list to be carried out 
for use as an antecedent, whereas in sentences such as (5-35) 
"one (s) 11 can be interpreted simply as "member (s) 
just-mentioned list 11 .20 
--------------------~----------
of the 
19 "One"-anaphors can refer to descriptions of entities that 
don't exist in the discourse model and therefore don't have IDs. 
See Webber (1978a: 121). 
20 In my idiolect such a sentence is ill-formed exactly when 
this simpler interpretation of "one(s)" is not possible. Webber 
believes that the additional requirement that the list be 
composed of names, not descriptions, is necessary, and thus does 
not like this example of hers (1978a:124): 
(i) At the Paris zoo, Bruce saw a lion, a tiger, a 
tfootnotes continue] 
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5.4.3 V~ EQrase ellipsis. The third and last class of 
anaphor that Webber treats is verb phrase ellipsis (VPE) (in 
which she includes the pro-verb "to do") ,21 extending Sag•s 
(1976) theory of logical forms and VPE. A verb phrase may be 
ellided if its logical form representation (written such that 
the predicate of the sentence applies to the subject) is 
identical to that of some preceding22 VP, called the ellipsis 
trigger. 
r 
example: 
( 5- 37) 
(The antecedent is 
~ 
the deleted VP 
Ross gave Nadia a book. Sue gid ~ too. 
lambda (s) [Gave, s, Nadia, book] Ross 
lambda (s) tGave, s, Nadia, book] sue 
itself.) For 
Webber proposes that a syntactic variant of her 
abovementioned representation is adequate for resolving VPE, 
discussing (1978a:129-149) the requirements that it must and 
does fulfil, including the problems caused by negation and 
---~--~------------------------
giraffe, a hippopotamus and an elephant. It was feed-
ing time, and the carnivorous o~ were eating boeuf 
bourgignon, and the herbivorous ones, salad ni9oise. 
However, this is acceptable to me, and is amenable to the 
simpler interpretation. On the other hand, the list of animals 
in (i) is, in a very real sense, a list of names rather than 
descriptions . (Where is the dividing line between a name and a 
description?) It may therefore be that Webber's explanation is 
correct and that she has misconstrued her own example. 
21 Webber sees "to do" as a dummy verb sitting in the void left 
by a VPE, rather than as an anaphoc in its own right. 
22 Cataphoric VPE is also possible, but heavily restricted. 
Webber discusses it briefly (1978a:152). 
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sloppy identity (see section 2.6). 
The focus for VPE is then the set of all possible triggers 
in the logical form representation. Recency, with the 
additional constraints of sentence structure, voice, negation 
and tense, determines what is available as a trigger. When an 
ellipsis is detected, the appropriate trigger is sought; Webber 
discusses this and associated problems in (1978a:157-162). In 
particular, it is necessary to resolve VPE before definite 
pronouns, to avoid problems of missing antecedents (see footnote 
59 of chapter 2). 
As Webber herself points out, this approach only works 
where the trigger is textually similar to the elided VP. But 
this is not always the case. Recall texts (2-16) and (2-17) ,23 
for example. This type of VPE requires inference and/or 
alternative ways of looking at the text; Webber makes some very 
tentative suggestions on how this might be handled 
(1978a: 162-167). 
----~----------~---~-----------
23 (2-16) Nadia wants to climb Mt Everest, and Ross wants to 
tour Africa, but neither of them will~ because they are both 
too poor. 
(2-17) Ross and Nadia wanted to dance together, but Nadia's 
mother said she couldn't~-
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5 . 4.4 Conclusions. It remains to discuss the strengths 
and weaknesses of Webber's approach, and she herself (in 
contradistinction to some other workers) is as quick to point 
out the latter as the former . The reader is therefore referred 
to her thesis (1978a) for this. However, I will make some 
global comments on the important aspects relevant here. 
Webber's main contributions, as I see them, are as follows: 
1 The focus problem is approached from the point of view 
of determining what an adequate representation would be, 
rather that trying to fit (to straitjacket?) focus into 
some pre-existing and perhaps arbitrarily chosen 
representation; and the criteria of adequacy for the 
representation are rigorously enumerated. 
2 A formalism in which it is possible to compute focus 
elements as they are needed , rather than having them 
sitting round in advance (as in Grosz's (1977) system), 
perhaps never to be used, is provided (but compare my 
further remarks below). 
3 Webber brings to NLU anaphora research the formality and 
rigour of logic , something that has been previously 
almost unseen. 
4 Previously ignored problems of quanti~ication are dealt 
with. 
5 The formalism itself is an important contribution. 
The shortcomings, as I see them, are as follows: 
1 The formalism relies very much on antecedents being in 
the text . Entities evoked by, nut not explicit in, the 
text cannot in general be adequately handled (contrary 
to Grosz's system). 
2 The formalism is not related to discourse structure. 
So , for example, it contains nothing to discourage the 
use of "the table" as the antecedent in the •table' 
examples of chapter 4 . It remains to be seen if 
discourse pragmatics can be adequately integrated with 
the formalism or otherwise accounted for in a system 
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using the formalism. 
3 Intrasentential and intraclausal anaphora are not 
adequately dealt with. 
4 Webber does not relate her discussions of 
representational adequacy to currently popular knowledge 
representations. If frames, for example, are truly 
inadequate we would like to have some watertight proof 
of this before abandoning current NLU projects 
attempting to use frames. 
You will have noticed that contribution 2 and shortcoming 1 are 
actually two sides of the same coin it is static 
pre-available knowledge that allows non-textual entities to be 
easily found -- and clearly a synthesis will be necessary here. 
Another approach to coreference resolution attempts to exploit 
local discourse cohesion, building a representation of the 
discourse with which references can be resolved. This approach 
has been taken by (inter alia) Klappholz and Lockman (again 
herea£ter "K&L") (1977; Lockman 1978). By using only cues to 
the discourse structure at the sentence level or lower, one 
avoids the need to search for referents in pre-determined 
dialogue models such as those of Grosz's task-oriented dialogues 
(see section 5. 2) , or rigidly predefined knowledge structures 
such as scripts (Schank and Abelson 1975, 1977) and frames 
(Minsky 1975), which K&L, for example, see as overweight 
structures that inflexibly dominate processing of text. K&L 
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emphasize that the structure through which reference is resolved 
must be dynamically built up as the text is processed; frames or 
scripts could assist in this building, but cannot, however, be 
reliably used for reference resolution as deviations by the text 
from the pre-defined structure will cause errors. 
The basis of this approach is that there is a strong 
interrelationship between coreference and the cohesive ties in a 
discourse that make it coherent. By determining what the 
cohesive ties . discourse are, put each sentence in a one can new 
clause, it . into the appropriate place in or as comes in, a 
growing structure that represents the discourse. This structure 
can then be used as a focus to search for coreference 
antecedents, since not only do coherently connected sentences 
tend to refer to the same things, but knowledge of the cohesion 
relation can provide additional reference resolution restraints. 
Hobbs ( 1 97 8) in particular sees the problem of coreference 
resolution as being automatically solved in the process of 
discovering the coherence relations in a text. (An example of 
this will be given in section 5.5.2.) Conversely, it is 
frequently helpful or necessary to resolve coreference relations 
in order to discover the coherence relations. This is not a 
vicious circle, claims Hobbs, out a spiral staircase. (This 
helical approach to understanding also occurs elsewhere in 
artificial intelligence; compare for example Mackworth's (1978) 
Cycle of Perception.) 
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In our discussion below, we will cover four issues: 
1 deciding on a set of possible coherence relations; 
2 detecting them when they occur in a text; 
3 how the coherence relations can be used to build a focus 
structure; and 
4 searching for referents in the structure. 
5. 5 . 1 The first thing required by relations . 
-----.-. 
this approach is a complete and computable set of the coherence 
relations that may obtain between sentences and/or clauses. 
Various sets have been suggested by many people, including 
Eisenstadt (1976), Phillips (1977), Pitkin (1977a, 1977b), Hirst 
(1977b, 1 9 7 8 b) , Lockman ( 1 9 7 8) , Hobbs (1978) and Reichman 
(1978a, 1978b) .2• None of these sets fulfil all desiderata; and 
while Halliday and Hasan (1976) provide an extensive analysis of 
cohesion, it does not fit within our computational framework of 
coherence relations, and those, such as . Hobbs, Lockman, 
Eisenstadt and Hirst, who emphasize computability, provide small 
sets which cannot, I believe, capture all the semantic 
subtleties of discourse cohesion. Nevertheless, the works cited 
above undoubtedly serve as a useful starting 
development of this area. 
point for 
2• Reichman•s coherence relations operate at paragraph level 
rather than sentence or clause level. 
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To illustrate what a very preliminary set of cohesion 
relations could look like, I will briefly present a set 
abstracted from the various sets of Eisenstadt, Hirst, Hobbs, 
Lockman and Phillips (but not faithful to any one of these). 
The set contains two basic classes of coherence relations: 
expansion or elaboration on an entity, concept or event in the 
discourse, and temporal continuation or time flow. Expansion 
includes relations like EFFECT, CAUSE, SYLLOGISM, ELABORATION, 
CONTRAST, PARALLEL and EXEMPLIFICATION. In the following 
examples, "a" 1.s used to indicate the point where the cohesive 
tie illustrated is acting: 
(5-38) tEFFECTJ Ross pulled out the bottom module. 
entire ~tructure collapsed. 
a The 
( 5- 39) 
( 5- 40) 
( 5- 41) 
tCAUSE] Ross scratched his head furiously. 
Hoary Marmot® shampoo that he used had made 
unbearably. 
a The new 
it itch 
tSYLLOGISM] Nadia goes to the movies with Ross on 
Fridays. Today's Friday, a so I guess she'll be going 
to the movies. 
lELABOR!TION] To gain access 
remove the c0ntrol panel cover. 
and rock it gently until it 
mounting bracket. 
to the latch-housing, 
a Undo both screws 
snaps out from the 
(5-42) [CONTRAST] The hoary marmot likes to be scratched 
behind the ears by its mate, a while in the lesser 
dormouse, nuzzling 1.s the primary behaviour promoting 
pair-bonding. 
(5-43) tPARALLEL) Nearly all our best men are dead! 
Carlyle, Tennyson, Browning, George Eliot! a I'm 
not feeling very well myself!2S 
tfootnotes continue] 
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(5-44) tEXEMPLIFICATION] Many of our staff are keen amateur 
ornithologists. a Nadia has written a book on the 
Canadian triller, and Daryel once missed a board 
meeting because he was high up a tree near Gundaroo, 
watching the hatching of some rare red-crested snipes. 
(You may disagree with my classification of some of the 
relations above; the ooundaries between categories are yet 
ill-defined, and it is to be expected that some people will find 
that their intuitive boundaries differ from mine.) 
Temporal flow relations involve some continuation forwards 
or backwards over time: 
(5- 45) 
( 5- 46) 
VICTORIA - A suntanned Prince Charles arrived here 
Sunday afternoon, a and was greeted with a big kiss by 
a pretty English au pair girl.26 
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico -
major job here Sunday 
650 passengers from the 
Angelina 1auro. 
Travel officials tackled a 
to find new accommodations for 
burned Italian cruise liner 
a The vessel caught fire Friday while 
Charlotte Amalie in the Virgin Islands, 
passengers were ashore at the time.27 
docked at 
but most 
Temporal flow may be treated as a single relation, as 
Phillips, for example# does, or it may be subdivided, as 
Eisenstadt and Hirst do, into categories like TIME STEP, 
FLASHBACK, FLASHFORWARD, TIME EDIT, and so on. Certainly, time 
25 From: A lament ( cartoon caption J. Punchr Qr the LO!!dQl! 
charivari, CIV, 1893, page 210. 
26 From: The VanCQUV~r ~E£.§§S, 2 April 1979, page A 1. 
27 From: The V~l!COUVer §!2r~§S, 2 April 1979, page AS. 
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flow in a text may be quite contorted, as in ( 5-4 7) (from Hirst 
1978b); "a" indicates a point where the direction of the time 
flow changes: 
(5-4 7) Slowly, hesitantly, Ross approached Nadia. a He had 
waited for this moment for many days. a Now he was 
going to say the words a which he had agonized over a 
and in the very room a he had often dreamed about. a 
He gazed lovingly at her soft green eyes. 
It is not clear, however, to what extent an analysis of time 
flow is necessary for anaphor resolution. I suspect that 
relatively little is necessary less than is required for 
other aspects of discourse understanding. Temporal anaphora 
(see section 5. 6. 1) probably makes the stongest demands here, 
though the definitive set of temporal cohesion relations will 
probably be a superset of those actually required to resolve 
anaphors. 
I see relations like those exemplified above as 2£imitive§ 
from which more complex relations could be built. For example, 
the relation between the two sentences of (5-38) above clearly 
involves FORWARD TIME STEP as well as EFFECT . I have 
hypothesized elsewhere (Hirst 1978b) the possibility of 
constructing a small set of discourse relations (with 
cardinality a~out twenty or less) from which more complex 
relations may be nuilt up by simple combination, and, one hopes, 
in such a way that the effects of relation R1+R2 would be the 
sum of the individual effects of relations R1 and R2. Rules for 
permitted combinations would be needed; for example, FORWARD 
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TIME STEP could combine with EFFECT, but not with BACKWARD TIME 
STEP. 
What would the formal definition of a coherence relation be 
like? Here is Hobbs's (1978:11) definition of ELABORATION: 
Sentence S1 is an ELABORATION of sentence SO if a proposition P 
follows from the assertions of both SO and S1, but S1 contains a 
property of one of the elements of P that is not in SO. 
5.5.2 An exa~Ele Qf anaBhO£ r~solu1i2B usigg a £Oh~re!1£e 
relatio~. It is appropriate at this stage to give an example of 
the use of coherence relations in the resolution of anaphors. I 
will present an outline of one of Hobbs's; for the fine details 
I have omitted, see Hobbs (1978:18-23). The text is this: 
(5-48) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination. 
We want an NLU system to recognize the cohesion relation 
operating here, namely ELABORATION, and identify "he" as John 
and "the combination" as that of Bill's safe. We assume that in 
the world knowledge the system has are various axioms and rules 
of inference dealing with such matters as what combinations of 
safes are and knowledge ahout doing things. Then, from the 
first sentence of (5-48), which we represent as (5-49): 
(5-49) can (John, open (Bill's-safe)) 
(we omit the details of the representation of "Bill's safe") , we 
can inf e1:: 
(5-50) 
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know (John, cause (do (John, ACT), open (Bill•s-
safe) ) ) 
"John knows an action ACT that he can do that will 
bring about the state in which Bill's-safe is open" 
From the second sentence of (5-48), namely: 
(5-51) know (HE, combination (COMB, Y)) 
"someone, HE, knows the combination COMB to something, 
y II 
we can infer, using knowledge about combinations: 
(5-52) know (HE, cause (dial (COMB, Y), open (Y))) 
"HE knows that by causing the dialling of COMB on Y, 
the state in which Y is open will be brought about" 
Recognizing that (5-50) and (5-52) are nearly identical, and 
assuming that some coherence relation does hold, we can identify 
HE with John, Y with Bill's-safe, and the definition of the 
ELABORATION relation is satisfied. In the process, the required 
referents were found. 
Given a set of discourse cohesion relations, how may they be 
computationally determined in the processing of a text and used 
to build a structure representing the discourse that can be used 
for reference resolution? only Hobbs (1978) and Lockman (1978; 
Klappholz and Lockman 1977) seem to have considered these 
aspects of the problem, though Eisenstadt (1976) discusses some 
of the requirements in world knowledge and inference that would 
be required. In this section we look at Lockman•s work; a full 
description of Hobbs's program was not available at the time of 
writing. 
Lockman does not separate the 
recognizing cohesion, resolving references 
three 
and 
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processes 
building 
of 
the 
representation of the discourse. Rather, as befits such 
interrelated processes, all three are carried out at the same 
time. His contextual reference resolution algorithm (CRRA) 
works as follows: 
The structure to be built is a tree, initially null, each 
node of which is a sentence. As each new sentence comes in, the 
CRRA tries to find the right node of the tree to attach it to, 
starting at the leaf that is the previous sentence and working 
back up the tree in a specified search order (see below) until a 
connection is indicated. Lockman assumes the existence of a 
judgement mechanism which generates and tests hypotheses as to 
how the new sentence may be fea2 ibly cgng~cted to the node being 
tested. The first hypothesis whose likelihood exceeds a certain 
threshold is chosen. 
The hypotheses consider both the coherence and the 
coreference relations that may obtain. Each member of the set 
of coherence relations is hypothesized, and for each one 
coreference relations between the conceptual tokens of the new 
sentence and tokens either in the node under consideration or 
nearby it in the tree. (The search for tokens goes back as far 
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as necessary in the tree until suitable ones are found for all 
unfulfilled definite noun phrases.) The hypotheses are 
considered in parallel; if none are judged sufficiently likely, 
the next node or set of nodes will be considered for feasible 
connection to the current sentence. 
The search order 1s as follows: First the ifil~~diate 
context, the previous sentence, is tried. If no feasible 
connection is found, then the immediate ancestor of this node, 
and all its other descendents, are tried in parallel. If the 
algorithm . 15 still unsuccessful, the immediate ancestor of the 
immediate ancestor, and the descendents thereof, are tried, and 
so on up the tree. If a test of several nodes in parallel 
yields mode than one acceptable node, the one nearest the 
immediate context is chosen. 
If the current sentence is not a simple sentence, it is not 
broken into clauses dealt with individually, but rather 
converted to a small sub-tree, reflecting the semantic 
relationship between the clauses. The conversion is based 
simply upon the structure of the parse tree of the sentence and 
uses a table look-up. One of the nodes is designated by the 
table look-up as the head node, and the sub-tree is attached to 
the pre-existing context, using the procedure described above, 
with the connection occurring at this node. Similarly one (or 
more) of the nodes is designated as the immediate context, the 
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starting point for the next search. (The search will be 
conducted in parallel if there is more than one immediate 
context node.) 
There are some possible problems with Lockman•s approach. 
The first lies in the fact that the structure built grows 
without limit, and therefore searches in it could, in theory, 
run right through an enormous tree. Normally, of course, a 
feasible connection or desired referent will be found fairly 
quickly, close to the immediate context. However, should the 
judgement mechanism fail to spot the correct one, the algorithm 
may run a little wild, searching large areas of the structure 
needlessly and expensively, possibly lighting on a wrong 
referent or wrong node for attachment, with no indication that 
an error has occurred. In other words, Lockman•s CRRA places 
much greater trust in the judgement mechanism than a system like 
Grosz's (1977) (see section 5.2) which constrains the referent 
search area -- more trust than perhaps should be put in what 
will of needs be the most tentative and unreliable part of the 
system. 
Secondly, I am worried about the syntax-based table look-up 
for sub-trees for complex sentences. on the one hand, it would 
be nice if it were correct, simplifying processing. On the 
other hand, I cannot but feel that it is an over-simplification, 
and that effects of discourse theme cannot reliably be handled 
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like this. However, I have no counterexamples to give, and 
suggest that this question needs more investigation. 
The third possible problem, and perhaps the most serious, 
concerns the order in which the search for a feasible connection 
takes place. Because the first hypothesis exceeding the 
likelihood threshold is selected, it is possible to miss an even 
better hypothesis further up the tree. In theory, this could be 
avoided by doing all tests in parallel, the winning hypothesis 
being judged on both likelihood and closeness to the immediate 
context. In practice, given the ever-growing context tree as 
discussed above, this would not be feasible, and some way to 
limit the search area would be needed. 
The fourth problem lies in the judgement mechanism itself. 
Lockman frankly admits that the mechanism, incorporated as a 
black box in his algorithm, must have abilities far beyond those 
of present state-of-the-art inference and judgement systems. 
The problem is that it is unwise to predicate too much on the 
nature of this unbuilt black box, as we do not know yet if its 
input-output behaviour could be as Lockman posits. It may well 
be that to perform as required, the mechanism will need access 
to information such as the sentence following the current one 
(in effect, the ability to delay a decision), or more 
information aDout the previous context than the CRRA retains or 
ever determines; in fact , it may need an entirely different 
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discourse structure representation from the tree being built. 
In other words, while it is fine in theory to design a reference 
resolver round a black box, in practice it may be 
computationally more economical to design the reference resolver 
round a knowledge of how the black box actually works, 
exploiting that mechanism, rather than straitjacketing the 
judgement module into its pre-defined cabinet; thus Lockman•s 
work may be premature . 
None of these problems are insurmountable. However it . 1S 
perhaps a little unfortunate that Lockman•s work offers little 
of immediate use for NLU systems of the present day. 
5 . 5. 4 Conclusion. 
---,--------
Clearly, much work remains to be done 
if the coherence/cohesion paradigm of NLU is to be viable. 
Almost all aspects need refinement. However, it is an 
intuitively appealling paradigm, and it will be interesting to 
see if it can be developed into functioning NLU systems. 
The theories and approaches discussed heretofore in this chapter 
have been almost exclusively concerned with anaphors whose 
antecedents are NPs or other noun-like entities in 
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consciousness, and indeed this is where most of the interesting 
problems lie. However, as we saw in chapter 2, there are many 
other kinds 0£ anaphor, and in this section I would like to 
describe the focus that temporal and locative anaphors require. 
These are simpler than the nominal case, and I present what I 
believe to be a complete theory (i.e. one which accounts for all 
cases).2a 
-------------------------------
2a A note on methodology: 
In what I say below, I will make assertions like the 
following: 
(i) Linguistic phenomenon X occurs in English in exactly n 
ways: X1, X2, ••• , Xn. 
(ii) Linguistic phenomenon Y cannot occur in English. 
These assertions will not be proved, in the sense that a 
mathematical or scientific assertion might be proved, for they 
cannot be. So, when I say (i) or (ii), what I really mean is 
this: 
(iii) Although I've · thought about it quite _ a bit, neither I, 
in my capacity as a native speaker of Australian 
English, nor anyone else I've asked (if any), can come 
up with an example of well-formed English text in 
which Xp (p > n) or Y occurs. 
It is possible, therefore, that Xp (p > n) or Y may in fact 
occur in English, perhaps even rampantly -- the language after 
all is infinite -- but has managed to avoid my investigations. 
Maybe you, faithful reader, can easily come up with an example 
of Xp or Y. If so, I would be interested in seeing it. 
The problem here is that of the "boundary of language". 
Wilks (1975c) expresses the situation well: 
"Suppose that tomorrow someone produces what appears to be 
the complete AI understanding system, including of course 
all the right inference rules to resolve all the pronoun 
[footnotes continue] 
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66Rush on into the Aramis counter ••• 
now! Discover Aramis 900, the 
revolutionary grooming system for men. 
our trained Aramis consultant will take 
you through the 900 systems programmer 
first, after you recieve a complementary 
bottle of herbal after shave.29 ~9 
Linguists have 
spent considerable time analyzing time and tense, and in recent 
years a few AI workers have examined the problems of computer 
understanding and representation of temporal concepts and 
~-----.-.--------------------~---
references in English • . We know in advance that many ingen-
ious and industrious people would immediately sit down and 
think up examples of perfectly acceptable texts that were 
not covered by those rules. We know they would be able to 
do this, just as surely as we know that if someone were to 
show us a boundary line to the universe and say •you cannot 
step over this•, we would promptly do so. 
Do not misunderstand my point here: it is not that I 
would consider the one who offered the rule system as 
refuted by such an example, particularly if the latter took 
time and ingenuity to construct. On the contrary, it is 
the counterexample methodology that is retuted. 11 
Because language is inherently infinite, one cannot prove the 
non-occurrence of Xp (p > n) or Y by enumeration of all possible 
sentences. And, a fQrtiori, it is claimed by some (such as 
Wilks 1971, 1973a, 1975c) that a natural language cannot even be 
understood or generated by a finite set of rules; that almost 
anything can be understood by a human•s language system, 
provided it is accompanied by enough context or explanation. 
Thus a language understanding system cannot be refuted on the 
basis of a counterexample, provided its level of performance is 
by some criterion adequate, for a counterexample could be 
generated for $gy system we could ever possibly construct; and 
therefore we need special rules and recovery mechanisms to 
handle these counterexamples. While I am not convinced that 
[footnotes continue] 
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temporal reference in natural language (Bruce 1972; Cohen 1976; 
Kahn and Gorry 1977; Sondheimer 1977a, 1977b). 
workers have not considered temporal anaphora. 
Strangely, AI 
My discussion 
below will assume the availability of an understander for 
non-anaphoric temporal references. I will show that temporal 
anaphors -- the temporally relative phrases and certain uses of 
the word "then" that we saw in section 2. 3. 11 -- refer to the 
"temporal location" of the preceding text, and that discourse 
structure and topic have little to do with such anaphors. 
By the t~filEQr~l locatign of a text, I simply mean the time 
at which the actions being described take place. This time may 
be specified explicitly, as in (5-53), or not, as in (5-54): 
(5-53) After dinner, Ross retired to the bathroom with a copy 
of Time, while Nadia and sue played cribbage. tafter 
dinner] 
(5-54) Nadia ~ropped the orange down the chute, fervently 
hoping for a miracle. tthe time when Nadia, while 
hoping fervently for a miracle, dropped the orange 
down the chute] 
The text in brackets after each example represents its temporal 
location. 
Not all text has a temporal location. Some present-tense 
this view is entirely correct (I discuss it further in Hirst 
(1976a)), it is not unappealling. What it means to us for the 
present is that the method of argument expressed in (iii) is the 
best we can do here. 
29 Advertisement for David Jones• department store in: The 
Canberra times, 21 June 1977, page 1. Spelling, punctuation and 
temporal location are as supplied. 
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sentences are effectively tenseless in that they refer to "all 
eternity"; this case occurs, for example, when discussing 
abstract ideas, as in (5-55): 
(5-55) Some present-tense sentences are effectively tenseless 
in that they refer to "all eternity"; this case 
occurs, for example, when discussing abstract ideas, 
as in (5-55). 
Clearly, detecting tenselessness requires inference on the 
meaning of the text.30 Tenseless texts do not, in general, 
involve temporal anaphors, except when describing repeated 
actions over time: 
(5-56) on Saturdays at the Enver Hoxha Christian Gospel 
Commune, we always follow the same inspiring schedule. 
Reveille is sounded at six am, and the residents eat a 
hearty breakfast of hash-brown potato peels. The n~~t 
two hoJ!£s are spent in quiet meditation and prayer, 
and it is then that glossolalia sometimes occurs. 
The referent of any temporal anaphor is always the most 
recent temporal location of the text. For example, in (5-56) 
the antecedent of "the next two hours" is the time the residents 
have breakfast, and of "then" is the two hours of meditation. I 
have been unable to construct any well-formed text which 
violates this general rule.31 Temporal cataphors are not 
30 Some languages allow a lexical disambiguation. For example, 
in Spanish the verb "to be" is 11 ser 11 if tenseless and "estar" if 
not; compare (i) and (ii) : 
(i) Soy austr aliano. [ I am an Australian. J 
(ii) Estoy enfermo. t I am sick.] 
31 One possible exception occurs when two times are contrasted 
as in (i) : 
tfootnotes continue] 
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possible. 3 2 
The problem then becomes one of establishing a temporal 
location for the text. This is one aspect of the problem that 
Bruce, Cohen, and Kahn and Gorry, in the work cited above, 
approached, and it is not appropriate to discuss it here -- the 
interested reader should see the work mentioned -- except for 
two points: 
-----~--------------~--~-------
(i) Surely their plane is more likely to arrive on 
Tuesday than on Wednesday. If we want to meet them, 
we should go to the airport THEN. 
This sentence, in which "then" is stressed and intended to be 
temporally anaphoric, is acceptable only to a small proportion 
of informants, who understand "then" as meaning Tuesday. (There 
was no general consensus among informants as to whether or not 
(i) was either grammatical or meaningful. When I first tried it 
without the phrase "if we want to meet them", some informants 
understood the referent to be Wednesday and the intent of the 
speaker to be av2idin~ meeting the plane.) This could be 
another example of a case in which stress on an anaphor is to be 
interpreted as meaning "the intended referent is not the one 
this word would normally have•• (see section J.1 on the effects 
of stress and intonation). 
32 In Hirst (1976b) I described {i) as temporally cataphoric 
(and, a fortiori, as a prototype of the only possible temporal 
cataphor) : 
{i) #It was !hen, when sue had given up all hope, that it 
began to rain fish. 
I no longer believe this to be ca ta phoric. Rather, "then" here 
refers to the temporal location of the previous text, and the 
embedded clause is an expansion on that same temporal location 
rather than a cataphoric referent for 11 then 11 • When presented 
without preceding text, as it is here, (i) is not coherent, as 
it presumes a previous temporal context. This could be 
acceptable as a literary device at the start of a story (cf 
footnote 5 of chapter 4). 
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First, time tends to move forward in the discourse, as in 
this example: 
(5-5 7) Nadia filled the kettle, put it on 
busied herself with the task of 
suddenly, the telephone rang. 
the stove, and 
icing the cake. 
Although there are no explicit indications in the text, when 
reading it we have no trouble in deciding that the four events 
described took place one after the other in this order: 
1 Nadia fills the kettle. 
2 Nadia puts the kettle on the stove. 
3 . Nadia commences icing the cake. 
4 The telephone rings. 
The assumption of discourse cohesion implies further that these 
events took place contiguously (when viewed at a certain level 
of detail). This is the default case, and variations from it 
must be explicitly flagged.33 This means that the temporal 
location is constantly changing in text. Thus in (5-56), the 
referent of "the next two hours" is not six am precisely, but 
six am plus the time taken in breakfast plus some certain amount 
of time taken in relevant overheads (like getttng out of bed). 
(Kahn and Gorry attempt to handle the natural inexactitude of 
~~-----~----------------------~ 
33 If variations from the default are not flagged, the result 
is ill-formed; hence (i) sounds strange: 
(i) #I wanna hold you till I die, 
Till we both break down and cry. 
lFrom~ Hill, Dan. Sometimes when we touch. On: Hill, 
Dan. l&!!ger ~use. LP recording, GRT 9230 -1073. ] 
(One informant told me that they interpreted "die" 
metaphorically, and thereby restored forward sequential ordering 
to (i) .) 
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temporal reference with an explicit FUZZ element in their 
representation.) 
Second, topic is relevant to temporal anaphora only insofar 
as it affects temporal location; a new topic will usually have a 
new temporal location. But sometimes a temporal anaphor will 
explicitly refer across a topic shift to establish the new 
location by relating it to that of the previous topic. 
5.6.2 The focl!§ of locatiye a~fil!Qrs. The anaphor "there" 
and locative relations exactly parallel "then" and temporal 
relations in that they refer to what we shall (ambiguously) call 
(5-58) The Church of Scientology met in a secret room behind 
the local Colonel Sanders• chicken stand. sue had her 
first dianetic experience the~e<t>. A~ro§§ the §f£gg~ 
was a McDonald's where The Church Of God The Utterly 
Indifferent had their meetings, and Ross went ther~<2> 
instead, because of the free Big Macs they gave to 
recent converts. 
The referent of 11 there<1> 11 is the secret room behind the local 
---~~-------~------------------
3• Also parallelling temporal reference 
contrastive usage and the impossibility of 
Texts (i) and (ii) correspond exactly 
footnotes 31 and 32: 
are the problematic 
locative cataphora. 
to the examples in 
(i) 
(ii) 
surely they are more likely to go to Spuzzum 
Vancouver. We should wait for them T!lliRE. 
It was thg£e, where Sue had given up all hope, 
the pile of dead fish lay rotting. 
than 
that 
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Colonel Sanders stand, and the referent of "across the street" 
is either the secret room or the chicken stand -- there is no 
semantic difference.3s The McDonald's is the referent of 
"therec2> 11 • 
Determining a text's physical location is quite a different 
task from finding its temporal location, as there is no locative 
equivalent to tense in English {nor in any other language, as 
far as I am aware), nor does text automatically move through 
space as it does time. Determining physical location therefore 
relies solely on understanding locative references in the text. 
A complicating factor in doing this is that a text may have a 
separate "here" location the place where the speaker/writer 
is producing the text. This requires understanding the text to 
the extent of being able to determine whether a locative 
reference applies to the first person or not. For example, in 
( 5- 59) : 
(5-59) Ross is in Canberra, while I am in Vancouver. In July 
it is warmer here than there. 
one must be able to work out that "here" is Vancouver and 
"there" is canberra.36 
---~--------------~----~-------
3s This suggests the possibility of a similar text in which 
there i§ a semantic difference, and hence whose physical 
location is not uniquely determined. I have not, however, found 
a well-formed example of this. 
36 Text also has a "now" location in time which parallels its 
"here" location, and which an NLU system may have to distinguish 
from other temporal locations in the text. 
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There is, of course, no firm dividing line between the act of 
deciding what the candidates for an anaphor•s antecedent are and 
the act of deciding among them; it all depends on how much 
information there is to limit the possibilities during the 
search. We can imagine at one extreme a two-pass system which 
computes when necessary, or always maintains, a focus as we have 
discussed above, and then chooses among them when necessary, and 
at the other extreme a one-pass system which applies both focus 
and anaphor-specific constraints to each entity when looking for 
a particular referent. Combination approaches are also 
possible. I know of no evidence favouring one of these 
approaches over the others on theoretical grounds, nor is it 
clear when each is the most computationally efficient. 
So far in this thesis, I have tacitly assumed that in 
determining the candidates the focus -- we have no 
information about a particular anaphor occurrence, but are 
rather generating the maximal set of entities that some 
could refer to at the present point in the text. 
anaphor 
In this 
chapter, now, I consider the additional constraints imposed by 
having information on a particular anaphor that needs resolving, 
and the problem of default referents. It is unimportant to the 
present discussion at what point anaphor-specific information is 
used. 
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Many anaphor-specific factors have been discussed earlier 
in this thesis; in these cases, the reader is referred back to 
the appropriate sections. 
6.1 Gender and number 
While gender and number are strong constraints on reference, we 
saw in section 2.3.1 that they are not absolute: a plural 
anaphor can have a singular antecedent, a feminine one a 
masculine antecedent and so forth. 
Linguists have discovered many syntactic constraints on 
anaphoric reference; see section 3.2.2. 
In sections 2.4.2 and 3.2.6, we saw how world knowledge and 
inference may need to be applied. 
l 
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Consider the following texts: 
In 
(6-1) Ross likes hi.§C 1 > beer and Daryel }lis cz > carrot juice, 
but Bruce swears by hisC3> Samoa Fogcutter (two parts 
gin, one part red wine). 
(6-2) Roger makes some great drinks at home. Ross likes 
hisC1> beer and Daryel his<z> carrot juice, but Bruce 
swears by hisC3> Samoa Fogcutter. 
(6-1) each "his" refers to the immediately preceding name, 
and in the additional context of (6-2), each refers to Roger. 
That each "his" 1.s dealt with in the same way, in a certain 
sense, is the not uncommon linguistic phenomenon ~£~llelisfil. 
Parallelism can operate at both the syntactic and semantic 
levels. Its effects are quite strong: there is, I conjecture, 
no context in which (6-1) can be embedded such that the "his"s 
aren't dealt with in a parallel manner (in which "his< 1 > 11 is 
someone in a previous sentence, "his<2> 11 is Daryel, and "his<3> 11 
is Ross, for example). 
Clearly, an anaphor resolver needs a knowledge of 
parallelism, although I am not aware of any attempt to formalize 
the phenomenon, let alone implement it. Note that parallelism 
is particularly important in resolving surface count anaphora 
{see section 2.3.2). 
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In section 2.6, when discussing the problems of ambiguous text, 
The preferred antecedent rule says "If you cannot decide on a 
single 'right' antecedent for the reference, choose from the 
uneliminated candidates the one that has quality X in the 
greatest proportion; if no candidate has significantly more of 
quality X than the others, treat the sentence as genuinely 
ambiguous". In this section, I will look at the nature of 
quality X, and will start by immediately prejudicing the 
discussion by giving X the name .Elgus_ibili:t_y. 
Let us first recall two potentially ambiguous examples from 
section 2.6: 
(6-3) 
(6-4) 
Daryel told Ross he<t> was the ugliest person he<z> 
knew of. 
The FBI's role is to ensure our cou~try•s freedom and 
be ever watchful of those who threaten it. 
The default interpretation of (6-3) is that Daryel is insulting 
Ross ("he<1> 11 = "Ross", 11 he<2> 11 = 11 Daryel"), rather than being 
self-critical ("he<1> 11 = "he<2> 11 = "Daryel"). This may be 
simply because insulting behaviour is more common than openly 
self-critical behaviour with respect to personal appearance in 
western English~speaking cultures. That is, an insult is the 
most plausible interpretation of (6-3), and the corresponding 
antecedents are chosen accordingly. Similarly, in (6-4), "it" 
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is more plausibly "our country" or "our country's freedom" than 
"the FBI" or "the FBI• s role". 
Moreover, Kirby (1977, 1979) has shown in psycholinguistic 
experiments that plausibility of meaning is a factor in the time 
taken to understand a structurally ambiguous sentence ~-
ambiguous sentences lacking a single, obviously most plausible 
interpretation take longer. This suggests that plausibility 
could also be relevant to ambiguous anaphors.1 
Plausibility differs from other constraints mostly in its 
weakness. For example, the gender constraints that make (6-5) 
so .bad: 
(6-5) *Sue found himself pregnant. 
can be broken in certain cases (see 2.3.1), but in most contexts 
is very strong and not really a matter of degree. Plausibility, 
on the other hand, is a matter of degree, and always requires 
evaluation relative to the other possibilities. 
Is plausibility the only factor (other than theme, of 
course) in assigning the default antecedent? Or conversely, is 
there a well-formed anaphorically ambiguous text in which a 
preferred antecedent exists but is neither the theme nor the 
-----------~--------~----------
1 It remains for someone 
experiment to test this 
section, on causal valence. 
to perform 
hypothesis. 
a properly controlled 
But see also the next 
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candidate that gives the text its most plausible reading? I 
have not been able to construct such an example, but am not 
willing to assert that none exist. If they do exist, they are 
probably rare enough for an NLU to ignore with reasonable 
impunity. 
The computational problem of deciding how plausible an 
alternative is, is extremely difficult. While it relies on 
knowledge of real-world norms, inference plays a part too. For 
example, one is unlikely to find explicitly in a knowledge-base 
grounds on which (6~4) can be resolved, namely: 
(6-6) If X guards Y, then it makes more sense for X to keep 
under surveillance all who threaten Y rather than just 
those who threaten x. 
Working out what "makes most sense" can involve an extremely 
complex and time-consuming process of generating and evaluating 
consequences. 
However, there is at least one form in which plausibility 
becomes computationally simple, and we shall examine this in the 
next section. 
one guise in which plausibility turns up is im~licit vgrb 
causali~ or causal valence. In a series of experiments (Garvey 
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and Caramazza 1974; Garvey, Caramazza and Yates 1975; Caramazza, 
Grober, Garvey and Yates 1977), it was shown by Catherine Garvey 
and her colleagues that the causal valence of a verb can affect 
the antecedents assigned to nearby anaphors. 
consider these texts (from Caramazza et al 1977): 
For example, 
(6-7) 
(6-8) 
Muriel won the money from Helen because §he was a 
skillful player. 
Ronald scolded Joe because h~ was annoying. 
People tend to interpret "she" in (6-7) as "Muriel", the first 
NP of the sentence, and "he" in (6-8) as "Joe", the second NP. 
In general, with sentences of the form: 
(6-9) NPl VERBed NP2 because {he I she) ••• 
(where both NP1 and NP2 are of the same gender as the pronoun) 
there is a distinct tendency for people to construct and 
interpret the sentence such that the pronoun refers to NPl in 
the case of some verbs, and NP2 in the case of some others. 
(Some verbs are neutral.) Tne strength of this tendency is the 
verb's causal valence. 
Garvey et al (1975) determined the causal valence of a 
number of verbs by asking subjects to complete sentence 
fragments in the form of (6-9) with a suitable reason for the 
action described therein; to distract them from the potential 
ambiguity, subjects were told that the experiment was about 
people's motivations, and apparently the subjects performed the 
task unaware of the ambiguity. For each verb, the proportion of 
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responses favouring NP2 as the referent was defined to be its 
causal valence. In a subsequent experiment (Caramazza et al 
1977) it was found that subjects took longer to comprehend 
sentences such as this: 
( 6- 1 0) Patricia won the money from Janet because she was a 
careless player. 
where semantics force an interpretation contrary to the usual 
causal valence of the verb. 
We can see that if an NLU system had the implicit causality 
of each verb marked in its lexicon, this information could be 
used to help find the preferred antecedent in potentially 
ambiguous cases.2 
The phenomenon of causal valence may be explained as simply 
being a special effect of plausibility. The causal valence data 
in Garvey et al (1975), Caramazza et al (1977) and Grober, 
Beardsley and Caramazza (1978) suggest that verbs with an NP2 
bias are exactly those describing an action normally performed 
in response to an external cause, while NP1-biased verbs 
describe an initiating action. 
So, for example, in (6-11), where the verb is NP1-biased: 
----~----------~--------------~ 
2 The similar constraints which verbs 
experience place on anaphors could also 
Springston (1976) and Caramazza et al (1977). 
of 
be 
introspective 
included; see 
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(6-11) Ross apologized to Daryel because he ••• 
it is most likely that Ross has initiated the action-· the 
cause lies with him -- and so he is the actor in the subordinate 
clause, and hence in turn probably the referent of its surface 
subject. On the other hand, in the case of (6-12) with an 
NP2-biased verb: 
(6 ... 12.) Ross scold-ed Daryel because he ••• 
it is most likely that Ross is responding to something Daryel 
has done, and hence the cause lies with Daryel. It follows that 
a text like (6-13), in which it is hard to determine the 
initiator with any confidence, is more ambiguous than one in 
which there is an actor who is clearly the initiator: 
(6-13) Ross telephoned Daryel because he wanted an apology. 
Unfortunately, the nice computability of implicit causality 
does not seem to generalize; with the exception of 
interrogativization (Garvey et al 1975) and certain strong modal 
verbs (Grober et al 1978), most linguistic variations on the 
"pure" form of (6-9), such as negation, passivization or the use 
of "but" instead of "because", tend to attenuate the effect of 
NP2-biased verbs, moving them towards NP1. It is possible that 
analogous measures may be found that apply in different contexts 
from (6-9). However, unless these contexts are rather general, 
such measures are of little use; indeed, one wonders if enough 
sentences of the form of (6-9) are ever encountered to make the 
inclusion of implicit causality in an NLU system a worthwhile 
endeavour. 
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6.7 Semantic distance 
To check for the possibility of an antecedent being 
non-identically related to a referent (see section 2.4.2), the 
distance between the referent and its candidate 
....---~---
antecedents needs to be considered. The semantic distance 
between two concepts or entities is simply a metric of how 
11 si milar" they are. If a candidate is within a certain 
threshold semantic distance of the referent, then the 
possibility that it is an antecedent must be considered. 
How to compute a semantic distance and set a threshold are 
major research problems that underlie much of the research in 
anaphora understanding. In sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 we saw 
approaches in which a knowledge representation was used to 
provide a measure of semantic distance. However, as we saw in 
2.4.2, computing the semantic distance relationship may involve 
complex inference, and no-one has yet attempted a general 
solution. 
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This chapter . J..S a miscellany. In the first three sections, I 
discuss some residual points and issues raised by the previous 
chapters. I then list some of the interesting problems that 
remain, and conclude with some appropriate remarks. 
In spoken English, vocal stress can be used to change the 
intended referent of an anaphor. For example, in this sentence 
(with normal stress) Ross gives Daryel both the measles and the 
mumps: 
(7-1) Ross gave Daryel the measles, and then hg gave hi! the 
mumps. 
However, when the anaphors are stressed the meaning is reversed 
so that Ross gets the mumps: 
(7-2) Ross gave Daryel the measles, and then HE gave HIM the 
mumps. 
In effect the stress indicates that the referent of the anaphor 
is not the one you would normally choose but rather the next 
choice. 
The principle may explain why (2-52)1 works. If "one~" 
----~--~------------~--~-------
1 (2-52) Ross is already a father THREE TIMES OVER, but Clive 
hasn't even had ONE~ yet. 
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were unstressed,2 it would clearly albeit nonsensically refer to 
"father 11. The stress indicates that a different referent must 
be found, and the only place another referent can be found is 
"inside" the anaphoric island "father". 
For more discussion of the relationship between anaphora 
and intonation, see Akmajian and Jackendoff (1970) and Akmajian 
(1973). 
7.2.1 Introduction. 
-,---------
Although much effort has been 
expended towards the understanding of natural language by 
computer, relatively little work has been done on the converse 
problem of generating a surface text from some internal meaning 
representation. such generation is however necessary, for 
example in machine translation systems that use a language-
independent intermediate representation. 
Among the many unresolved issues in language generation is 
how best to describe an entity, and to what extent, including 
anaphorization, the description may be abbreviated. For 
-------------------------------
2 Note here the interesting concept of stressing an ellipsis. 
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example, consider (7-3) and (7-4) (based on an example from 
McDonald (1978b:69)), which are intended to convey the same 
message: 
(7-3) 
(7-4) 
Because of the Sangrail crisis, Ross asked Daryel to 
cancel his meeting with the Lesotho delegation. 
Because of the crisis resulting from the theft of the 
Sangrail, Ross asked Daryel to cancel Ross•s meeting 
with a delegation of people from Lesotho who had been 
going to inspect our taxidermy research section. 
The difference between these texts is that the first is designed 
for an audience familiar with the people and basic issues 
involved, while the second is not. The first might be spoken to 
a co-worker, the second to a stranger met a cocktail party. In 
each case, different descriptions are chosen for some entities, 
and (7-4) avoids a pronoun which is ambiguous without knowledge 
of the people involved, in this case that Daryel is Ross•s 
secretary who schedules his boss's activities. 
In its most general form, description formation is an 
extremely difficult task, requiring the speaker to have a 
detailed model of the listener. In practice, so far, designers 
of computational systems have not used such a model, nor even 
given much attention to the problem; Goldman's BABEL (Goldman 
1974, 1975; Schank, Goldman, Rieger and Riesbeck 1975), for 
example, apparently had only very primitive heuristics for 
description and pronominalization (though Goldman did address 
other important issues in the word-choice problem). Grosz 
(1978) and Ortony (1978) discuss some issues in generation of 
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descriptions. To my knowledge, the only study of anaphora from 
the viewpoint of computational generation of language is that of 
David McDonald. The next sub-section is a brief description of 
this work. 
7.2.2 stru£tgrgl cgnstraigt2 on 
McDonald (1978b) addresses the issue 
§~!?.§ggyent r~ference. 
of anaphor generation, 
which is more constrained by syntax and sentence structure than 
the generation of of initial reference to an entity . He 
describes how these constraints are used by a computer program 
which generates an English sentence from a tree representation 
based on predicate calculus. (For an overview of the program 
and the representation, see McDonald (1978a).) 
The generation process is done in one pass without back-up. 
(This mirrors people's inability to unspeak the earlier words of 
a sentence as they generate the later ones.) When it is 
necessary to make reference to an element, a list of message 
elements mentioned so far is consulted to see if the present one 
has been previously referenced. If it has, a set of 
pronominalization heuristics are applied. First come quick 
checks such as whether the element has been pronominalized 
before. If these are unable to decide for or against 
pronominalization, more detailed examination takes place, and 
the syntactic or structural relationship between the present 
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instance and the previous instance, such as whether they are in 
the same simple sentence or not, is computed. 
This relationship is then used by a set of heuristics which 
determine whether there are any nearby "distracting references" 
which would cause ambiguity if pronominalization occurs. 
Ideally, this requires a model of the listener's knowledge; for 
the present, McDonald's program relies on testing the "pronom-
inalizability" of the current element and possible distractors, 
and does not pronominalize if any distractor scores highest. 
Pronominalizability is measured simply as the weighted count of 
the number of pronominalization heuristics that apply to that 
element at that point in the text. 
If an element is not rendered as a pronoun, the program 
must find the simplest description which will distinguish it 
Often it is sufficient to use a from possible distractors. 
definite determiner, "the" or "that", with the head noun of a 
descriptive NP. See McDonald (1978b:70-71) for details. 
McDonald hopes to add pragmatic and rhetorical 
considerations to his program. This would include using the 
notion of a focus or theme, pronominalization of which would 
usually be obligatory. 
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7.2.3 Conclusion. Research in anaphor generation 1.S 
lagging behind that in anaphor understanding, and this is 
perhaps not surprising. A properly generated anaphor is one 
that may be quickly and easily understood, suggesting that the 
generator needs to consider how its audience will resolve the 
anaphor . It follows that the development of a proper anaphor 
generation system will require first the development of a full 
anaphor Lesolution system . 
A persistent theme that has kept resurfacing throughout this 
thesis is the problem of knowing whether or not a sentence is 
well-formed. I have complained about texts alleged to prove 
points about the English language which are probably not English 
at all (see footnote 8 of chapter 4), and about feeble attempts 
(my own included) to avoid this problem merely by verifying 
texts with a couple of readily-available informants. 
It seems to me that nothing short of psychological testing 
is adequate to determine the relative well-formedness of a text 
about which there is even the slightest doubt. Language 1.s, 
after all, a psychological phenomenon, and surely no-one 1.n 
these modern times believes that well-formedness is a binary 
value engraved indelibly on a text and known to every competent 
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speaker of the language. In fact well-formedness is a matter of 
degree, and no two people speak exactly the same language. It 
follows, therefore, that a well-formedness judgement, if 
meaningful at all, must represent the unbiased consensus of a 
number of speakers of the language. 
Since the demand characteristics (Orne 1962) of informal 
enquiries will bias the results, it is necessary to obtain other 
people's judgements in a formal experiment, well controlled for 
influences that could bias subjects. This kind of experiment is 
well known in psycholinguistics; one example that we•ve already 
seen was in determining the causal valence of some verbs (see 
section 6.6). It is often claimed that linguistics 1s just a 
branch of psychology. Artificial intelligence is too. And both 
linguistics and AI need to use the experimental methods of 
psychology to substantiate their claims about human linguistic 
behaviour, upon which their theories are based. 
What kind of experiment constitutes an adequate test of a 
sentence's well-formedness? I think that a simple speeded 
binary choice test would do: Subjects, told that the experiment 
1s to determine how fast people can tell if a sentence is 
grammatical and meaningful, are presented with test sentences, 
intermixed with distractors, on a display. They have to judge 
the sentence and press a YES or NO key as fast as possible. 3 
tfootnotes continue] 
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The proportion of subjects pushing the YES button would be a 
measure of each sentence's well-formedness. 
You will by now be wondering if I really think that such a 
procedure should be carried out for each and every "John can 
run" sentence used as an example in the literature. After all, 
you object, while there are undoubtedly dubious texts for which 
the procedure is necessary, we highly educated and literate 
researchers are expert at determining what a language community, 
our own at least, will accept. Every time we write a sentence, 
whether it be an example in a linguistic argument or not, we 
check it for well-formedness, with almost invariable success. 
so why shouldn't we trust our own judgements? 
My rejoinder to this is that determining the 
well-formedness of a text in support of a linguistic argument is 
not the same as determining the well-formedness of sentences 
used for normal communication. In the former case, one usually 
has the linguistic argument first and then works backward trying 
to find a text which supports the point and which contains no 
obfuscating factors. And then, as we have seen, it is all too 
easy to come up with an ill-formed text without being aware of 
it, even if that text 1.s as simple as, for example, (4-9). • 
----------------------~--~---~-
3 This experimental procedure has been used 
researchers in psycholinguistics. 
by several 
[footnotes continue] 
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Recall, too, that linguists• intuitions of well-formedness are 
different from those of normal people (Spencer 1973) and vary 
according to mood (Carroll and Bever 1978).s Even if the 
linguistic argument is inspired by an unusual real-world text, 
it is well to verify that this text is not unusual merely by 
reason of being subtly ill-formed. 
I do not, of course, expect a new experimental rigour to 
take linguistics by storm, even though I think most people would 
agree with my arguments, for most linguists have neither the 
facilities nor the inclination to start performing experiments. 
A useful compromise would be a service to which linguists could 
send the key texts on which their arguments lie for 
well-formedness testing for a moderate fee.6 7 
---------------------------~---
~ (4-9) John left the window and drank the wine on the table. 
It was good. 
s Moreover, I have occasionally been surprised by the poor 
linguistic abilities and/or minimal communicative competence of 
some of AI's "amateur linguists". 
6 World-wide franchises are now available. Contact the author 
for details. 
7 Nothing in this section is to be construed as belittling the 
important theoretical aspects of linguistics. One reader of a 
draft of this section suggested that just as experimental 
physics needs theoretical physics, so linguistics needs the 
important insights gained from theoretical work which cannot be 
supplanted by any amount of experiment. This is true. However 
theoretical physics has its theories tested by experimental 
physics. My complaint is that linguistic theories are often 
accepted without any attempt at experimental verification, and 
this is a Bad Thing . 
This is 
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i i Write a function TRANSLATE which 
translates the input from English to a 
LISP form. , 1! 
Alan Keith Mackwortha 
traditional suggestions-for-further-research 
section . 
the 
In it, I present some questions that remain 
unanswered, tasks that remain undone, exercises that the reader 
may find amusing . For each, the section number ( s) in 
parentheses indicate where in this thesis the matter is 
discussed further . 
The study of language and reference: 
• 
• 
( 1 . 1) 
( 1. 2) 
Is an implementation a theory? 
How do words denote concepts? 
• (1 . 1) Can we define a (domain- independent) Habitanle 
• 
English for database queries? (Habitable English is to 
grammar, semantics and pragmatics as Basic English is to 
vocabulary . ) Is there a simple formula, similar to 
those used to determine tne readability of a text, which 
could measure habitability without recourse to 
performing real-world experiments with the language 
subset? 
(3 . 2. 7) Write a book discussing issues in the 
-----~~------------------~-----
a Part of an assignment for third-year UBC Computer Science 
students learning LISP, 17 November 1978. 
• 
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relationship between the nature of language generation 
and understanding, and the structure of the human mind. 
(4. 2) How do oenologists communicate? 
• (5.6) Can natural language be understood by a system 
using a finite set of rules, or a finite set of rules 
for generating a possibly infinite set of rules? 
• (7.3) Write a critique of my remarks on the need to 
psychologically test the well-formedness of sample 
texts, presenting an opposing view. 
• (7.3) Buy a sample text testing 
the author, and see if it proves 
profitable. Has your service 
attitudes to sample texts? 
service franchise from 
to be useful and/or 
influenced linguists• 
Anaphora, anaphors and antecedents: 
• (2.1) Can the set of implicit antecedents that texts 
can evoke be formally defined? What may be an implicit 
antecedent, and under what circumstances? Consider 
especially antecedents for verb phrase ellipsis. 
• (2. 3.1) Formalize the conditions under which "same" can 
be used as an anaphor. 
• (2.3.2) Formalize rules for the generation and analysis 
of surface count anaphors. 
• (2.3.7) Come up with an elegant theory explaining all 
usages of the non-referential "it". Explain why 
sentence (iv) of footnote 38 of . chapter 2 seems 
ill-formed. 
• ( 2. 4. 2, 6. 7) What non-inf erred reference relations are 
possible? What is to be done about semantic distance? 
• (2.6, 6.5, 6.6) Investigate default antecedents. Are 
they affected by any factors other than plausibility and 
theme? How do they relate to verb causality? 
• ( 6. 4) Formalize 
parallelism. 
rules for syntactic and semantic 
• (6.5) How can plausibility of a candidate antecedent be 
efficiently measured computationally? 
• (6.6) Are causal valence data of any computational use? 
Can the concept of causal valence be usefully 
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generalized? 
• (7.1) In what ways can stress on an ellipsis be 
phonetically realized? 
Anaphora resolution systems: 
• (3.1.6) 
Prepare 
types of 
make it 
data for 
How may an anaphor resolver best be evaluated? 
a standard corpus of text, which includes all 
anaphora and reference both easy and hard, and 
available to people who want independent test 
their theories or systems. 
• (3.1.6) Beef up Hobbs's algorithm so that it works even 
more frequently. 
• (3. 2.3) Can an anaphor resolver do without heuristics? 
Focus and discourse theme: 
• ( 3. 2. 1) Should there be one large foe us set, or should 
focus be divided up into noun types, verb types, etc? 
What is the best such division? 
• (4. 1 passim) Define the concepts 
topic, comment, given and new so 
everyone will use your definitions. 
of theme, rheme, 
definitively that 
• (4.1 passim) How can the local and global theme of an 
arbitrary text be determined computationally? 
• (4. 2, 5 passim) What exactly ~ 
between theme and focus? 
the relationship 
• (6) To what extent should a focus be computed 
independent of any anaphor that needs resolution? 
Current approaches to anaphora and focus: 
• (5.1) Generalize the concept of secondary competence. 
Is there any psycholinguistic evidence that linguistic 
competence and/or verbal ability comes in well-defined 
layers? Are some people more prone to generating 
inconsiderate anaphors than others? Do such people 
actually find inconsiderate pronouns easier to 
understand than other people do? Could there be a 
consistently different model of language in such people? 
• (5. 1. 1, 5.1. 2, 7. 3) Test Kantor' s assertions about 
pronoun comprehension through experiments such as 
observation of readers• eye movements and/or reaction 
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time measurement. 
• (5.1.1) What factors affect the activatedness of a 
concept? 
• (5.1.2) How do we know when a concept occurs only as a 
descriptor and not "in its own right"? 
• (5.2.1) Are there other common sorts of dialogue which 
are as highly structured as task-oriented dialogues? 
How can their structures be exploited? 
• (5.2.2) How could Grosz's methods be applied to the 
resolution of pronouns? 
• (5.2.2, 5.3.3) Given a sentence in a vacuous context 
which sets up a theme or focus for the interpretation of 
subsequent sentences, how may this theme be discovered? 
That is, how is an initial focus determined? 
• ( 5. 2. 2, 5. 3. 3) Analyze and classify various clues to 
focus shift, and give rules for their detection. If 
more than one is indicated, how is the conflict 
resolved? 
• (5.1.2, 5.2.3, 5.5) Can 
generalized? 
Grosz's mechanisms be 
• (5. 2.1, 5.3) Is focus, the repository of antecedents, 
really identical to the focus of attention or the 
discourse topic? If not, under what conditions are they 
identical? 
• ( 5. 3. 2) How can a language understa.nder decide when a 
difficult reference can be left unresolved without 
engendering problems later on? 
• (5.3.4) What is the relation between the genericity of 
an anaphor and its antecedent? 
• (5.4.1) Formalize a 
intrasentential anaphor 
formalism. 
complete solution to the 
resolution problem in Webber's 
• (5.4.2) How may a 11 one 11 -anaphor be reliably recognized? 
• (5. 4. 2) Are all antecedents of 11 one 11 -ana phors textually 
recent? Under what conditions are textually recent 
descriptions not available as antecedents? 
• (5.4.2) Find the general principle by which strained 
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anaphors can be resolved. 
• (5.4.2) Under what conditions can list elements be 
abstracted into an antecedent for a "one"-anaphor? 
• (5.4.3) How may inference be used with Webber's 
formalism so that verb phrase ellipsis triggers that are 
not textually similar to the elided VP may be detected? 
• (5.4.4) 
addition 
provided? 
To what extent does Webber's formalism need the 
of discourse pragmatics? How could they be 
• (5.5) Can scripts or frames be made suitable for the 
understanding of free or deviant discourse? 
• (5.5.1) What is the "right" set of discourse coherence 
relations (a) for anaphor resolution, and (b) for 
general NLU? Define them rigorously. 
• (5.5.1) Can a set of primitive coherence relations for 
building more complex relations be defined? Be sure to 
give the rules under which the primitives may combine. 
• (5.5.1) What is the best level -- clause, sentence or 
paragraph -- to handle discourse cohesion? 
• (5.5.3) Is the search order for a node for feasible 
connection in Lockman•s (1978) CRRA always optimal? Can 
it lead to error? 
• (5.5.3) Can Lockman•s CRRA be sure all 
entities are considered? 
referable 
• (5.5.3) can the sub-tree of a complex sentence always 
oe determined syntactically? Look for counterexamples 
to Lockman•s table look-up procedure. 
• (5.5.3) Devise and implement a judgement mechanism for 
Lockman• s CRRA. 
• (5.6.1) How can the temporal location of a text be 
determined? 
• (5.6.1) Under what conditions can a tenseless text 
contain temporal anaphors? 
• (5.6.2) Is there a natural language that has a locative 
equivalent to tense? (May require field work.) 
• (5.6.2, 5.6.1) Is the "now" location of a text ever an 
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obfuscating factor as the "here" location sometimes is? 
Anaphora in discourse generation: 
• (2 . 2, 7 . 2) What sort of model of the listener does a 
speaker have to have for anaphor generation? What 
knowledge representation is appropriate for the model? 
Does the model have psychological reality? How does the 
model relate to Cohen's (1978) work on models of 
discourse participants? 
• (7 . 2) Should a discourse generator operate in one pass 
without back-up? 
• (4.1 passim, 7.2) Devise a generative grammar in which 
local and global theme are explicit elements in the deep 
representation . Use your model to construct a 
computational discourse generation program for a machine 
translation system. 
• (7.2) Devise a mechanism which uses an audience model 
in generating descriptions and anaphors in discourse. 
Integrate it into the program you constructed in the 
preceding exercise. 
7. 5 Conclusio.!! 
This thesis has surveyed the problem .of computational 
understanding of anaphora and attempts at a solution thereof. 
We have seen that an adequate solution to the problem will 
require the use of discourse pragmatics and the notion of theme 
to maintain a focus . We have further seen that a complete 
solution, in which all reference relations, including those 
determined by inference, are recovered is extremely difficult, 
and the surface has yet barely been scratched. The work that 
remains to be done will influence and be influenced by work in 
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linguistics and artificial intelligence. 
exciting time ahead. 
Anaphora buffs have an 
iiEnglish has no anaphors and the whole 
notion of anaphora has simply been a 
popular fallacy.·!!-' 
William c Watt (1973:469) 
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••I think, sir, since you care for the 
advice of an old man, sir, you will find 
it a very good practice always to verify 
your references, sir!f~ 
- Martin Joseph Routhl 
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